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I. Introduction
For more than a decade, the pace of product liability legislation in
the United States and in Europe has been brisk. Domestically, the
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Model Uniform Product Liability Act (MUPLA or the Act),1 as
adopted in some form by many states,' has been the principal engine
of change. The European Union's surprisingly parallel approach is
captured by the Product Liability Directive (the Directive), brought
into effect by national legislation in the member states.3
1. MODEL UNIFORI PRODUCt LIBnLITY ACT (1979) [hereinafter MUPLA].
MUPLA has been selected over its principal competition, the proposed revision of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which is slated to find its way into a Restatement
(Third) of Torts. For an exhaustive discussion of the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability, see Symposium, A Symposium on the ALI's Proposed Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1043-1454 (1994). My reasons
for selecting MUPLA over competing legislation and proposals are three: First, MUPLA
has been in place for more than a decade now, and many of its provisions have found their
way into the legislation of specific states. Second, it represents a more detailed and there-
fore more useful document, and expressly incorporates procedural reform, which the Re-
statement proudly eschews. Finally, valid questions have been raised about whether the
proposed Restatement of Product Liability is even deserving of the name. As Professor
Little has pointed out, the drafters of the Restatement, in attempting to define design de-
fect, have "abandoned this orthodox [riestatement approach [and have instead] esse-ntially
sought to limit design defect liability to cases involving proof of safer alternative designs."
Joseph NV. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict Llabt&y Actions
for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1189, 1193 (1994). The full text of
MUPLA is reprinted in RicHARD F. SCHADEN & VIC'rOWix C. HEU.LVN, PPODUCr DE-
SIGN LLAnILrr-, APP. A (198S).
2. By one count, thirty-eight states have enacted some legislation bearing on product
liability. These statutes have been collected and exhibit such rich variety that they are
beyond summary here. Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) vol. 2. MUPLA has been selected for
analysis because it represents a fair cross section of the reform statutes. By way of exam-
ple, states have: (1) limited the liability of nonmanufacturing sellers, see, e.g., COLo. RE'.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-402 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 6-
1407 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-621 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IowA CODE
AN. § 613.18 (West Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306 (1994); Ky. RE'V. STAT.
ANN. § 411.340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); MD. CoDE AtN-;.,0 [Crs. & JUD.
PROc.] § 5-311 (1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 1990); Mo. At.-m. STAT. § 537.762
(Vernon 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99 B-2 (1994); OHIO REv. CODE. Am. § '307.78 (Bald-
win Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (Supp. 1994); (2) expressly permitted man-
ufacturers to escape liability by proving that their product was the "state of the art" at the
time of its manufacture; and (3) have disallowed recovery for products that were moJified
after leaving the manufacturer, either by third parties or by the plaintiff. See James A.
Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 77 CORNm. L. RE%,. 1512, 1529 n.17 (1992). State laws also pose a host
of procedural hurdles for product-injured plaintiffs to vault before reaching recovery.
Common examples include statutes of limitation and repose, and modifications to the rules
of joint and several liability. Many of these provisions take their cue from MUPLA. See
discussion infra Part IV.
3. Council Directive 851374 of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regula-
tions, and administrative provisions of the member states concerning liability for defective
products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Directive]. A complete listing of the imple-
menting statutes with effective dates is set forth, infra, n.137.
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The similarities between the approaches extend to both underly-
ing philosophy and implementation. First, both MUPLA and the Di-
rective largely follow the civil law's tradition of attempting to blanket
a field through legislation so as to streamline, unify, and to some ex-
tent dictate the ensuing decisional law. Because of its obvious appeal,
this approach claims a number of adherents among those schooled in
the common-law tradition as well.4 Second, both legislative initiatives
impose strict liability for injury caused by defective products,5 but
then hedge that basic principle with significant limitations.6 Both also
impose statutes of repose,7 restrict the liability of nonmanufacturing
sellers,8 and recognize compliance with "state of the art" (or, as the
Directive has it, "development risks") as a complete defense.9
Although the statutes bear substantial similarities, it would be a
mistake to assume that these responses to the problems of defective
products have evolved from similar backgrounds. As has been em-
phasized in the zeal for reform currently barrelling through the
United States Congress, the domestic movement has largely been a
response to the perceived excessive costs of product liability litigation,
with its supposed attendant effects on the ability of corporations to
produce useful products and to compete in increasingly global mar-
kets. The Directive, on the other hand, was animated by the percep-
tion that member states' existing product liability law was unfair to
consumers and generally unfavorable to product liability plaintiffs.
4. This impulse among common-law scholars often finds voice in the demand for
"fixed rules of tort liability." Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIo ST.
L.J. 469, 469 (1987).
5. Directive, supra note 3, art. 1 (see infra subparts III.B.1 & 2); MUPLA, supra note
1, § 104 (see infra subpart IV.B.I(a)).
6. These restrictions begin with the very definition of defect. See MUPLA, supra
note 1, § 104 (B)(1); Directive, supra note 3, art. 6. For a detailed discussion of other
limitations on liability, see infra subpart III.B (discussing the Directive) and subpart IV.B
(discussing MUPLA).
7. Directive, supra note 3, art. 11 (imposing an absolute limit of "10 years from the
date on which the producer put into circulation the actual product which caused the dam-
age"); MUPLA, supra note 1, § 110 (creating a presumption rebuttable by clear and con-
vincing evidence).
8. Directive, supra note 3, art. 3, § 3 (exculpating nonmanufacturing "suppliers" who
"inform... the injured person... of the identity of the producer or of the person who
supplied him with the product"); MUPLA, supra note 1, § 105 (allowing exculpation of
faultless nonmanufacturing sellers unless manufacturer is unavailable).
9. Directive, supra note 3, art. 7, § e (defense that state of current scientific and tech-
nological development was such that the defect could not have been discovered); MUPLA,
supra note 1, § 107(D) (product seller not liable if it can prove that "it was not within
practical technological feasibility to make the product safer"). By the terms of Article 15,
member states are permitted to derogate from the Directive's state of the art defense.
[Vol. 19:1
1995] Limits of Product Liability Reform within a Consumer Expectation Model 5
These parallel projects in product liability law are significant and
will continue to have importance. An understanding of the history of
each undertaking can inform scholarly efforts and judicial decisions in
the field of products liability. Through a critical, narrative style, this
Article assays an historically grounded comparison of the two statu-
tory approaches and offers observations as to the nature of product
liability law and the requirements of justice that bear on all reform
proposals.
In searching out the requirements of justice, this Article argues
for two central truths about product liability. These truths, once rec-
ognized, can remove much of the mystery currently enshrouding virtu-
ally every area of product defect adjudication. The first of these is
that legislation should generally be limited to issues concerning the
conduct of litigation. As to such issues, legislative oversight can im-
part a welcome consistency and achieve a considered balance that is
fair to injured consumers and which also discourages unnecessarily
burdensome litigation. As to substantive issues, however, ex ante reg-
ulation is a mistake, especially if the legislation has dispositive effect.
Questions such as whether a product is defective, and whether or to
what extent the manufacturer should be liable for a particular "devel-
opment risk," should be answered by the courts, operating with the
benefit of a full factual record. Othenrise, substantive definitions and
rules leech from courts the flexibility and attention to factual nuance
that are peculiarly within their judicial competence.10
10. This position may appear contradictory to that espoused by Professor Henderon,
who has argued that issues of product design are polycentric and therefore beyond the
institutional competence of courts: "[P]olycentric problems are many-centerd problems,
in which each point for decision is related to all the others as are the strands of a spider
web. If one strand is pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will occur throughout the
entire web .... Because absolute [product] safety is not attainable . . . the engineer must
place relative values upon a multitude of factors. The decisions he must make regarding
these factors are as interrelated and interdependent as the strands of an intricate %cb,'
James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Cho.c:s:
The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLUM. L. RE-,. 1531, 1536, 1540 (1973).
Ultimately, Professor Henderson's argument against judicial intervention in design de-
fect cases is less absolute than it first appears. For one thing, he is careful to distinouish
inadvertent design errors from conscious design choices. id. at 1547-50, and acknoledges
that the availability of an external engineering standard in cases of inadvertence makes
such cases amenable to judicial resolution. Many of the examples adduced throughout this
Article, and where I argue that liability should attach, involve such inadvertent errors in
design. In such cases, as Henderson also notes, the peril is likely to be concealed from the
product user, and would therefore betray the consumer's expectation. Id. at 1549. Second,
Professor Henderson recognizes that cases involving bystanders, or in i hich there is a
readily available market alternative that other manufacturers are using, have properly re-
sulted in judicial regulation. Id. at 1565-73. Yet in the former class of cas es there is no
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The argument that courts must assume the primary role in prod-
uct liability grows out of the second "truth" that informs this Article:
analysis should focus on a product's marketing and representation,
and on the consumer expectation that such salesmanship creates.
Such a focus will develop naturally during the course of the adjudica-
tive process and will allow consideration of a number of case-specific
issues: how the product was marketed; how well the consumer under-
stood (or could have understood) any dangers it presented; whether
an alleged product misuse was one that the seller either could have
expected or actively encouraged; the alternatives available to the
manufacturer at the time of distribution and the costs of those alterna-
tives; the setting in which the injury occurred; and the kind of presale
scrutiny-by the manufacturer, the industry, and the regulators-to
which the product was subjected. It should be conscripted that these
questions, even those that seem outside the scope of consumer expec-
tation, should be adapted to the task of assessing those expectations."
particular reason to believe that the problems of polycentricity can be avoided. Third, his
position leads him to champion liability for failure to warn, since warnings are the way to
tell the consumer about the risks that the manufacturer has chosen to impose. Id. at 1558-
65. But the issues of which warnings to impose, and how such warnings are best communi-
cated, involve their own problems of polycentricity. Henderson tries to avoid these by
"assum[ing] that... courts will commit themselves to a rule of full disclosure regardless of
what might be described as indirect or secondary costs or consequences of such disclo-
sure." Id. at 1559-60 n.121. This assumption is naive, as the events of the past twenty years
have borne out. In fact, courts have been impelled to recognize that full disclosure is unde-
sirable, if not impossible. See, e.g., Liesener v. Weslo, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 857, 861 (D. Md.
1991) ("the manufacturer need not warn of every mishap or source of injury that the mind
can imagine flowing from the product"); Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prod. Co., 840 F.2d 935,
938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting the time and effort needed to grasp each warning, the court
states that "Itihe inclusion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every other item. Given
short attention spans, items crowd each other out.").
Perhaps most importantly, Professor Henderson's admonition to courts to not exceed
their institutional competence rests on the assumption that regulatory, and to a lesser ex-
tent, industry-imposed standards will achieve the proper market balance between safety
and risk. Henderson, supra, at 1555-57 ("governmental bodies.., are presumed to be free
from partiality or abuse."). As I demonstrate in subpart IV.B.1(c), infra, such an assump-
tion cannot be supported by the facts, even as to "impartial" regulators. A fortiori, inter-
ested industry standards should be afforded little weight. He does acknowledges that
regulatory and market failures will induce courts to adjudicate polycentric problems. Hen-
derson, supra, at 1578. I agree that regulatory efforts to create safe products are preferable
to judicial resolution, especially since well-engineered products will not injure consumers
in the first place. But, problems of polycentricity notwithstanding, courts cannot and
should not abdicate their responsibility to redress injury.
11. This approach borrows from that taken by Professor Marshall Shapo in his influen-
tial work, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function, and
Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974). His thesis is that
"[j]udgments of liability for consumer product disappointment should center initially and
[Vol. 19:1
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This representation-based, consumer expectation approach to the
law of defective products is a logical outgrowth of the position es-
poused as long ago as Justice Traynor's landmark 1944 concurrence in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.12 Where the consumer has no means
of self-protection, strict liability places responsibility for injury-caus-
ing defects upon the manufacturer, because it is best-positioned to
prevent the defect and can usually spread the costs of any injuries that
do occur. Of course, the considerations set forth above recognize that
in many cases, the course of communication between manufacturer
and seller is more involved than that of the paradigm latent manufac-
turing defect situation, where the consumer's helplessness is total."3
Those more complex cases, which now dominate the law of product
liability, capnot be decided absent the full-throated factual develop-
ment that is the special genius of the common law.
For the most part, this argument is developed incrementally,
through critical comparison of the Directive and MUPLA and
through the product-category analyses that follow.1 I hope this ap-
proach allows the Article's narrative structure to develop naturally,
and that this "prescription in action" approach not only suits the com-
parative nature of this piece, but will also fill a need, since thoughtful
and well-grounded pieces on what might be deemed "first principles"
principally on the portrayal of the product %hich is made.._ by the ellzr. This portrayal
should be viewed in the context of the impression reasonably raceived by th2 cansumer
from representations or other communications made to him about the proact." Id at
1370. Yet, in setting forth the "[considerations relevant to dccisionmakin- on the bmis of
this model," id., he includes such consumer-independent factor- a- "[tIhi j:ntihes that
the proposed decision would provide to make the product safer, [and] the Iihcl, eIect on
prices and quantities of goods [and services]." Id. at 1371.
12. 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Tramynor, J., concurring).
13. A necessary corollary of this position is that liability should alto attaclh C .n V.11ere
the product's dangers were unknowable at the time of sale. This '.ie:. ila- b:.n frcfully
presented in the recent article by Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I tif t KLrn U
(Even Though I Didn't): Why the Pro-De'fazdant Conscnsus on Wirmnq gL t is Iran:r, o1
TENN. L. REa. 1125 (1994). As he notes, few decisions ha.e gone this far Id. at I120 n32
(citations omitted). The question of the proper course of communications for c2a' inv olf-
ing unknowable defects is addressed infra in subpart VD. However, v.hre no information
is provided to those who are exposed to dangerous producti-as v:as o in the ab2stos
cases-liability should be (as it sometimes has been) strict. Id. See also Little, sunra nQte
1, at 1193-94 (criticizing the proposed Restatement's retooling of the d i-f dfect stan-
dard by noting that it "simply and neatly eliminates the concept of strict hahlity from
product design law. Gone is the notion that %where a product is dtcrmimJ , . to b
unreasonably dangerous ... a seller places such a product in the marlct at the seler's
peril.").
14. This latter approach has recently been taken by Marshall S. Shapo in Mvst,tLL
S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS LiABErr AND THE SEARCH FOR Jus-TicE (1993). c d. at 4 (exs
plaining his case study methodology).
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of product liability are already available. 5 In making this case, I take
a somewhat unusual approach. The Article begins with a brief discus-
sion of law-making in civil-law jurisdictions before the enactment of
the Directive. Part II is meant to serve two purposes. First, within the
specific context of product liability, an overview of the pre-Directive
law shows the emergence of the Directive from a background compar-
atively unfavorable to consumers. The second aspect of this discus-
sion is a more general consideration of the relation between the
legislature and judiciary within the civil-law context. The dramatic
gulf between the "folklore" of this relation and its practice illustrates
the danger of exhaustive legislative regulation, particularly in a rap-
idly changing area of law.
In Part III, I analyze the European Union's Product Liability Di-
rective. This discussion is preceded by a brief history of the process of
directive promulgation in general and of the Product Liability Direc-
tive in particular. Only thereby can the reader appreciate the limita-
tions that have compromised the Directive's promise from the start.
Part IV is something of a parallel exercise applied to the domestic
experience of product liability reform under MUPLA and consistent
state statutory reforms. Again, this discussion is energized by a brief
historical overview of the development of the product liability law
that has spawned such reform. Parts III and IV are largely exegetical,
intended to set the stage for Part V's critical assessment of the wisdom
of legislative responses to the problems of product injuries and prod-
uct litigation.
The mixed assessment rendered in Part V is developed by consid-
ering categories of products that either make for good paradigms
(such as manufacturing defects and crashworthiness problems) or that
raise issues that have often been considered unique (e.g., workplace
injuries and sale of pharmaceuticals). For each class of products, the
Article works through a series of cases-real and hypothetical-for
15. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: To-
ward First Principles, 68 NomE DANME L. REv. 427 (1993). Professor Owen's piece, and
the seminal work by Professor Shapo which constitutes an effective empirical brief on be-
half of the consumer expectation test, Shapo, supra note 11, are the principal inspirations
for the normative conclusions drawn throughout this Article. See also John B. Attanasio,
The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Products Liability,
74 VA. L. Rnv. 677 (1988); Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM
L. REv. 819 (1992); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353 (1988). As Professor Owen noted, the weakness and the
strength of the three articles just cited are the same: "[By] organizing products liability law
around a single moral pole, [they exclude] from consideration other perspectives ....
Owen, supra, at 433.
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the purpose of demonstrating both the likely practical effect of the
reform provisions and the extent to which the consumer's expectation
is or is not sufficiently valued by these competing regimes.
We begin with a compelling object lesson on the danger of over-
regulation.
II. Civil Law Treatment of the Law of Defective Products
The commentary on the Directive typically discusses the state of
product liability law before its effective date,16 and may also pause to
consider the Directive's elliptical path toward approval by the Euro-
pean Community, 7 before analyzing the language and implications of
the Directive itself. An effort to more broadly embed the discussion
within the civil-law tradition is seldom seen.ls I now proceed to do so,
not primarily for reasons of historical interest, but in order to high-
light some aspects of civil law that may be instructive in settling on a
proper hermeneutic and assessment of reform legislation.
16. TWo comprehensive books that focus on the Directive also discuss some of the
preexisting law. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES, PRODUCT LiAmBLrTm EUROPEAN LAws AND
PRActicE 3-8 (1993); GERArNT How LLs, COMPARATIVIE PRODUCT LIABILITY, chS. 34
(United Kingdom), 7 (France), and 8 (Germany) (1993). See also Frank A. Orban III,
Product Liability A Comparative Legal Restatement-Foreign National Law and the EC
Directive, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 342 (1978); Kathleen M. Nilles, Note, Defining the
Limits of Liability. A Legal and Political Analysis of the European Communtity Products
Liability Directive, 25 VA. J. INTL L. 729, 732-40 (1985); Donna Shettler, Note, Products
Liability: A Comparison of U.S. and EEC Approaches, 13 SYRAcusE J. IrT'L L. & Com.
155 (1986).
17. See, eg., Lori M. Linger, The Products Liability Directive A Mandatory Develop-
ment Risks Defense 14 FoRDHAM IN"L L J. 478, 479,83 (1990); Nilles, supra note 16, at
748-56. The entity that promulgated the Directive was the European Community and is
now called the European Union. This name change was accomplished at a meeting of
members in Maastricht, the Netherlands, on Dec. 9-10, 1991. Id.
18. There is at least one good reason for this, namely, not all of the nations that form
the Union have a civil-law tradition. This Article omits the product liability experience in
Great Britain for two reasons. First, to the extent that product liability law reflects com-
mon-law development, the United States experience, discussed in Part IV, infra, is of more
immediate interest; and second, searching analyses of pre-Directive product liability com-
mon law has already been accomplished. See Howt.us, supra note 16, at 51-S3. For a
spirited discussion of the effect of European unification on the British common law more
generally, see Colloquy, Can the Common Law of the United Kingdom Survive European
Unification?, 22 IDEA J. L. & TEcH. 171 (1992).
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A. Civil Law: Doctrine, Law, and Interpretation19
The syntax of the civil law is foreign to a common law lawyer. At
the risk of gross overgeneralization, the formal sources of the civil law
begin and end with the legislature: thus, constitutional law;20 national,
regional, and local legislation; and implementing regulations, consti-
tute the binding or "written" law. For reasons that are largely histori-
cal, "custom" '21 is sometimes considered another source of law.
Conspicuously lacking is judicial precedent, which historically has not
been regarded as binding.22 As we will see, this notion of the second-
class treatment of decisional law is to some extent a matter of folklore,
not of reality. Nonetheless, the implications of the stated hierarchy
have profoundly affected juridical business in civil-law countries.
These same implications can serve as a warning against taking too se-
riously the notion of legislative supremacy-an admonition perhaps
especially apt in the product liability field.
1. Historical Sources of the Civil Law
How did the civil law come to the position, curious from a com-
mon lawyer's perspective, that judicial decisions are without prece-
dential value? This question cannot be approached without some
basic understanding of the civil law's roots in Roman law.
In the late days of the fracturing Roman Empire, the Byzantine
Emperor Justinian commissioned a number of scholars to undertake a
codification, of sorts, of the "best" Roman law that could be found.
Their product, now referred to as the Corpus Juris of Justinian, or
simply as the Justinian Code, contained a number of sections, most
notably the Digests, which were summaries of decided cases; and the
Institutes, which made the Corpus Juris intelligible by "set[ting] out
19. I have borrowed this heading from Merryman's important three-part article on the
Italian legal system; his categories seem to me instructive in attempting to understand the
workings of the civil law. John Henry Merryman, The Italian Style I: Doctrine, The Italian
Style Il" Law, The Italian Style 1: Interpretation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 39-65, 396-437, 583-611
(1965-66) [hereinafter Merryman, Doctrine; Merryman, Law; and Merryman,
Interpretation respectively].
20. Not all civil-law jurisdictions have a formal, written constitution.
21. The meaning of "custom," and how it is pressed into service in the various civil law
countries, could be the subject of a treatise. One coherent explanation appears in JOHN P.
DAwsON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 417-24 (France), 440-45 (Germany) (1968).
22. See Merryman, Law, supra note 19, at 398. It can be argued that this statement is
somewhat out of date. If the jurisdiction in question has a constitutional court, for exam-
ple, that court's interpretation of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment bind both
the legislature, and in turn, subsequent courts. Id. at 400-01.
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the elementary principles of the law in remarkably perspicuous
order."23
Owing to a dearth of original source material, it is difficult to
know how accurately the Corpus Juris captured the spirit of the cases
it summarized.2 4 What is clear is that the Digests were highly abstract,
formalistic statements of authority-not too different from how one
imagines a digest today. As Professor Dawson has pointed out, the
Digests are riddled with maxims, inferred by the compilers from the
original decisions, and stated in a form suggestive of sovereign ukase.
These pronouncements, thought to flow from the ruler, were consid-
ered the only true source of law .5
Dawson can therefore state accurately that "j]udicial decisions
were merely examples 'n6 of the operation of legal principles. Thus
was born the tenet, waning today in the civil law, that decisional law
was without binding effect.2 7 Of course, the locus of official power has
since shifted from the sovereign to the legislature, but that change has
not improved the formal status of the judiciary.
The subsidiary position of the judiciary was reinforced from the
early twelfth century by the Glossators, legal scholars who resurrected
the Corpus Juris and then began an exhaustive process of exegesis. At
least initially, the Glossators did not critically examine whether the
positive law found in the Corpus was sound; as subjects of the much-
transformed Roman Empire, they accepted that they and all citizens
were still bound to follow its pronouncements?-8
The effect of their exegesis, however, was to belie this cardinal
principle of sovereign supremacy. Any text examined as microscopi-
cally as was the Corpus Juris was bound to acquire an interpretive
gloss that somewhat supplants the studied document itselfP9 The
23. Lecture Delivered at the University of Michigan (Nov. 16, 1953) an F.H. LVo,
A COMMON LAWYER LooKs AT THE CrVqL LAW 10 (1955).
24. It has been suggested that the Digests were inaccurate in this respect. S6e DAw-
SON, supra note 21, at 122-24.
25. ld.
26. Id. at 123.
27. See LAWsON, supra note 23, at 82 ("The ... distinction, between a Common Law
made by judges and a Civil Law made by jurists, has long been wearing thin."). Professor
Lawson then moves on to a discussion of the role of precedent in France, Germany, and
Italy, id. at 83-86, and concludes that its "force ... is pretty clearly greatest in France and
much less in Italy, which has a [then] recent civil code." Id. at S6.
28. See id. at 22-23. See also DAvsoN, supra note 21, at 127 (the Glo~sators
"[a]ccept[ed] the value of the whole and of every part.").
29. Professor Dawson makes this point graphically, in discussing the Glossators' treat-
ment of local custom, specifically acknowledged as a source of law in the Digests, but often
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Glossator scholars thus developed a growing reputation as oracles of
the law. The interesting result, which yet echoes throughout the civil
law, is a curious assignment of roles: the sovereign-today the legisla-
ture-is the sole creator of law, but requires the services of the legal
academy to interpret that law. The judge is assigned the lesser role of
application. He or she is the engineer, the applied scientist who is
called upon to follow the text, gratefully accepting guidance from
scholars who have made a career of studying legal text.30
Over the course of centuries, this reinvigorated Roman law mi-
grated throughout Western Europe. The Roman law was "received"
in certain places; that is, it became the law of a particular area. This
was certainly true in Italy,31 and there is some support for the view
that the same happened in Germany.32 In France, the Roman law
played a more significant role in some areas than in others.33 Even
where Roman law was received, however, it naturally accepted scions
of local customary law.
Local law thus became a hybrid of sorts. Local customs and mo-
res somewhat transformed the received Roman law, while still retain-
ing a common, Roman root. Therefore, when emerging nation-states
such as France, Italy, and Germany undertook to codify their laws
during the eighteenth century, the animating principles of the Corpus
Juris survived. For present purposes, the most important principles
concern the relationships between the legislature, the courts, and the
legal academy.
France provides the best illustration of how the impulse toward
codification of Roman law dovetailed with contemporary political ide-
ology. The French Civil Code, or Code Napoleon, which became ef-
fective in 1804, reflects both substantive Roman law and its underlying
assumptions. On a substantive level, the French Civil Code reflects
basic Roman law precepts of freedom of contract and the preemi-
in real or apparent opposition to express commands of the Corpus Juris. DAWSON, supra
note 21, at 128-34.
30. "[T]he ... judge [is relegated] to inferior status, as the operator of a machine
designed and built by scholars and legislators .... The tendency is to think of a judge as
just another kind of civil servant. Judicial appointment is not a reward for distinguished
academic or government service or for eminence in practice, it is not the crowning achieve.
ment, the ultimate recognition, that it often is in the common-law world." Merryman,
Interpretation, supra note 19, at 589 (speaking particularly of the Italian experience).
31. DAwsoN, supra note 21, at 125-26.
32. As Professor Dawson has pointed out, there is wide disagreement among German
scholars regarding the extent to which Roman law influenced German law; indeed, two
camps have formed over the issue ("Germanists" and "Romanists"). Id. at 176-85.
33. Id. at 263-66.
[Vol. 19:1
19951 Limits of Product Liability Reform Vithin a Consumer Expectation Model 13
nence of private property rights. These concepts served France as well
as they had served the Rome of the Republican epoch. The bourgeoi-
sie that arose after the French Revolution demanded, and won, pro-
tection of those rights most central to those with money but without
royal blood. 4
Further, the distrust of the king and of the parlements or royal
courts that were in his thrall found natural expression in the doctrine
of legislative supremacy. The legislature, as a democratically chosen
body, was to "speak the law." That task was not to be entrusted to the
judiciary.3"
One might therefore expect to find a highly detailed Code, one
that could supply solutions to every legal problem in advance. In fact,
the Code Napoleon is written in rather general terms. It is fiction to
state that a judge will invariably be able to discern the answer to a
particular legal problem by consulting the Code.26 Consistent with the
Roman law interpretation, the scholar soon began to fill that void be-
tween written law and the judicial task of interpretation. It might
even be said that the legal academy, practically moribund in 1804, was
reanimated precisely by the perceived need for such interpretation as
well as by the Code itself.37 Despite Napoleon's celebrated objection
to any interpretation of his Code,- s the reemergent scholar served the
national interest, at least in theory, by devising "correct" interpreta-
tions of the various provisions of the Code. Those interpretations, in a
sense part of the Code itself, were to supply any guidance the judiciary
might need when the language of the Code did not unequivocally de-
termine the resolution of a case.39 The Glossators had reemerged, in
different garb.
34. Id. at 382-86.
35. Id. at 403-05.
36. Indeed, Dawson has noted that the courts were called upon to -fill the great empty
spaces around the high superstructure of the Civil Code." Id. at 383.
37. Id. at 387.
38. Upon learning that the Code had been the subject of interpretation, Napoleon is
reported to have said: "My Code is lost." Id. at 3S7 n.5 (citing GAUDEMET, BASLEP.
STUDiEN, Vol. 8, 13).
39. Id. at 392-94 (noting that the great exegeses began in the 100's). Dawson has also
noted that relying on the scholar to defend the Code, and more generally the notion of
legislative supremacy, against all challengers eventually led to an unhappy solipsism. If
one's own interpretation of the Code was "correct" then by hypothesis comp2ting inter-
pretations were "wrong." Each scholar thereby becomes the sole oracle of truth. Id. at
395-96.
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2. Current Approaches to Doctrine, Law, and Interpretation
This conception of the workings of law in Code jurisdictions still
directs at least the formal business of the law. Thus, in France as well
as in Italy,40 even the pronouncements of the supreme civil court are
not binding on lower courts in subsequent cases, no matter how simi-
lar the facts might be.41 This result follows inexorably from the tenet
that only the legislature can make law; the courts just decide this dis-
pute between these parties.
Furthermore, in France and in Italy the decisions by the courts
are in much the same inscrutable form as the Digests of the Corpus
Juris. In France, a decision is presented in the form of a logical syllo-
gism in which a series of non-fact-specific "whereas" clauses are fol-
lowed by a "therefore" statement.4' Italian decisions are hardly more
illuminating.4 3 In a sense, the decisions in both France and Italy look
oddly like legislation. Again, it is largely left to the legal academy,
with some help from the practitioner, to organize and to interpret
these decisions so as to provide the guidance that litigants and courts
in fact need.
Germany's experience has been different. Interest in codifying
German law flared shortly after the Code Napoleon was introduced,
but the Germans took almost a full century to realize their goal of a
civil code. The Code, enacted in 1896 and taking effect on January 1,
1900, achieved a legal synthesis and formal structure that remain im-
pressive to this day.44
Despite its attempt at comprehensive regulation, the German
Civil Code proved no more capable than its Italian or French counter-
parts of predicting future developments that might have evaded spe-
40. The Italian Civil Code of 1865 was modelled closely on the Code Napoleon and
shared many of its assumptions as well as its basic structure. The revised Italian Code of
1942 moves away from the highly individualized notions of private property and freedom
of contract that were ascendant during the 19th century, and recognizes that other impor-
tant societal goals dictate limitations of individual economic liberties. These broader goals
are also reflected in the Italian Constitution, in effect since 1948. See Merryman, Law,
supra note 19, at 408-17.
41. Indeed, the decision by the French Cour de Cassation is not binding even on the
parties to the particular dispute before it; the court "quashes" (casse) the lower court's
decree, and remands the case to another lower court for disposition. Only after a second
hearing by the Cour de Cassation is the lower court bound to follow the Cassation's de-
cree. DAwsON, supra note 21, at 377-79.
42. l at 407.
43. Merryman, Interpretation, supra note 19, at 587.
44. For an illuminating discussion of these points, see DAWSON, supra note 21, at 450-
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cific codal regulation, and that would therefore require substantial
judicial creativity. Fortunately, the Code contained a number of more
general clauses, the plasticity of which allowed courts a measure of
regulatory power. Two examples of judicial willingness to regulate
will suffice.
The Industrial Revolution was in full swing by 1896, but the labor
movement did not attract substantial judicial attention until shortly
thereafter. Once claims began to be brought for what we might call
unfair labor practices, the courts were placed in a difficult situation.
The Code did not regulate labor matters. Therefore, the judiciary
faced a dilemma: it could either be a party to injustice, by refusing to
recognize that the complaining party had any rights-because no code
section seemed to cover the issue-or it could "legislate" by using a
more general provision to cover the conduct in issue.
The German court chose the latter approach. Section 826 of the
Code "had not attracted much attention in the drafting process,"45 but
was retooled toward the development of labor regulation. The clause
provides: "Whoever causes injury to another intentionally, in a man-
ner offending good morals, is bound to repair the injury." 4 '
The "good morals" language soon acquired a judicial gloss that
the drafters of the Code could not have predicted: "misuse of eco-
nomic freedom through profit-seeking exploitation was proscribed."47
That interpretation was then quickly pressed into service in the devel-
oping struggle between labor and management, where section 826
grew into a blueprint for detailed regulation. A sprinkling of holdings
illustrate this point: an employer could blacklist employees on strike
during a wage dispute, but not a lone employee, and not without a
strike; employee boycotts were permitted, but not if the employer was
disproportionately weaker, and not without affording the employer
fair notice and the chance to meet employee demands."
A still more dramatic example of "the flight into the general
clauses"4 9 was the court's treatment of section 242, which provides:
"The obligor is bound to carry out his performance in the manner
required by good faith with regard to prevailing usage." " It was the
45. Id at 461.
46. Id
47. Id. at 462.
48. Id. at 463-64.
49. Id at 475. This phrase was coined by Justus W. Hedemann in Jcrus W.
HEDEMLxNN, THE FLIGHT iNTo THE GENERAL CLAUSES, A DANGER FOR Lv.' ANo STATE
(1933).
50. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 461.
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complete collapse of the German mark in the aftermath of World War
I that triggered judicial resort to this very general language. The
courts began rewriting contracts that had been entered into before the
mark's decline, leaning heavily on the connected notions of "good
faith" and the "tacit presumptions" underlying every consensual
transaction. 1
The court's bold initiatives in the restructuring of debt bear the
earmarks of American judicial activism. The courts proclaimed them-
selves the equal of the legislature 5 and broadly stated that the codes
were inherently incomplete.53 The court also allowed the general
terms of section 242 to override a subsequent, more specific piece of
legislation that had seemingly precluded restructuring debt arising
from an original money loan. Even riskier, the court admonished the
legislature for considering legislation that would have expressly pro-
hibited the judiciary from continuing to recast money debt as it had
been doing: "The idea of good faith stands outside any particular stat-
ute or any particular provision of positive law .... Therefore the
legislator may not ... frustrate a result that good faith imperatively
demands ....
The judiciary won the ensuing public relations battle, with the
legislature acquiescing in the courts' continued restructuring of debt
on a massive scale.55 It is reasonable to suppose that the legislature
came to believe in individualized solutions to the equitable problems
of unwieldy debt structures, recognizing that legislative response
would be too blunt an instrument. Not surprisingly, public approval
of the judiciary's treatment of this difficult problem conferred great
respect on the courts. Further, the German Legislature in the imme-
diate post-World War I period was itself struggling for legitimacy to
the extent that a partnership between the courts and the democratic
lawmakers became necessary and evident.56
51. kl at 465-66.
52. "There are three sources by which private rights are created, the law of the parties
(Le., the concurring wills of the parties, legislation and judicial law (das richterliche Recht)).
The last of these stands fully equal in rank besides the other two . . . ." Id. at 469 n.29
(citing Juristische Wochenschrift 910 (Third Senate, May 26, 1922)).
53. "[It is not enough to speak of a 'gap' in legislation, for this is to assume] that all the
fullness and richness of life can be encompassed in a Code. That is impossible." Id.
54. lIt at 470.
55. In fixing a new value in particular cases, the court arrogated to itself the right to
consider the entire financial condition of the parties to the contract. In so doing, the court
was engaged in an ad hoc kind of redistribution of wealth. Id. at 471-72.
56. Id.
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Thus, just as the role of the French judiciary continues to be im-
peded by the antimonarchical circumstances under which the Code
Napoleon was drafted, the societal position of the German courts is
largely a product of the historical exigencies that spurred judicial in-
novation. One interesting corollary of this more prestigious status is
that German legal scholars do not generally question that judges can,
and do, make law. Since capturing the moral high ground by declar-
ing certain principles such as "good faith" supereminent, the courts
have not ceded their power to serve as the conscience of the nation-
For example, the constitutionality of enacted law often hinges on the
Constitutional Court's determination of whether the legislature has
been faithful to principles of natural law, which are given only sketchy
expression in the Civil Code and the Constitution.
These same historical differences are useful in explaining the style
of German judicial writing, which is not unfamiliar to those schooled
in the common-law tradition. Facts are developed, certainly more
fully than in France and in Italy, and "full and careful formulations of
doctrine ''Ss are common. If anything, German legal decisions are
more detailed than American or British opinions, reading "at times
like small treatises,"59 and relying more heavily on doctrinal writers
than we are accustomed. The decisions thus furnish useful guidance
to courts later called upon to resolve related issues. Indeed, German
legal scholars praise "the open legal development" that such factual
and legal detail allows;60 a court action can then be properly com-
pared to what has been done before and to overarching principles that
the decisional law should support.61
57. At least one scholar has argued that precedent has value in Germany not b2cau:c
subsequent courts treat it as binding law, but because, at least where "the decision e.-
presses a general legal ethical principle corresponding to an established or deQeloping gn-
eral legal conviction," the people develop reliance on the court's interpretation. Karl
Larenz, The Open Legal Development: Germany, reprinted in Ti RoLn oF JuDICIAL
DECISIONS AND DocrliN 133, 161 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974). Professor Dawon be-
lieves that "judges can and do make law," and that "the isue... is no longer seriously
debated." DAwsoN, supra note 21, at 495.
58. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 494.
59. Id.
60. This phrase was borrowed from Larenz, supra note 57, at 133.
61. Id. at 134-40. Larenz identifies central principles that courts can and have refied
upon in filling gaps in legislative schema: there arises an urgent need for a legal transac-
tion, the "nature of the thing" considered demands judicial recognition not afforded by
statute, or an overarching legal or ethical principle can only be served by reconizing a
given right. The natural law check on positivism is evident in this approach, as it is in
Larenz's further recognition that courts are sometimes compelled to actually rewrite leis-
lation for the same reasons given above. His caveat that this latter power should be used
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While principally intended to serve as a backdrop to analysis of
early Continental product liability law, the foregoing discussion also
makes a more general point about the danger of unchecked legislative
supremacy. Where the courts are "told" simply to follow the statute,
which is supposed to yield a predictable result, the danger is that the
statute's inability to anticipate particular facts may encourage either
unjust results, on the one hand, or strained-or disingenuous-read-
ings so as to achieve justice, on the other. These possibilities multiply
in those civil-code jurisdictions such as France and Italy that have a
heritage of underdeveloped opinions, because a later court called
upon to interpret the same provision lacks the benefit of a developed
legal record. Paradoxically, in these jurisdictions judicial discretion is
broadened rather than cabined.
In Germany, the United States, and Great Britain, more exhaus-
tive opinions, to some extent a product of the openly acknowledged
lawmaking role of the judicial branch, diminish but do not eliminate
the peril of legislative tyranny.
B. Pre-Directive Product Liability Law in the European Union:
An Overview
Before promulgation of the Directive, the development of prod-
uct liability law in the member nations lagged noticeably behind that
of the United States. Although the present section focuses on the sub-
stantive sources and effects of these differences, it should be noted
that broader, systemic differences between domestic and European
litigation have also figured significantly in the disparate development
of product liability law.62
sparingly, so as to husband political credibility for the undemocratic judiciary, has also
been articulated by the United States Supreme Court. See United States v. Carolene
Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (Court presumes constitutionality of regulatory legislation
"unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character
as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators.").
62. This split is between the United States and Europe, not between the United States
and civil-law jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, the losing party generally also pays the
winner's court costs, but as Christopher Hodges, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Eng-
land and Wales, has pointed out, this decision is subject to the court's discretion, and gen-
erally results in a reduction of costs by some 30%. HODGES, supra note 16, at 675-76. A
move to this position has recently been endorsed by the Republican controlled House of
Representatives, as part of its "Contract with America." This provision, which is certain to
face stiff opposition in the Senate-and a likely Presidential veto, if it gets that far-would
affect all federal trials. See HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE, COMMON SENSE PRODUcT LIA.
BILrrY AND LEGAL REFORM Acr, H.R. RP. No. 65, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1995).
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Unlike his or her American counterpart, the unsuccessful Euro-
pean litigant generally pays the other side's court costs and attorneys'
fees,63 thereby discouraging cases in which liability is less than as-
sured. Further, contingency fee arrangements are typically not per-
mitted,' thereby effectively barring less well-heeled injured parties
from judicial redress in all but the clearest cases.
Additionally, most nations show far less willingness, if they are
willing at all, to allow recovery for pain and suffering.65 The potential
for relatively large pain and suffering awards is thought by many to
encourage litigation, a conclusion that seems sensible. In addition, the
ready availability of state-funded health services reduces the incentive
to litigate, 66 especially where the recovery cannot be augmented by
pain and suffering damages.67
These initial disadvantages are multiplied through differences in
product liability law itself. Most centrally, the strict liability for defec-
tive injury-causing products that has been recognized, in one form or
another, in the United States for several decades was largely unknown
in the European Union before the promulgation of the Diective!"
As we have seen, civil-law jurisdictions at least nominally required
that liability be pegged to a specific code section. Not surprisingly,
tort and contract provisions were the most commonly invoked vehi-
cles for recovery. Inasmuch as the codes required negligence in order
63. See Orban, supra note 16, at 393.
64. The absence of the contingency fee arrangement coupled with the potential pay-
ment of legal fees to the opposition imposes a large financial risk on the European plaintiff.
Id.
65. Nilles, supra note 16, at 737 n.38.
66. See Orban, supra note 16, at 393. The author also suggests that in Europ.an coun-
tries lesser discrepancies generally exist between what can be recovered through courts and
what can be recovered under workers compensation, thereby further reducing the incen-
tive to litigate.
67. Inasmuch as these differences are not specific to product liability litigation, they lia
beyond the consideration of this Article. Yet these differences must be recognized and
considered before any kind of real uniformity of result can be achieved. For the reasons
developed in Part IV, such uniformity is a desideratum.
68. One enormous exception to this general principle is the German Pharmaceutical
Law of 1976 which imposed strict liability for injury-causing pharmaceuticals. Arznemit-
telgesetz [Pharmaceutical Act], Aug. 24, 1976, Bundesgesetzblattz, Teil I [BGBII] 2445.
Article 84 is the source of such liability, but the liability is limited in two significant re-
spects: First, the drug's harmful effects must exceed acceptable bounds, as determined by
relevant medical opinion. This requirement is intended to bleek suits alleging what
amount to relatively minor side effects. The second qualification is familiar enough to
American product liability lawvyers: the adequacy or presence 'el non of %%arnings is
judged against a negligence standard. See Nilles, supra note 16, at 740 n.57.
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to find tort liability,6 9 recovery was much less certain than in the
United States. 70  Contractual recovery was impeded by the same
pesky privity requirement that had dogged American product liability
law until the landmark decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.71 To place the Directive in context by pointing out the inadequa-
cies of the prior doctrine, I now proceed to a more detailed examina-
tion of these liability. Given this limited purpose, I have again chosen
France, Italy, and Germany as representatives of the kinds of treat-
ment received product liability in the pre-Directive era. Other juris-
dictions will be mentioned only as they reinforce or contradict these
examples.
1. France
France provides a most striking illustration of judicial creativity in
the face of legislative inaction and the stated principle of legislative
supremacy. At least one commentator has suggested that in France
the Directive may not provide the plaintiff with any recovery
that was not already available.72 This striking conclusion deserves
investigation.
Product liability law in France is governed by both tort and con-
tract principles. Articles 1382-86 of the Civil Code, particularly Arti-
cles 138273 and 1383,74 provide the source of tort liability. Inasmuch
as these sections, by their terms, require negligence as a condition of
liability, it seems that the Directive's strict liability would be wel-
69. Similarly, in England, recovery depended critically upon a showing of negligence.
For a thorough discussion of the state of product liability law in that country before the
Directive, see WARREN FRIEDMAN, 1 INTERNATIONAL PRODucrs LIABILITY 234-39
(1986). The issue whether to impose strict liability was the subject of investigation and
serious debate at the time that the Directive was first proposed. In light of that proposal,
however, the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury
in 1978 qualified its recommendation of strict liability with the wish that further considera-
tion of legal reform in the product area be deferred pending consideration of the proposed
Directive. Nilles, supra note 16, at 738-39.
70. Courts in France, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, and the United Kingdom have
eased plaintiffs' paths by allowing a presumption of negligence. However, the courts of
these countries "generally allow the producer to rebut this presumption by showing the
exercise of care." Nilles, supra note 16, at 735 n.27.
71. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
72. The same is true in Belgium, where the jurisprudence also derives from the Code
Napoleon. See HODGES, supra note 16, at 238-40 (Belgium), 316-26 (France).
73. "Any act whatever of man which causes damage to another obliges him by whose
fault it occurred to make reparation." CODE CIvL [C. Crv.] art. 1382 (Fr.).
74. "Each one is liable for the damage which he causes not only by his own act but
also by his negligence or imprudence." C. Civ. art. 1383 (Fr.).
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corned by injured consumers. In a flash of judicial policy-making,
however, the French Cour de Cassation, supported by the lower
courts, established an irrebuttable presumption of manufacturer negli-
gence; this approach effectively makes liability strict.7 - So much for
legislative supremacy. It is also worth noting that, in calling the pre-
sumption irrebuttable, the French judiciary has exceeded even the
early American approach of using res ipsa loquitur to establish an in-
ference of negligence.76
Proper plaintiffs under the tort sections, however, do not include
the buyer. Thus, the sections apply only to nonpurchasing third par-
ties, ranging from members of the buyer's family to remote bystand-
ers. The buyer must sue under the contractual sections of the Code.
Liability for breach is therefore strict, so that it might appear that
purchasing plaintiffs stand in virtually the same position as injured
third parties.
American product liability lawyers and scholars are well aware of
the theoretical "fit problem" with warranty law, as applied to personal
injuries caused by defective products. These limitations have been
duly recognized at least since Justice Traynor's opinion in Escola i.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co.77 First, there is a threshold problem that war-
ranty recovery might have been limited to recovery of the purchase
price or the replacement of defective goods. Similarly, even though
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)-for reasons having much to
do with the state of product liability doctrine at the time of the Code's
drafting-specifically extends to recovery for personal injuries, the
implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular
purpose can in theory be disclaimed.73 Further, the requirement of
prompt notice and the running of the statute from the date of sale can
75. See Shettler, supra note 16, at 171. See also Hans Taschner, La Future Respon.
sibilit du Fait des Produits Dgfectuem: dans la ConununautW EuroptCnne, 297 R CVUE DE
MAgcf CosUN 257,258 (1986) (in France and Luxembourg, and to a certain extent, in
Belgium, "la jurisprudence... a progressivement instaure []a rtsponsabilit6 objective de
facto] par le biais d'une pr~somption de faute irrefragable.")
76. The best-known example of the (mis)use of res ipsa loquitur in a defective pro'iuct
case is probably Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
77. 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
78. Again, this problem was anticipated by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial
Code, who provided that any limitation of liability for personal injuries is -prana fazte
unconscionable." U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1994). Since strict liability in tort was not then afa
accompli, the drafters of the U.C.C. extended protection this far. The discerning reader
will note that § 2-719 does not by its terms prohibit the seller from totally dizclaiming all
warranties, express or implied; courts have on occasion permitted such disclaimers Sce
Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tenn. 1974).
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trap the unwary consumer.7 9 Perhaps most importantly, locating re-
covery within the contract may have meant that the buyer had only a
remedy against the immediate seller, although the party who should
be sued is the manufacturer.80
Courts in the United States had, by degrees, eliminated most of
these problems by the time the principle of strict liability in tort was
finally judicially proclaimed in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.81 In fact, judicial willingness to overlook the formal structure of
warranty law in order to afford recovery to injured buyers82 spurred
Traynor's call for strict liability in tort; why bend contract law when, in
his view, sound reasons of policy supported tort liability?
The French courts have overcome most of these same hurdles,
sometimes with the assistance of the Code itself. Perhaps because of
continued deference to the structure of liability imposed by the Code,
however, the extra step of shifting to tort liability has not been taken.
As suggested above, the Code Napoleon is more generous to in-
jured plaintiffs than the Uniform Commercial Code. For example,
under the Code Napoleon, the statute of limitations begins to run
from the time of sale, but the limitations period is thirty years. 3 In
contrast, the comparable period under the Uniform Commercial Code
is four years. In addition, the courts have simply rewritten Article
1643, which parallels the Uniform Commercial Code in facially per-
79. These requirements have been somewhat eroded by case law in some jurisdictions.
For example, the New York Court of Appeals allowed the U.C.C.'s statute of limitations to
be overridden by the state's tort rule, measuring accrual from the date of injury. Victorson
v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 335 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1975). As to notice, courts have
either relaxed the requirement, as in Wojciuk v. Rubber Co., 122 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. 1963)
(informally notifying the seller that the tires had blovn out was sufficient), or have held it
inapplicable to a nonpurchaser. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 460 (Md.
1976).
80. The hedged language in the text is attributable to an ambiguity in U.C.C. § 2-318
(1992), which, depending upon which of three alternatives a particular state adopts, attenu-
ates or abolishes problems with horizontal privity in which the injured party is other than
the consumer/purchaser. Whether that section was also intended to affect "downstream,"
or vertical, privity is much less clear. Alternative C, the most liberal from an injured
party's point of view, extends a seller's liability for breach of warranty "to any person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is in-
jured by breach of the warranty." Is this text intended simply to extend liability further
across the range of nonpurchasers or to do away with vertical privity as well? The issue
soon became academic as the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), began an avalanche of decisions judicially abolishing
vertical privity.
81. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
82. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Lorenz, 173 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 1961).
83. See Shettler, supra note 16, at 170 n.136.
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mitting good faith exclusions of liability.. 4 Moving in step with Amer-
ican courts, the French judiciary has not permitted such exclusions in
practice. 85 Finally, plaintiffs have been permitted to proceed directly
against the manufacturer in spite of the lack of privity typical in a
mass-marketing situation. 5 Nonetheless, the warranty solution is not
wholly salutary; the notice problem, for example, has remained.,,
The Byzantine structure of French product liability law in the pre-
Directive era teaches more than one lesson. Most obviously, it is ben-
eficial to replace the unwieldy, bifurcated system created by the Code
and the judiciary with the streamlined approach taken by the Direc-
tive.'s Furthermore, the Directive's mandate to create implementing
legislation perforce ends legislative inaction-inaction that had
spurred the judicial branch to submerge the tenet of leZislative
supremacy in favor of achieving results it thought just.
2. Italy
Matters are considerably simpler for those injured by defective
products in Italy. Although both contract and tort provisions of the
Italian Civil Code can theoretically be used, in practice the restrictions
imposed under the Code's contract law-which the judiciary has not
been willing to ignore-make such a course fruitless. First, privity
holds fast: contractual liability is limited to the direct seller, and
nonpurchasers have no remedy even against that party.:) Second, a
difficulty with warranty law that American and French courts have
long since surmounted remains in Italy: remedy is limited to a reduc-
tion in purchase price or a rescission of the contract. -' Third, warran-
ties may be limited or excluded entirely."' Fourth, the time limits
imposed by both the notice requirement and the statute of limitations
84. Article 1643 states, in pertinent part: [The seller] is liable for lmhi n dfets.5
even though he did not know of them, unless, in such case, he had stipulaJc thate V.ou~l
not be obligated for any guaranty." C. Civ. art. 1643 (Fr.).
85. See HODrEs, supra note 16, at 320-21.
86. See Orban, supra note 16, at 34S, making the point that the French court; c2:-d
plaintiffs' paths toward recovery by not requiring succesive actions alon! t12 c112in of
manufacture, distribution, and sale.
87. Article 1648 of the Code states: -An action resulting from defect; cA an annullikn
character must be brought by the buyer within a brief delay according to the nature o~c the
defects... and the usage of the place where the sale v.as made." C. Cov. art i 4S FrI
88. Yet streamlining will not eliminate the need for judicial crcati.ity in fa-hio'mnZ
solutions along the complex spectrum of defective product casca+
89. See Shettler, supra note 16, at 167 n.104.
90. Id. at n.100.
91. Id. at n.101.
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will frustrate many claims. Absent contrary agreement, the purchaser
must inform the seller of a defect within eight days of its discovery,
and must bring all actions within one year of the delivery date. 2 Fi-
nally, and most surprisingly, the purchaser must prove that the seller
was at least negligent in not knowing of the defect at the time of the
contract. 93
While this contractual remedy may be useful to the disappointed
commercial buyer, it does not provide the kind of relief demanded by
those personal injury plaintiffs fortunate enough to come within its
coverage. The tort provisions of the Italian Civil Code, however, are
somewhat more generous: the basic tort provision enshrined in Arti-
cle 2043 imposes a general duty of care on everyone, which of course
includes creators of injury-causing products. 94 As is true in all juris-
dictions, plaintiffs must show that the product was defective and that it
caused injury.95
The Italian courts had generally been unwilling, however, to per-
mit plaintiffs to sidestep the high hurdle of demonstrating negli-
gence. 96 Although some courts had moved toward a "presumed
negligence" rule, the cases were in conflict, and no steady movement
in that direction was apparent. Another possible avenue of recovery
used in some cases was something close to the American position of
strict liability for dangerous activities. Nonetheless, the majority of
courts had not been willing to go so far.97
Despite their courts' professed deference to the legislative will, a
jurisprudence of product liability has emerged in France and Italy that
is only consistent with the relevant code to the extent that such consis-
tency suits judicial temper. This conclusion is especially easy to draw
in France, where courts have remade warranty law in the image of
strict tort liability. Similarly, at least some Italian courts have man-
aged to avoid the strictures of negligence, thereby compensating in-
jured consumers in defiance of codal prohibition.
92. Id. at n.102.
93. Id. at n.99.
94. Id. at 167-68 n.106.
95. Id. at 168 n.107.
96. Nilles, supra note 16, at 735.
97. The Italian Civil Code provides at Article 2050: "[W]hoever causes injury to an-
other in performance of an activity dangerous by its nature of by reason of the instrumen-
talities employed, is liable to pay compensation unless he proves that he has taken all
suitable measures to avoid the injury." CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] art. 2050 (Italy). Even if
applied, the section does not literally create strict liability, since the defendant has avail-
able the defense that he or she had taken "all suitable measures" to prevent the injury.
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3. The Federal Republic of Germany
In Germany9" as in Italy, restrictions against recovery under war-
ranty theory have driven those injured by products to the friendlier
shores hospitable region of tort law. While it is true that a proper
plaintiff may sue under both theories at once, since warranty liability
is strict,99 the advantages of suing under contract principles end there.
The seller can exclude liability;'00 there is a six-month statute of limi-
tations period;101 only those in privity of contract can sue;'C" and rem-
edies open to those plaintiffs able to negotiate the preceding obstacles
are limited to return, repair, or price reduction.10 3
Tort liability in the pre-Directive German Republic fell some-
where between that of France and Italy. Liability issues arose from
section 823(1), which requires compensation from anyone "who,
wilfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, free-
dom, property or other right of another."'1 4 Faced with a code provi-
sion drafted long before the emergence of product liability, the
German judiciary has compromised; negligence is required, but in-
jured plaintiffs benefit from a presumption of negligence which the
manufacturer must rebut. °' Plaintiffs are also assisted by an ex-
tremely generous statute of limitations-in most cases, thirty years.' 6
Again, the German judicial system, faced with code sections
never intended to solve problems relating to mass-marketed defective
98. I here discuss what was popularly called "West Germany," %%hieh was the reposi-
tory of the German Civil Code under discussion in the period immediately preceding the
Directive.
99. Section 459 so provides: "The seller of a thing warrants the purchaser that, at the
time when the risk passes to the purchaser, it is free from defects which diminish or destroy
its value or fitness for its ordinary use, or the use provided for in the contract .... The
seller also warrants that, at the time the risk passes, the thing has the promised qualities."
BORGERICHES GEsEZBUcH [BGB] art. 459 (F.RtG.).
100. Shettler, supra note 16, at 169 n.121 (citing Orban, supra note 16, at 352).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 169 n.120 (citing B. VON BRAuNSChiwEiG, A MANUAL OF PP.AcrTcE rN SE.
LEcrED NATIONS, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 7 (1981)). Consequential and un-
foreseeable damages may be available if fraud or misrepresentation by the seller can be
proven. Id.
104. BGB art. 823 (F.R.G.).
105. Needless to say, this presumption of negligence is of no help to plaintiffs Aho !sh,
or need, to sue some other party in the chain of distribution. It applies only against the
party who caused the defect. Shettler, supra note 16, at 169-70 (citing VoN BPAUN.
sci-iwEi, supra note 103, at 28).
106. The statute of limitations is three years where the plaintiff has kno.ledge of the
injury and the person who caused it. Shettler, supra note 16, at 170 (citing KLuWEP.-HAR.
RAP, PRODUCT LiABrIrY iN EUROPE 83 (1975)).
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products, has come up with a solution that gives little more than a nod
to the code. As we have seen, however, in Germany this creativity is
as likely to be admired as condemned, since the doctrine of legislative
supremacy is not rigorously followed, and scholarly and political as-
sessment of the courts' innovations centers on the merits of what the
court has done, rather than bogging down in complaints about unwar-
ranted arrogations of power.
In. Reforming Product Liability Law-The European
Community's Product Liability Directives
The present section undertakes an analysis of the Directive. Such
an analysis is important, not only to enable an understanding of the
Directive's provisions, °7 but also to understand the practical impact
that this ambitious attempt at reform is likely to have.
Preliminarily, some of the problems likely to plague the Direc-
tive's effectiveness are external to its text. First, although courts have
sometimes balked at their assigned second-class role, local interpreta-
tions of the proper relationship between the court and the legislature
may nonetheless make courts of a particular country unwilling to in-
terpret the Directive with the flexibility that its language requires. If
it is seen as "code-like," courts may overemphasize strict interpreta-
tion of the text, thereby frustrating justice in particular cases. If those
same courts then combine this approach with continued unwillingness
to consider decided cases-both pre- and post-Directive-in resolving
new matters, progress toward a coherent law of product liability may
be fitful or entirely frustrated.
Second, and at least as important as de jure judicial modesty, the
European civil plaintiff generally labors under disadvantages that may
prevent full benefit of protection for the product-injured consumer.
These disadvantages, discussed in Part II, supra, need not be reiter-
ated here. But, consider whether a lower-middle class or poor prod-
uct liability plaintiff would proceed with a unique or risky claim-
even an objectively meritorious one-without a contingency fee ar-
107. Able commentaries on the Directive have thus far been provided by Heinz J.
Dielmann, The EEC's Council Directive on Product Liability, 20 IN'L LAW. 1391, 1391-99
(1986); Marshall S. Shapo, Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European and
American Law, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 279, 323 (1993); Simon Whittaker, The EEC Direc-
tive on Product Liability, 5 Y.B. EUR. L. 233 (1986).
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rangement and faced with the prospect of being assessed court costs in
the event of a loss.0s
The subject of the present section, however, is not the daunting
national obstacles awaiting the Directive. Rather, the thrust will be
on the internal limitations of that text itself, limitations stemming
from two discrete sources. First, I enclose the Directive within the
context of its drafting. That context is one of compromise and conten-
tion, and the resulting document bears the scars of its promulgation.
Forced to allow "home rule" options on some of the most crucial pro-
visions, the Directive betrays its own promise of providing uniformly
fair treatment to all product liability litigants.
The second part of this section discusses the substantive com-
mands that did find their way into the Directive. Although these also
contain problems, they are nonetheless promising; in fact, I prefer the
Directive's approach to the grand issue of "defect" to the more elabo-
rately developed solution under the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act. But, beyond introducing strict liability-which, as always, is not
truly strict-the Directive is confronted by the same intractable inabil-
ity to predict future problems that afflicts every attempt at codifying
product defect law. Indeed, for reasons made clear in Part IV, infra,
the better approach is to focus on procedural reform. The Directive
does little of that, and what it does accomplish is not uniformly for the
better.
A. Genesis of the Product Liability Directive
The European Economic Community was established in 1957 by
the signing of the Treaty of Rome.10 9 The European Community
108. See Larry T. Yanawitch, Note, The European Community's Products Liabitty Di-
rective: Is the U.S. Experience Applicable?, 18 L. & PoL'Y INr'L Bus. 795. 810-11 (19S6).
A related issue is the lower threshold of 500 ECU for claims for damage to prop.erty in
Article 9, thus prohibiting a remedy under the Directive for the plaintiff with a -small"
claim. "The relatively richer consumer would thus have an extra remedy for damage to his
valuable property, whereas the poorer consumer would not have a remedy for his les
valuable property." Whittaker, supra note 107, at 275.
109. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 293
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter the Treaty of Rome]. Article 240 established the Community "for
an unlimited period of time." Books and articles tracing the development of the Commu-
nity since that time are legion. See, eg., T. C. HTmLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS oF Euroa
PEAN Cohihn1rrY LAw (2nd ed. 19MS); PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROFEAN CO''.nINYTY LA'w
FROM COMMON MARE TO EUROPEAN UNION (1992); Nicola Preston, Several States, One
Unity, One Law?, 24 AKRON L. REv. 141 (1990).
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(EC), as it subsequently became known," 0 currently has fifteen mem-
bers,"' and others are clamoring to join.112
The Community legislates both directly through regulation and
indirectly through directives. 1 3 The process by which a directive is
promulgated has been detailed elsewhere." 4 Nonetheless, a brief ex-
planation is in order.
1. The Process of Directive Drafting, Consulting, and Adoption
The Commission of the EC, comprising of seventeen Commis-
sioners representing all of the member states, initiates the process by
drafting proposals for directives. The Commissioners are expected to
represent the interests of the entire Community, not simply those of
their home nations."15 The Council of Ministers, consisting of one
representative from each state, has the power to adopt these initia-
tives into law. The Council's membership changes depending on the
subject of the directive under consideration. Thus, national ministers
of varying portfolios are sent to Brussels to confer and to vote on
matters within their particular expertise." 6 Although proposals are
110. This name change reflected that the "community" had become one of a host of
shared interests, of which economics is only one, albeit still the most important. As stated
earlier, the name has more recently been changed again, this time to the European Union.
See supra, note 17. I have for the most part used the European Union terminology herein,
except where that term would be historically inaccurate. The entity that promulgated the
Directive, for example, was the European Community.
111. Until recently, the membership included: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United King-
dom. Treaty of Rome, supra note 109, art. 148. These twelve have recently been joined by
Austria (voted to join in June 1994; entry becomes effective Jan. 1, 1995), Finland (voted to
join in Oct. 1994; entry became effective on Jan. 1, 1995), and Sweden (voted to join in
Nov. 1994; entry became effective on Jan. 1, 1995). Bucking the trend, Norwegian voters
rejected membership on November 29, 1994. John Darnton, Vote in Norway Blocks Join-
ing Europe's Union, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al.
112. "Recent applications for European Community membership [include] Tubrkey in
1988, Austria in 1989, Malta and Cyprus in 1990, Sweden in 1991, Finland in 1992 and,...
the new democracies of Eastern Europe would also like to join." See Joseph L. Brand, The
New World Order Of Regional Trading Blocs, 8 AM. U. J. IN'L L. & POL'Y 155, 163 n.28.
(1992) (citing JONATHAN DAVIDSON, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE NINETIES 4
(1992)). Now, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are also seeking membership.
Howard LaFranchi & Francine S. Kiefer, EC Girds Itself for Inevitable Expansion, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 24, 1991, at 5.
113. Treaty of Rome, supra note 109, art. 235.
114. See, eg., Anthony Arnull, Note, The Direct Effect of Directives: Grasping the Net-
tle, 35 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 939 (1986); MENGOZzi, supra note 109, at 90-98.
115. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY LAW 57-59 (1993).
116. ld. at 51-53.
[Vol. 19:1
1995] Limits of Product Liability Reform Within a Consumer Expectation Model 29
sent directly from the Commission to the Council, Council members
do not act until the proposal at issue is sent to the European Parlia-
ment for consultation. 117 Article 138 of the Treaty of Rome provides
that members of the European Parliament are to be elected "by direct
universal suffrage" within the individual member states and specifies
the number to be selected from each state." s These members typi-
cally are not representatives of their own nation's government. More
importantly, these members of Parliament do not vote on the direc-
tives because their function is one of consultation."" The apparent
paradox is that while the Parliament is the most democratic of EC
institutions, it has little actual power.120 After consultation with Par-
liament, and often with the Economic and Social Committee as
well,12' the proposal may return to the Commission for redrafting.
Before acting on the updated directive, the Council may choose to
resubmit it to the Parliament for further consultation. The Council
then adopts the final version of the directive, which member states are
required to adopt within a certain period of time. "
A directive establishes community policy, leaving the specifics of
implementation to the member states.3 This two-step process sows
seeds of disharmony which germinate when each individual state fun-
nels the directive through its unique legislative apparatus. This prob-
lem is compounded when, as is true of certain provisions of the
Product Liability Directive, states are afforded two or more options
with respect to certain provisions.
2. The Product Liability Directive's Tortured Path to Adoption
Although the actual process of member state approval of direc-
tives means that "harmonization" is a bit of a misnomer, its achieve-
ment remains a signal goal of the Community, as evidenced by the
117. Id. at 66.
118. Id. at 64.
119. By the terms of the 1992 Treaty on European Union, Parliament received outright
decision-making power in some cases. Id. at 66.
120. See id. at 93-94.
121. The Economic and Social Committee is composed of members appointed by indi-
vidual governments to represent three overarching groups: employers, employees, and
various other coalitions, such as farmers and consumers. Id. at 83 nA.
122. This complicated procedure is explained well in Bermann. See id. at 79-90.
123. "Directives shall bind any Member State to which they are addressed, as to the
result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to forms and
means." Treaty of Rome, supra note 109, art. 189, para. 3.
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language of the Treaty of Rome itself.124 As far back as 1974, when
the product liability directive was first proposed, three separate ratio-
nales were offered in its support: harmonization would equalize com-
petition among member states, promote the free movement of goods,
and foster equal protection of the consumer.12
The Directive that finally emerged in July 1985 expressly adopts
these purposes in "the Preamble": "Approximation of the laws of the
Member States concerning the liability of the producer ... is neces-
sary because the existing divergences may distort competition and af-
fect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a
differing degree of protection of the consumer ....,126 For the rea-
sons developed below, the path to the foregoing statement was rocky.
Under one view of European integration, since the Treaty of
Rome provides no express authority for "improving" national laws
deemed inadequate, directives should be written only to further the
goal of harmony and are within the EC's legal competence only to the
extent that they do so. The European Parliament initially questioned
the legal basis for the product liability directive on the related grounds
that the Directive did not "directly affect the establishment or fiinc-
tioning of the common market,"1 27 and that increasing consumer pro-
tection was not a proper subject for Community governance.128
Strictly speaking, since harmonization can be achieved without
affording any increased protection to the consumer, the Parliament's
argument has a certain logic. As evidenced by the Preamble cited ear-
lier, a broader view of the Council's power ultimately prevailed. That
view assumes that European integration should always seek the "opti-
mal legal solution in light of the present requirements of the [Commu-
124. Article 100 of that document empowers the EC Council of Ministers to "issue
directives for the approximation of such provisions of the Member States as have a direct
incidence on the establishment or functioning of the Common Market." Id. art. 100.
125. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIEs, MEMORANDUM ON THE APPROXI-
MATION OF THE LAWS OF MEMBER STATES RELATING TO PRODUCT LIABILITY 4 (working
Group "Product Liability" Working Document No. 1, Aug. 1974) [hereinafter 1974 Work-
ing Document] cited in Nilles, supra note 16, at 742-44 n.78.
126. Directive, supra note 3, pmbl.
127. Report of the Legal Affairs Committee, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 246) 7 (1978-79)
(citing Article 100) (emphasis in original).
128. Some have thought that such an approach would require the Council to search for,
and to then enshrine into directives, the lowest common denominator among constituent
nation legislation. Nilles, supra note 16, at 744 n.86 (citing Hans von der Groeben, Speech
to the European Parliament (Nov. 19, 1969), in EUR. PARL. DEB. (119) 148 (Nov. 27,
1969)). This position overstates the problem. At most, the narrow view of EC power,
pressed logically, would seem to restrict the permissible subject of directives to those al-
ready found in member states' laws.
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nity]."' 29 With a recent spate of highly specific, regulatory-type
directives promoting consumer safety and welfare, this latter interpre-
tation has been ascendant of late.120
As became clear in subsequent wrangling between the Commis-
sion and the Parliament, the latter's central concern was not with the
issue of the Directive's legal foundation, but with its imposition of lia-
bility even for risks that the producer could not have known about-
so-called "development risks."1 31 After the Council, the Commission,
and the Parliament had gone a few rounds on the development risk
issue, an industry-friendly compromise was reached. Article 7(e) of
the Directive allows the producer to escape liability upon a showing
that, given existing scientific and technological knowledge at the time
of the product's circulation, the defect could not have been
discovered.
Article 15 appeased advocates of true strict liability by allowing,
in subsection (1)(b), derogations by member states from the provi-
sions of Article 7(e). States wishing to avail themselves of this deroga-
tion, however, must "communicate the text of the proposed measure
to the Commission [which] shall inform the other Member States
thereof."' 32 The Commission then must decide whether to propose
amending the directive to create liability for development risks, and
129. Nilles, supra note 16, at 744 n.86. Nilles also makes the point that the Legal Af-
fairs Committee of the European Parliament agreed to drop its ultra %ires objections only
when they believed they had struck an agreement with the Commission to exonerate pro-
ducers from development risks. When the Commission subsequently refuw".d to exclude
such risks from liability, Committee members were incensed. Id. at 753 n.143.
130. Council Directive 871357 regarding products w~hich, despite their appearance, en-
danger the health or safety of consumers, 1987 OJ. (L 192) 49; Council Directie 3!37, on
approximation of the laws of the member states concerning the safety of toV3, 198B OJ (L
187) 1; Council Directive 92159 on general product safety, 1992 OJ. (L "2S) 24; Council
Resolution on a second program of the EEC for a consumer protection and information
policy, 1981 OJ. (C 133) 1; Council Regulation 245592 on export and import of certain
dangerous chemicals, 1992 OJ. (L 251) 13; Council Directive 89391 regarding measures to
encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at %%ork, 19S9 0J. (L 13) 1;
Council Directive 93113 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 1993 O. (L 95129; Council
Directive 93143 on hygiene of foodstuffs, 1993 OJ. (L 175) 1; Council Directie 9237 on
implementation of minimum safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile can-
struction sites, 1992 OJ. (L 245) 6.
131. This same issue has been labelled the state of the art defense in the United States.
Fuller comparisons of the two terms appear infra in subparts IILB.4, IV-B1.Ic). Expresing
a concern familiar to readers of American opinions concerned with liability for defects not
known at the time of product manufacture, the European Parliament %%as worried that
liability for development risks would restrict innovation, increase producer costs, and gen-
erally weaken industry. Nilles, supra note 16, at 750.
132. Directive, supra note 3, art. 15, para. 2.
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the member state proposing the derogation must hold its law in abey-
ance until that decision is reached. If the Commission does decide to
press for amendment, a further waiting period is mandated. 133
One other area of debate during the lengthy drafting process
should be mentioned. The Commission, which favored true strict lia-
bility from the outset, believed that a total damage cap for defects of a
particular type was necessary to keep manufacturers' liability from
spiralling out of control. The Commission declined, however, to es-
tablish individual damage caps, at least for personal injury.11
The Economic and Social Committee strongly disagreed on both
counts, favoring a cap on individual damages, but expressing dismay
over the prospect of uncompensated injury for mass disasters if an
overall cap were established.
Here, the Commission largely prevailed. Article 9(a) sets no
limit on recovery for personal injuries or death. As to an overall limit,
a compromise was again struck: Article 16(1) allows a member state
to limit overall damages "caused by identical items with the same de-
fect" provided that the limitation not fall below 70 million ECU. Per-
haps to assuage the concerns expressed by the Economic and Social
Committee, Article 16 (2) then provides that:
Ten years after the date of notification of this directive, the Com-
mission shall submit to the Council a report on the effect on con-
sumer protection and the functioning of the common market of the
implementation of the financial limit .... [T]he Council, acting on
a proposal from the Commission ... shall [then] decide whether to
repeal paragraph 1.135
3. Status of Member State Implementation of the Directive
After resolving these internecine disagreements, the EC's constit-
uent decision-makers adopted the Product Liability Directive on July
133. Id.
134. The Directive does contain a damage limitation where the damage is to property.
Article 9(b) states that property damage begins at the "lower threshold of 500 ECU," and
that even those damages are only recoverable where the property damaged was ordinarily
used, and was also used by the injured party, primarily for personal use and consumption.
AL art. 9 (b) (i)-(ii). This important limitation is presumably to excise the realm of com-
mercial dealing from the Directive's reach. This issue has greatly vexed American courts,
with the great majority holding that commercial losses-most typically those resulting from
damage to the product itself- should be dealt with under the Uniform Commercial Code,
not under tort law. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858
(1986).
135. Directive, supra note 3, art. 16(2).
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25, 1985. Article 19 of the Directive provided that member states
were to "bring into force, not later than [July 30, 198S), the laws, regu-
lations and administrative provisions necessary to comply."'IZ)
As of the present writing, most members of the EC, as well as
new members Austria, Sweden, and Finland, had adopted the Direc-
tive. 37 In addition, Norway, which recently rejected membership into
the EC, has adopted the principles of the EC Product Liability Direc-
tive into its national laws.as The decisions made by the EC nations
on the options left open by Articles 7(e) and 16, as well as an addi-
tional option regarding liability for certain non-manufactured prod-
ucts, are discussed infra in subpart H.B.4.
136. Id. art. 19. The Directive was sent to member states on July 30, 195. and the text
omitted from the quoted material provides three years from the date of notification.
137. Legislation by which EEC member countries enacted the Directive includes: Aus-
tria: Produkthaftungsgesetz [Federal Product Liability Act of January 21, 19881 (Effcetiv.
July 1, 1988 and enacted before Austria joined the EEC, but deliberately based on the
Directive); Belgium: Loi Relative a ]a Rdsponsabilit6 du Fait des Produits Defectueu:
[Act of Feb. 25, 1991 on Defective Product Liability] (Effective Apr. 1, 1.91); Denmark:
Lov. nr. 371 af 7. Juni 19S9 om Produktansvar [Products Liability Act No. 371 of June. 7.
1989] (Effective June 10, 1989); Finland: Tuotevastuulaki No. 694 [Product Liability Act
No. 694] (Effective Sept. 1, 1991, with amendments passed in Jan. 1993); Franc,: Dc Ia
Rdsponsabilit6 du Fait du Dfaut de S~curit6 des Produits [Product Liability Resulting
from Lack of Safety (draft act as of June 11, 1992)] (The purpose of this act is to harmonize
French Product Liability law wvith the Directive); Germany. Produkthaftung e_ setz [Prod-
uct Liability Act] (Effective Jan. 1, 1990, and applicable to products put into circulation on
or after Oct. 3, 1990); Greece: Act 1961/1991 Consumer Protection and other Pro% isions,
ch. 3, "Liability of the Producer for Defective Products," §§ 7-17 (Effective July 30, 19S?,);
Ireland: The Liability for Defective Products Act 1991 (Effective Dec. 16, 1991); Ital):
Infortuni sul Lavoro e Igiene (Prevenzione Degli) Presidential Decree No. 224 of May 24,
1988 (Effective May 24, 1988); Luxembourg: Loi du 21 Avril 19S9 R~lative a la R(span-
sabilit6 Civile du Fait des Produits Dfectueux [Act of Apr. 21, 19S9, on Cikil Liability for
Defective Products] (Effective May 2, 1991); The Netherlands: Wet van 13 September
1990, Houdende Aanpassing van het Burgerlijk Wetboek aan de Richtlijn %an de Rand ,an
de Europese Gemeeschappen Inzake de Aansrakelijkheid voor Produkten met Gebreken
[Act of Sept. 13, 1990, to Adapt the Civil Code to the Directive of the Council of the
European Communites on Liability for Defective Products] (Effective Nov. 1, 190 Por-
tugal: Decreto-lei No. 383189 de 6 de Novembro [Decree.law number 3S38 9 of Nov. 6,
1989] (Effective Nov. 11, 1989); Spain: Draft Act on Civil Liability for Damages Caused by
Defective Products; Sweden: Produktansvarlag 1992:18 [The Product Liability ActI J Effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1993, and only applies to products put into circulation after that date); United
Kingdom: Consumer Protection Act 1987 (Effective Mar. 1, 19S3).
138. Lov om Produktansvar av 23.12 19SS Nr. 104, Endret Ved Lov av 27.11.192 Nr.
112 [The Product Liability Act of December 23, 1988, No. 104, amended by Act of No-
vember 27, 1992, No. 112] (Effective Jan. 1, 1989; amendments effective on date EEC
Treaty enters into force).
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B. Analysis of the Product Liability Directive
The Directive is remarkable for its terseness of presentation. In
contrast to reform statutes in the United States, the Directive's eco-
nomical text runs only five pages. In addition, for good or ill, the
drafters did not copy the domestic predilection for appending analyti-
cal notes. The only explanation of the intent underlying the Direc-
tive's skeletal commands is contained in the Preamble, which
combines reiteration, slight expansion, and apparent contradiction.
What the Directive does contain of new product liability law is
almost entirely substantive, calibrating balances of rights and liabili-
ties between and among sellers and the consumers.139 Responsibility
for procedural matters, except for joint and several liability and time
limits for claims, remains with the individual members of the
Community.
Concern with state sovereignty appeared in provisions on the
substance of product liability law. Thus, the Directive's failure to
speak to important issues of procedural reform was no surprise. 140
Yet, this failure to develop rules governing the conduct of litigation-
as well as the allowable derogations from the liability rules that were
adopted-reduces one's confidence in the Directive's ability to secure
the consistency of treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs that is es-
sential to justice. 4 ' The Directive is nonetheless an important first
step towards a streamlined and mature system of product liability, and
it deserves the praise and the detailed treatment that it continues to
draw.' 42
139. The Directive does distinguish between producers and nonproducing suppliers. Di-
rective, supra note 3, art. 3. As we will see, however, the Directive is much less helpful
when it comes to distinguish the other players. The developed domestic law concerning
third parties, buyers, and users did not find its way into the Directive. Nor does the Direc-
tive take a position on the rights of bystanders. By the Directive's terms, "consumers" are
the protected class. But "[o]ne remarkable rather lacuna in the Directive is its failure to
define the crucial term 'consumer."' Shapo, supra note 107, at 283.
140. At least one commentator has accepted this frustrating lack of completeness in the
Directive by pointing out that gaining acceptance of the central principle of strict liability
("la rdsponsabilit6 objective") meant deferring other knotty questions until a later date
("rdlegue toutes les autres questions au second plan"). Taschner, supra note 75, at 258.
141. See HODGES, supra note 16, at 13 ("In the absence of either approximation or
harmonisation ... it can hardly be said that a level playing field has in fact been created for
the marketing of goods throughout the Community.").
142. See, eg., Whittaker, supra note 107; Thomas Greer, Product Liability in the Euro-
pean Economic Community: The New Situation, SUMMER J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 337 (1989);
Patrick Thieffry et al., Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practice and
Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 TORT AND INS. L.J. 65 (1989).
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Detailed analyses of the Directive's articles have already been ex-
pertly accomplished.' 43 My purpose is to develop some central
themes that recur throughout the Directive. Doing so here enables
later comparison with the more firmly established American doctrine
and provides the basis for the case analyses in Part V.
1. The Underlying Philosophy of the Directive
Unlike modem American law, which at least at the national level
shows a self-conscious tendency to be accompanied by useful analy-
sis,"' the European Union's Directives are usually bereft of signifi-
cant textual or extra-textual explanation.1 45 The Product Liability
Directive is no exception. However, as explained in the preceding
section, we can glean-from the protracted debates that preceded the
Directive's promulgation-a fundamental tension between adherents
of true strict liability and those who believed that negligence princi-
ples should retain their hold, at least to the extent of offering an
affirmative defense for development risks.14b The drafters' com-
promises over limiting damages are also a matter of record, 47 as are
acknowledgments that the Directive falls short of its stated goal of
uniformity. 148
Nonetheless, the Directive is surprisingly silent on unifying phi-
losophy. It does appear true that "the key informing principle [is] ...
consumer protection,"' 49 and consumer protection language suffuses
the Preamble.5 0 Nonetheless, that same Preamble, where one might
143. The best among these analyses is by Whittaker, stepra note 107.
144. MUPLA is itself a good example of this approach. Especially %%hen the statute at
hand carries no weight of its own, such accompanying analyses can provide justifications
for the chosen approach.
145. Whittaker, supra note 107, at 236-3S. See, ag., Council Directive S7W357 on prol-
ucts which, appearing to be other than they are, endanger the health or safety of consum-
ers, 1987 O.J. (L 192) 49; Council Directive S91391 regarding measures to encourageQ
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, 19S9 0J. (L 1&3) 1; Council
Directive 93143 on hygiene of foodstuffs, 1993 OJ. (L 175) 1.
146. See supra subpart III.A.2.
147. See supra subpart III.A.2.
148. See, eg., HODGES, supra note 16, at 13-14; Thieffry et al., supra note 142, at 226.
149. Shapo, supra note 107, at 328.
150. That protection of the consumer is regarded as an animating principle of the Di-
rective is borne out by the numerous references to the term *consumer protection" in the
Preamble, in both general and specific situations. As to the general comments, the Pream-
ble begins by stating that a primary concern of the Directive is to ensure that consumers
not receive "differing degree[s] of protection," suggesting that consumers had pre iously
been relegated to the protections provided by the individual states. Directive, supra note
3, pmbl., para. 2. Later, it is stated that the Directive's goal is "to protect the physical %iell-
being and property of the consumer." Id. pmbl., par. 7, More specific concerns are
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expect to find justification for the Directive's policy choices, is curi-
ously short on explanation, even as to the central goal of consumer
protection. Grand statements such as "liability without fault on the
part of the producer is the sole means of adequately solving the prob-
lem.., of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent... in produc-
tion" need support, even more so since the Directive falls short of
actually imposing "liability without fault."1 '
The absence of defining philosophy is still more glaring once one
moves beyond the Directive's animating principle to its specific and
general provisions. The Preamble does little more than serve as a
kind of throat-clearing, complete with abundant "whereas" clauses.15'
Justifications external to the Directive itself are absent.
For example, it was decided, that the legal regime established by
the Directive would supplement national laws affording protection to
product-injured consumers. 5 3 That decision may or may not have
been a good one. Facially, it is at odds with the announced goal of
uniformity and would presumably allow continued forum-shopping to
secure the most favorable slate of liability rules. Yet, such a sacrifice
may have been demanded by the strong residuum of national interests
resisting total replacement of established local law.5 4 In either case,
the Preamble's unadorned statement that claims "based on grounds of
contractual liability or non-contractual liability... under the legal sys-
tems of the member states.., should remain unaffected by this direc-
tive" is unhelpful.155
voiced in a host of contexts. For example, it is stated that "protection of the consumer
requires that all producers involved in the production process should be liable" thus afford-
ing the consumer the opportunity to pursue a claim against the most convenient entity. Id.,
pmbl., para. 5. Joint and several liability is also called for because the "protection of the
consumer requires . . . full compensation for the damage from any one of [the several
persons liable]." Id. pmbl., para. 6. This concern for "the protection of the consumer re-
quires that the liability of the producer remains unaffacted [sic] by acts or omissions of
other persons having contributed to cause the damage." Id. pmbl., para. 10. Lastly, "to
achieve effective protection of consumers, no contractual derogation should be permitted"
to relieve the seller from liability. Id. pmbl., para. 13.
151. Id. pmbl., para. 3. A similar criticism could be made of the Directive's concern
with "distort[ion of] competition and.., the movement of goods within the common mar-
ket." Id- pmbl., para. 2. Does this argue for a regime favorable to plaintiffs or one that
would reduce corporate costs? Competition might be distorted by unequal rules among
member states, but in which direction should the legal regime push?
152. It is interesting to note that this device owes a great debt to the structure of French
decisional law, which, as noted supra in subpart II.A, is notably deficient in underlying
rationale. See DAWSON, supra note 21, at 407.
153. Directive, supra note 3, art. 13. See Shapo, supra note 107, at 323.
154. See Taschner, supra note 75, at 258.
155. Directive, supra note 3, pmbl., para. 14.
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It may be that, lacking a well-developed body of product liability
law against which to assess the Directive, its drafters did not feel com-
pelled to offer much by way of overarching rationale; after all, instan-
tiation of a uniform principle of strict liability represents a watershed
development. That done, the bulk of the Directive can in one sense
be seen as an elaboration of that principle, and of the kernel truth that
the product-injured consumer should be compensated for injuries
caused by defective products.
This Article therefore takes a two-part approach to the Directive.
The remarks that follow represent one explanation of the language of
the Directive and can be seen, in part, as furnishing the analytical
notes that might have accompanied the express articles. In Part V, I
apply the Directive's commands to decided cases. This exercise awaits
the analysis of parallel developments in the United States in Part IV,
so as to enable a side-by-side comparison, along with suggestions for
the fair and coherent treatment of product liability law.
2. Defining Defect and Fixing the Standard of Liability
"The producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his
product"-Directive, Article 1.1S6
By placing this simple sentence at the top of the Directive, the
drafters meant to convey a strong, clear message: liability for defec-
tive products was to be strict. But the signal is actually less clear than
that, inviting speculation that the Directive hedges even on its funda-
mental premise. The Preamble states that "liability withoutfattlt... is
the sole means of adequately solving the problem.., of the risks
inherent in modern technological production."-15 7 Thus, while Article
l's liability language is inferentially strict, it is odd that the term -vith-
out fault" does not repeat itself. Perhaps the difference was over-
looked by the drafters (which I find unlikely), or it may have been
that Article 1 was seen as unambiguous enough. After all, no lan-
guage of "fault" appears within its one simple sentence.
It seems more likely that omission of strict liability language is a
way of emphasizing that a finding of defect is necessary for liability.T
156. Id art. 1.
157. Id. pmbl., para. 3 (emphasis added).
158. Reference to causation also appears in Article 1. Id. arts. 1. 4, Of course, the
requirement of causation is nearly universal in tort law. But codification of the Causation
requirement may preclude innovative judicial developments such as market share liability,
in which plaintiff need not link injury to a specific defendant. See Hyrnouitz v, Eli Lilly &
Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), in which the court applied the market share liability in
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As is true of the Model Act, and of legislation among the United
States, the definition of defect comprehends a more searching analysis
than would be demanded under a "true" strict liability regime. Arti-
cle 6, entitled "Defective Product," ties defect to consumer expecta-
tion: "A product is defective when it does not provide the safety
which a person is entitled to expect. ..."-19 In reaching its conclusion
on the issue, the court is to take "all circumstances into account. 160
The most significant of these are explicitly set forth in the Directive:
"(a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it could rea-
sonably be expected that the product would be put; [and] (c) the time
when the product is put into circulation.' 16'
Particularly in its general introductory language and in subsection
(a), the Directive looks suspiciously like the consumer expectation
test that has been a part of American product liability jurisprudence
since its inception. As I explain in subpart IV.B.1(a), infra, the con-
sumer expectation test was decidedly rejected in MUPLA and has
been generally disfavored among reformers. Instead, the consistent
approach of choice has been the risk-utility test, 6 2 whereby the prod-
the DES context, and extended the concept logically: "[T]here should be no exculpation of
a defendant who, although a member of the market producing DES for pregnancy use,
appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff's injury." Id. at 1078.
The language of Article 1 does seem to rule out market share liability in stating that
the damage must be "caused by a defect in his [the producer's] product," as opposed to
defects in the class of products. Directive, supra note 3, art. 1 (emphasis added).
159. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6.
160. IM § 1.
161. Id. The article also contains a second subsection, which disables a court from find-
ing defect "for the sole reason that a better product was subsequently put into circulation."
IA art. 6, § 2.
162. It might be argued that the test for defect under Article 6 allows room for consid-
eration of a risk-utility type of approach. Article 6, § 1(c), which demands consideration of
"the time when the product was put into circulation," may provide the entering wedge for
such an approach. Id. art. 6, § 1(c). Since this factor seems concerned with what the manu-
facturer could have done at a particular time, one might argue that a reasoned assessment
of risks and utilities be given weight. This argument should receive limited weight, if it
makes sense at all. Subsection 1(c), after all, is one of the factors to be considered under
the general pronouncement that defectiveness is defined by "the safety which a person is
entitled to expect," so we are brought, full circle, back to the consumer expectation para-
digm. Id. art. 6, § 1(c). Certainly, even if a court operating under the Directive were to
allow some consideration of the risks and utilities of the product, the language of Article 6
demands that such an inquiry be in service of the consumer expectation analysis. And
there is surely no room under the Directive for the either/or approach taken by some
domestic courts, under which the tests are formally separated, and the plaintiff can recover
by proving defect under either one. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.
1978); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Palmer v. Avco Distrib.
Corp., 412 N.E.2d 959 (II. 1978).
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uct's defectiveness vel non is assessed through a balancing of its use
and its potential perils.163
Nonetheless, focus on the product's presentation makes eminent
sense. Those cases involving the consumer who legitimately claims
disappointed expectation entail, explicitly or implicitly, a course of
communications and representations on the part of the product seller
that induces justifiable reliance on product safety.164 Having created
163. MUPLA adopts this approach in section 104(B)(1). See discussion infra subpart
IV.B.1(a). See also Henderson & TWerski, supra note 2, at 1532-24. Henderson and T% er-
ski follow the lead of most courts and commentators, w\ho consistently fix their attention
on the balancing required by the risk-utility calculus. For a small sampling of cass and
articles employing or recommending these tests in one variation or another, sae Barker v.
Lull, 573 P.2d at 443 (setting forth an "eitherfor" choice of reasonable consumer exp.!cta-
tion or risk-utility tests); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Dart
v. Wiebe Mfg. Inc., 709 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1985); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P2d
774 (Wash. 1975); John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabiity for Products. 44 Miss.
L.J. 825 (1973); Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Deftct, 5 Sr. M,,n,.'s
LJ. 30 (1973). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of RisklUtdity, 4S Oino Sr' LT 459
(1987) (criticizing the approach, and suggesting a return to the latent-patent distinction),
The proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts follows the same line of thinking, but places
the burden on the plaintiff to prove the risks "could have been reduced by the adoption of
a reasonable alternative design." RESTATEMENT (THmRD) OF Tours: P r.otors LiSUIL-
rry § 2 (Proposed Draft 1994).
Interestingly, Henderson and werski retain a place for consumer expectations:
"[E]ven courts that apply a consumer-expectation test rarely do so uithout tempering it
with significant risk-utility balancing. Consumer expectations are at the very least one fac-
tor to work into a risk-utility analysis.... As long as risk-utility standards are part of the
mix, whether courts characterize the test for defect as risk-utility or consumer-.exp ctation
is of relatively minor importance." Henderson & Werski, supra note 2, at 1533-34.
The ascendance of the risk-utility test should be seen as the result of the uay pre.luct
liability law has developed domestically. Once courts came to recognize that prodlucts
could be defectively designed, as well as defectively constructed, a novel methe& of as-s
ing defect seemed called for. In my view, risk-utility can supplement the consumer expec-
tation test in certain cases, but the latter model is usually preferable.
164. As Justice Traynor noted in Greenman v. Yuba Poer Products, Inc., "implicit in
[a product's] presence on the market [is] a representation that it [%Vill] safely do the jobs for
which it was built." 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962). Professor Marshall Shapo has long and
persuasively argued that questions of liability for defective products could be illuminated
by paying sufficient attention to the representations made by product sellers. Shaposupra
note 107, at 291-92 (applauding the emphasis on "the presentation of the product," as
admitting a broad range of readings that capture the complexities of the marketing, promo-
tion, and actual appearance of the product). Professor Shapo first drew attention to the
significance of product portrayal two decades ago. Shapo, supra note 11. More recently, I
have argued that representational notions can profitably be applied to other areas of tort,
including professional malpractice. See John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educattona! ',fal-
practice Claims: A Representational Focus, 67 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1992). There, I sug-
gested that one limitation on representational notions is that the injured party must b2
provided with enough information to act. Id. at 385. If not, the focus shifts to the plain-
tiff's forced reliance on the defendant. The same could be said of products that the "con-
sumer" does not even know he is encountering, such as with asbestos, and with toxic
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those expectations, the seller should not be heard to complain when
the consumer suffers injury because those same expectations have not
been fulfilled.
Although resort to the Preamble is once again required, the Di-
rective imagines the inquiry into consumer expectation as "product-
wide," not as an analysis of whether this consumer's expectations of
safety were met: "[T]he defectiveness of the product should be deter-
mined not by its fitness for use but to the lack of the safety which the
public at large is entitled to expect ... ."16 Yet the language is flexi-
ble enough to allow recovery to a consumer whose assurances of
safety, through direct promotion and sale by the producer, are greater
than that of other users of the same product. It might be said that any
member of "the public at large" in such a situation would be "entitled
to expect" a greater level of safety.1"
exposures more generally. Owing to the plaintiff's utter helplessness in many of these
cases, the argument for recovery is strengthened, not diminished. This result is under-
scored under a consumer expectation model, which values the citizen's reasonable expecta-
tion that he is not the unwitting victim of whatever dangerous product the manufacturer
drops into the market. A risk-utility test might yield a different result.
165. Directive, supra note 3, pmbl., para. 7 (emphasis added). It may be difficult, how-
ever, to gauge the reasonable expectation of consumers across national lines: "The Euro-
pean Community comprises ... countries with varying economic and social traditions and
values. Is it realistic to assume that a German or Danish consumer has the same values as a
Greek, Spanish or Portuguese one?" HOWELLS, supra note 16, at 11. As Professor Quine
has pointed out in the context of philosophy of language, the problems of individual trans-
lation appear both across language borders, Willard VanOrman Quine, Translation and
Meaning, in WORD AND OBJECr 26-72 (1964), and even between speakers of the same
language, in the same community. ld. at 79. Thus, in order to avoid complete solipsism,
consumer expectation should be assessed by reference to the objectively reasonable per-
son, as determined by the trier of fact, usually, the judge. Of course, such determinations
will naturally be infused with the judge's own view of the consumer's expectation, a view
shaped by the particular community in which she sits.
166. Whether the reasonable expectations of the individual consumer may be taken
into account has been the subject of some discussion. Professor Shapo believes that the
language of Article 6 allows "a potentially subjective interpretation centering on individual
claimants." Shapo, supra note 107, at 293. In light of the Preamble, though, I read Article
6's phrase "the safety a person is entitled to expect" as disapproving of a wholly subjective
analysis. Although the Directive's use of terms such as "person" and "consumer" seems
somewhat haphazard, the expression "the injured person" is used in Article 8, section 2,
which speaks to the plaintiff-specific issue of contributory negligence. Thus, it seems that
use of the indefinite article ("a person") in Article 6 is deliberately more general, referring
to any (and all) person. This reading is bolstered by the language of the Preamble, as well
as by Dr. Taschner's view that the issue is "what the community as a whole considers to be
right." Hans C. Taschner, Product Liability in Europe: Future Prospects, in EEC STRiCT
LIABILITY IN 1992: THm NEw PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES 83, 89 (PLI Litig. and Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 371, 1988). Dr. Taschner was "a leading figure in
the drafting of the Directive." Shapo, supra note 107, at 293. Dr. Taschner's view is not
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Article 6 recognizes that product defect cases run along a long
line between those involving the truly helpless and the foolhardy con-
sumer. The article's defect standard is sufficiently flexible to accom-
modate this broad range of cases since "all circumstances" are taken
into account. Thus, the unsuspecting victim of a manufacturing defect
would have the strongest case, while one who knowingly encountered
a dangerous feature of a product would likely have difficulty establish-
ing that he or she was "entitled to expect" the product to be safe for
that purpose. Wisely, the article does not anticipate the result in truly
hard cases. The seller of a child's toy, for example, might be accounta-
ble for a defect that might be obvious to anyone but a child.'6 7
This last possibility is supported by subsection 1(b) of Article 6
under which considers the producer's reasonable expectations as to a
product's use. The wording of this section suggests that the inquiry is
not whether the consumer has used the product reasonably,' '3 but
whether the misuse could reasonably be anticipated by the producer.
For example, depending on the circumstances attending sale, a press
manufactured with a removable safety guard might be considered de-
fective if the injurious use might have been anticipated and pre-
vented. 169 The lingering requirement that the use be "reasonably...
expected" stands against truly bizarre arguments, such as claims that
inconsistent with my own: what would the public at large consider to "be right" based on
the representations that were actually made to this consumer?
167. In Part V, infra, I discuss a slate of cases arising along this continuum. The point
here is just that, as a general matter, the complexities of product defect cases require a
flexible approach. This conclusion has not gone unchallenged. Richard Epstein, for exam-
ple, has argued that a bright-line rule is needed, allowing recovery in latent defect cases,
but denying it in cases where the defect is patent. Epstein, supra note 163, at 469. In the
course of a more general argument for clear tests, Epstein argues that making the liability
determination on the basis of latent versus patent "as a rule of thumb ... gives a clear,
cheap, and correct answer in most cases. The distribution of cases along the latent/patent
axis is such that there are few cases when the line between latent and patent is in doubt."
Id. at 474. If this premise were true, one might agree with his conclusion. But the more
complex model of product representation and portrayal better captures the range of cases.
Simplicity is beguiling, unfortunately, justice is not simple. The examples in Part V. infra,
make this point graphically. For elaboration of the powerful position advanced by Profes-
sor Shapo back in 1974, see generally Shapo, supra note 11.
168. That question is, and should be, a proper focus for the court. Under Article 8,
section 2, a user's own negligence ("fault") in using the product reduces recovery. Direc-
tive, supra note 3, art. 8, § 2.
169. As a rule, such cases turn on the foreseeability of the modification or alteration to
the manufacturer at the time of sale. See Sheldon v. West Bend Equip. Corp., 718 F2d 603
(3d Cir. 1983) (safety chains and bumpers had been removed from a man-lift; foreseeabil-
ity was a jury question); Kuziw v. Lake Eng'g Co., 586 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1978) (steel ram
cover had been removed while machine was in operation; jury properly held manufacturer
liable for foreseeable alteration when the only way to clean the machine was to remove
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power lawn mowers are defective because the plaintiff has been in-
jured using one to trim hair-either his own or someone else's.170
Again, these issues are interwoven with issues of product presentation
because for what a manufacturer might reasonably expect is often tied
to how the product appears and is marketed.
3. Note on the Relation between Defect and Failure to Warn
Although the Directive does not specifically address the problem
of defective warning, its focus on the "packaging" of the product can
also illuminate the warning issue. In Part IV, infra, I offer a detailed
analysis of the problem under MUPLA, referring to its response to
some of the specific difficulties that arise in the arena of absent or
inadequate warnings. For present purposes,. I note that the Directive's
emphasis on product presentation should also sweep in warnings. 171
This approach is consistent with the tendency of state courts to find a
product defectively designed because it is unaccompanied by a proper
warning. Thus, telling the product's story requires attention to its
parts, to its warnings, and to all the details of its marketing.
In one sense, then, the inquiry into product defect subsumes the
warning question. In one illustrative case, a court' 7 2 had to decide
whether a pool was defective because its shallow bottom was improp-
erly lined, or because it was unaccompanied by sufficient warnings of
its short depth.173 By keeping the focus on the product's overall pres-
entation, the Directive's approach might avoid unnecessary dissection
of defective claims.174
this cover); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice, 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980) (manufacturer was not
liable when plaintiff's employer had cut a hole in the plastic safety gate).
170. The ever-present causation requirement, embodied in both Articles 1 and 4, also
protects manufacturers against meritless suits of this sort. The cause of the plaintiff's injury
in such unusual cases is not the product at all, but the plaintiff's own conduct.
171. This point has been made elsewhere; not the least significant of these comments
has come from Dr. Taschner, one of the drafters of the Directive. See Taschner, supra note
75, at 95-96. Shapo seems to share this view. Shapo, supra note 107, at 306.
172. Courts, not juries, will usually do the fact-finding in European courts. Professor
Shapo has offered some insight concerning the potential significance of this difference in
interpreting the Directive. Shapo, supra note 107, at 293.
173. This example is provided by the case of O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298
(N.J. 1983). In that case, the warning not to dive was only 1/2 inch high. Id. at 302. The
design defect issue concerned whether the vinyl lining that was used on the pool's bottom
was as safe as a rubber latex lining would have been, and if not, whether plaintiff could be
barred from suing on the ground that no other manufacturer of above-ground pools used
rubber latex as lining. Id.
174. Omitted here is a separate discussion of subsection (c) of section 1, which takes
into account "the time when the product was put into circulation." Directive, supra note 3,
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Of course, the Directive can be criticized for its agnostic stance
on several issues specific to the duty to warn that have plagued Amer-
ican courts for years. Among these are questions such as whether the
so-called "sophisticated user" defense will be recognized for cases
arising in the workplace setting1 75 and whether any postsale duty to
warn might attach. These issues are addressed by MUPLA, which has
had a far greater wealth of case law to draw upon in reaching its con-
clusions. I therefore defer consideration of these issues until subpart
IV.B.1(a), infra.
4. Liability of Nonmanufacturing Sellers
Article 3 of the Directive houses the list, and speaks to the liabili-
ties, of product-selling defendants. Under section 1 of that article, lia-
bility attaches to any "producer." By this, the Directive drafters
meant to denote not only the entity that American courts have
dubbed "manufacturer," but also those who make a raw material or
any component part that finds its way into the finished product.176
art. 6, § 1(c). This factor might support liability for failing to recall a product that %%as
subsequently determined to pose a great danger, even if liability might not attach for the
initial sale. Since the Directive is also silent on the issue of recall, speculation is all we
have. For a discussion of MUPLA's treatment of the recall issue, see infra subpart
IV.B.1(c).
175. The term "sophisticated user" is generally used in workplace cases. %%here the issue
is whether the manufacturer can escape liability by communicating a warning to the em-
ployer, who is then expected to pass the information on to the workers. Some courts have
adopted a bright-line, "no duty" approach, holding that it is sufficient to wam the em-
ployer. See, ag., York v. Union Carbide Corp., 586 N.E2d 861 (Ind. App. 19)2); Rusin v.
Glendale Optical Co., 805 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1986). This approach has been justified by the
"difficulty of warning the individual employees, and because of the reasonableness of rely-
ing on the purchaser to protect his employees." DAVID A. FIsCHER AND WIt'AV.M POW.
ERS, PRODUC-rs LiAniLrry, CASES AND MATERtALS 403 (2d ed. 1994). The opposing
school of thought regards the issue of warning in the workplace context as amenable to the
same reasonableness analysis as is used in other cases alleging failure to warn. See RE.
STATENmNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388 (1966). For cases employing this approach, see Ad-
kins v. GAF Corp., 923 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1991); O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F-d 249
(4th Cir. 1993); Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 601 A.2d 123 (Md. 1992); Little v. Liquid Aid
Corp., 952 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing "bulk seller" doctrine). See generally,
Kenneth M. Willner, Note, Failures to Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense, 74 VA. L
RE%. 579 (1988), which describes defenses to actions arising out of industrial accidents,
compares the "duty" approach with the "Restatement" approach, and argues that some
courts have used a "mixed" approach.
176. Directive, supra note 3, art. 3. Article 7, which lists defenses to liability, provides
an escape from liability for component (and presumably raw material) sellers whose prod-
uct is itself unobjectionable. Where the alleged defect "is attributable to the design of the
product in which the component has been fitted or to the instructions given by the manu-
facturer of the product," the component manufacturer is exculpated. Id. art. 7(f). This
sensible rule, implicitly recognizing that liability without defect is incoherent, is echo-d by
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Of greater significance for American product liability scholars
and courts is the Directive's bold stand on two classes of sellers that
have mostly avoided notice in the United States: importers and those
who somehow present themselves as producers. Both of these are de-
fined as producers and consequently are liable whenever manufactur-
ers are.
Particularly with reference to those who hold themselves out as
producers, the Directive's representational bias again emerges. The
Directive treats as a producer "any person who, by putting his name,
trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product presents him-
self as its producer.' '1 77
As to importers, the Directive's treatment reflects both its under-
lying philosophy of consumer protection and its consistent emphasis
on the course of communications between buyer and seller. First, al-
lowing the injured plaintiff an avenue of recovery against the importer
may allow problems of jurisdiction to be surmounted, thereby maxi-
mizing the chances of finding an available defendant. 78
Second, the drafters presumably recognized that, as far as many
consumers would be concerned, the importer would seem to be the
manufacturer. At least, the importer (or its retailer, for example) is
the entity to which the consumer would complain if the product did
American courts. See, e.g., Wiler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 95 Cal. App. 3d 621, 157
Cal. Rptr. 248 (1979) (no strict liability on component part manufacturer where the com-
ponent is itself without defect). Cf. Feuerverger v. Hobart Corp., 738 F. Supp. 76
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (component part manufacturer liable if it supplies defective part which
causes accident); DeLeon v. Commercial Mfg. & Supply Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 336, 195
Cal. Rptr. 867 (1983) (component part manufacturer not absolved of liability where it was
foreseeable that design of component part could pose a hazard when utilized as a part of
the whole machinery).
177. Directive, supra note 3, art. 3, § 1. This approach is not without precedent in the
American courts. See Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 901 F.2d 750, 751 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that strict product liability applies to trademark licensors who "significantly
participate in the overall process by which the product reaches consumers"). This theory
focuses on the fact that trademark holders have the power and ability to "shape the destiny
of products, both as to form and manner of presentation to the public." Shapo, supra note
107, at 286. See generally Holly Piehler Rockwell, Annotation, Trademark Licensor's Lia-
bility for Injury or Death Allegedly Due to Defect in Licensed Product, 90 A.L.R. 4th 981
(1991). See also REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 400 (1977) ("One who puts out as
his own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as
though he were its manufacturer.").
178. For obvious reasons, the importer is treated as an additional producer; the actual
manufacturer is on the hook as well. Article 3, section 2 imposes liability on importers
"without prejudice to the liability of the producer." Directive, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2. By
the terms of Article 5, liability, where proper against multiple defendants, is joint and sev-
eral. Id. art. 5.
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not perform as expected. Therefore, it also appears sensible to re-
quire the importer to stand behind the product when personal injury
strikes. Indeed, a developing body of case law suggests that American
courts are moving in this direction too.1 79
A less definitive result applies with respect to those sellers who
do not qualify as producers. The Directive refers to all such sellers as
"suppliers."'18 By and large, suppliers consist of those who are "mid-
die sellers" of products, such as distributors and retailers.sI1 As devel-
oped in subpart IV.B.1(b), infra, the American judicial and statutory
law have been inconsistent as to their liability. The Directive attempts
yet another solution: by the terms of Article 3, section 3, all suppliers
are treated as producers unless they "inform... the injured person,
within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or of the
person who supplied him with the product."
This approach approximates the trend in domestic law, whereby
nonmanufacturing sellers are often cast in the role of guarantors,
standing by to provide compensation where the manufacturer is un-
able.182 The Directive's approach, however, is more restrictive than
the average state statute, which would allow supplier liability when
the manufacturer is not available for any reason, most typically insol-
vency. The Directive simply requires the supplier to do a bit of detec-
tive work, to unmask the producer.18 3 That done, the supplier is
exculpated, presumably even if the producer no longer exists.
To the extent that the Directive walls off recovery against suppli-
ers, it may betray its promise of consumer protection based on reason-
179. See, eg., Hapner v. Rolf Brauchli, Inc., 273 N.W 2d 82, 23 (Mich. 1978) (%%hil
the court found that this defendant importer did not have sufficient "minimum contacts"
with the forum to support jurisdiction, the court held that "[a] manufacturer's marketing
system is generally seen as a purposeful availment of the ... forum in %hich it has reason
to know its products are distributed pursuant to that [marketing] system"); Seattle.First
Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975) (upholding imposition of strict liability
upon an automobile importer, focusing on the role of the importer in the marketing of the
product).
180. Directive, supra note 3, art. 3, § 3.
181. The term "supplier" is nowhere defined in the Directive. As has been recognized,
however, the context in which the term is used makes clear that the drafters had in mind all
sellers who do not fit the definition of producer. See Whittaker, supra note 107, at 26-70.
182. See infra subpart IV.B.1(b). I have treated this issue in detail in John G. Culhane,
Real and Imagined Effects of Statutes Restricting the Liability of Nonmanufacturtng Sellers
of Defective Products, 95 Dim L. REk,. 287 (1991).
183. The same section also makes clear that, at least insofar as importers are concerned,
they are to be treated exactly like manufacturers. The rule as to suppliers "shall apply, in
the case of an imported product, if this product does not indicate the identity of the im-
porter even if the name of the producer is indicated." Directive, supra note 3, art. 3, § 3.
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able expectation. As domestic courts have long recognized, middle
sellers "are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing
enterprises," and may "[i]n some cases ... be the only member of
[those enterprises] reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. 1 84
The Directive's approach is especially puzzling given its enlightened
treatment of importer and "product presenter" liability. Indeed, to
the extent that middle sellers, particularly retailers, are viewed by con-
sumers as (re)presenting the product as safe, this penurious supplier
liability rule seems at odds with these other consumer protective
rules and perhaps even in conflict with the Directive's animating
philosophy.
5. Treatment of Problem Products
As is developed in subpart IV.A, infra, American product liabil-
ity law has been in active development for nearly a century. Thus, a
mature body of judicial, statutory, and scholarly literature is at hand-
a body that has expanded well beyond the basic issues involving the
definition and classification of defect, the tension between strict
liability and negligence, and the classes of proper plaintiffs and de-
fendants. The courts have tackled a wealth of issues, including: un-
avoidably unsafe products,185 postmanufacture changes in design, 186
184. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964).
185. See RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cnt. k (1966) (creating an excep-
tion to strict liability for "unavoidably unsafe" products which are otherwise properly pre-
pared and accompanied by proper directions and warnings. This exception has been held
to apply to certain drugs, vaccines, and asbestos). See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399
F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that there was a duty to warn of an extremely minimal
risk of contracting polio from a polio vaccine); Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 172 Cal. App. 3d 812,
218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985), disapproved in Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988)
(Abbott Laboratories) (holding that each prescription drug must be evaluated on its partic-
ular merits to determine if it is, in fact, "unavoidably unsafe"); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (the first
asbestos case in which a plaintiff recovered damages based upon failure of the product
manufacturer to warn workers of the dangers of asbestos).
186. See, e.g., Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957) (manufacturer
not liable where decedent's employer had added additional equipment to an elevator,
causing it to become unbalanced); Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 484 A.2d
1225 (NJ. 1984) (employer had made several modifications to a die casting machine; court
held that although the original design of the machine could be found defective under a
risk-utility analysis, it was a jury question whether the original defect was a proximate
cause of the accident, regardless of the post-manufacture changes); Brown v. United States
Stove Co., 484 A.2d 1234 (N.J. 1984) (holding that extensive modifications to a heater and
removal of its safety features was sufficient to release the manufacturer from liability).
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the effect of compliance with "state of the art",187 the effect of compli-
ance with both mandatory design specifications,&S and regulatory
requirements.18 9
The comparatively embryonic European product defect law has
not yet spawned sophisticated treatments of these issues. Nor does
the Directive deal with most of the "problem" cases. Article 7, how-
ever, directly faces the two questions of compliance with mandatory
regulations and the state of the art defense. While the Directive
187. The issue is whether the manufacturer has a defense when the product is built or
designed to the limits of available technological and other knowledge at the time of sale;
according to one court, state of the art "includes all of the available knovledge on the
subject at a given time, and this includes scientific, medical, engineering, and any other
knowledge that may be available." Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A2d 633, 639 (Md.
1992) (quoting Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir.
1986)). For cases holding that state of the art is a defense, see Bruce v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d
549 (Cal. 1991) (failure to warn case).
The other side is expressed by O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A2d 298 (NJ. 1933).
discussed supra note 173. The court in O'Brien noted that "a product may embody the
state of the art and still fail to satisfy the risk-utility equation.... ." 463 A2d at 305. In the
wake of the O'Brien decision, the New Jersey legislature passed a new statute %hich pro-
vides that a seller shall not be liable if at the time the product was manufactured there was
not a practical and technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the
harm without impairing the function of the product. NJ. STAT. A.N- § 2ALSSC-3 (West
1987). The statute also provides that, if the court finds, on the basis of clear and con incing
evidence, that the product is egregiously unsafe or has little or no usefulness, state of the
art will not be a defense. I&
188. Where a manufacturer builds to specifications required by the government, it can
assert the "government contract defense." The Supreme Court, in Boyle v. United Tech-
nologies Corp., 4S7 U.S. 500 (1988), set forth a defense by which manufacturers of military
equipment could escape liability for design defect if "(1) the United States approved rea-
sonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3)
the supplier warned the United States about the dangers ... known to the supplier but not
to the United States." Id at 512. The issue is less clear where the specifications have not
been set forth by the government, but by private contract. Compare Michalko v. Cooke
Color and Chem. Co., 451 A.2d 179 (NJ. 1982) (holding that strict liability was appropriate
notwithstanding construction according to specifications) with Lesnefsky v. Fischer &
Porter Co., 527 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding to the contrary, except %here the
danger is obvious to the contractor building to specification).
189. Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1933) held that
a manufacturer's failure to file certain reports regarding a drug in compliance with FDA
regulations constituted negligence and that there was sufficient evidence to show causation
between the failure to report and an injury caused by the drug. Even where there is com-
pliance with a regulatory requirement, this is not always sufficient to protect the manufac-
turer from liability. In Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 132 (Or. 1978), the court
noted that an FAA regulation addressing design specifications for aircraft design was only
a minimum standard, and compliance with that standard did not automatically shield the
manufacturer from liability.
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plainly states the rule as to each in plain language, interpretation of
the impact of these sections is difficult.
With respect to compliance with mandatory regulations, Article
7(d) offers a defense to a producer who can show "that the defect is
due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued
by the public authorities."'190 What exactly does this mean?
The domestic law has generally been careful to separate cases in-
volving compliance with mandatory design from those involving prod-
ucts that are subject to approval by the relevant regulatory agency.
The Directive's use of the term "mandatory regulations" thus creates
an ambiguity: Did the drafters mean to foreclose suit only where a
manufacturer built a product to specification, or more broadly, in any
case where regulatory compliance was needed? If the latter interpre-
tation holds, the number of cases would be drastically reduced. This is
especially so because whatever national regulations apply are supple-
mented by a daunting battery of European Union directives, which
impose safety requirements for vast classes of products.
It is probable that the drafters of the provision had in mind only
those cases in which the producer followed design specifications. As
Professor Whittaker has noted, the defense only applies "in the rare
situation where the defect is due to compliance with [regulations]."' 19 1
It would torture that language to argue, in the typical design defect
case involving a product subject to regulatory requirements, that com-
pliance with such requirement caused the defect. Usually, the pro-
ducer is attempting to push the product past the regulators, not
building to specification.
As to the state of the art issue, the Directive offers a defense-
defeasible by member states-to producers who can show that at the
time of production "the state of scientific and technical knowledge...
was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discov-
ered." 92 This very general formulation is unsatisfying to an American
readership, familiar with the variations on this theme sounded by the
judiciary and the legislature.193 Yet, by using the terms "scientific and
technical knowledge," the Directive makes clear that it will not suffice
to invoke common trade practice or custom as a defense.194 The lan-
190. Directive, supra note 3, art. 7(d).
191. Whittaker, supra note 107, at 257 (emphasis added).
192. Directive, supra note 3, art. 7(e).
193. See infra subpart IV.B.1(c).
194. It has been suggested that a whole industry could be negligent in its scientific in-
quiry. Garey B. Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products
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guage chosen also suggests that the defense will be applied sparingly.
A producer can only stand behind the state of the art defense where
available knowledge did not allow discovery of the defect. This stan-
dard is presumably more difficult to reach than one based on the pos-
sibility of eliminating the defect.
Let us consider one example where the distinction introduced
above would make a difference. In the case of new drugs, injurious
side effects are often not uncovered until well after the drug has come
to market.19 The Directive would not impose liability unless the
manufacturer knew or, using available scientific information, could
have known of the defect.196 The Directive does not even seem to
require a posted warning that the drug's possible effects are yet un-
known, thereby reflecting silent agreement with MUPLA's treatment
of the issue.197
On the other hand, if the dangers of the drug were known, but
could not be eliminated, the Directive suggests that liability could be
proper. In that case, the developmental risk defense would not be
available and the liability issue would return to a section 106 analysis.
Courts applying the Directive would do well to follow the approach
taken by the Second Restatement of Torts, in comment k to section
402A. For such unavoidably unsafe products, liability would depend
on whether the drug was "accompanied by a proper warning." '13 The
Directive's emphasis on product presentation could handily accommo-
date such a focus.
6. Time Limitations on Actions
As outlined above, the Directive, although moving in a con-
sumer-friendly direction on the substantive law of defective products,
is mostly silent on matters of procedure; it apparently consigns treat-
Liability, 67 MINN. L. REv. 343, 360-61 (1982) (citing Judge Hand in Th'e TJ. Hoop.er, 69
F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied sub nor. Eastern Trans. Co. v. Northern Barge.
Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932). This concern seems overstated because it requires the assump-
tion that scientific knowledge-as opposed to actual practice-in an entire indutry is being
squelched. That seems unlikely.
195. One such drug may be tetracycline, which had a once unknown propensity to dis-
color teeth. Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 608 A.2d 356 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 19-12). affd,
625 A.2d 1066 (NJ. 1993).
196. Note that the Directive speaks in strict terms, allowing no escape for a manufac-
turer who can show reasonable diligence in attempting to keep up w ith scientific and tech-
nological developments. Of course, as demonstrated in Part II, supra, the European courts
have been no less adept than our own in reinterpreting statutory language.
197. See infra subpart IV.B.I(c).
198. See infra subpart IV.B.A(c) for a fuller discussion of this point under MUPLA.
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ment of such issues to local legislation. 199 In addition to the optional
damage limitations set forth in Article 16,200 the Directive speaks only
to joint and several liability, which it expressly retains,20 1 and to issues
of limitation and repose.
Unfortunately, the Directive did not achieve a fully just result
with respect to these matters. Article 10, which establishes a three-
year statute of limitations, may be problematic. According to the lan-
guage of that provision, the statute starts to run "from the day.., the
plaintiff becomes aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of
the damage, the defect, and the identity of the producer. ' '20 2 The un-
answered question here is whether the running of the statute will be
delayed until the plaintiff can reasonably make the causal connection
between product exposure and the injury.203 The article should have
made clearer the tie between "damage[,] defect, and the identity of
the producer. '" 204 As discussed in detail infra, MUPLA makes this
point much more cleanly. 05
Worse yet is Article 11, which declares that "the rights conferred
upon the injured person ... shall be extinguished upon the expiration
of a period of 10 years from the date on which the producer put [the
product causing injury into circulation] unless the injured person has
... instituted proceedings against the producer. '20 6 By its terms, this
199. See supra subpart III.B.1.
200. See supra subpart III.A.2.
201. Directive, supra note 3, art. 5, provides: "Where, as a result of the provisions of
this directive, two or more persons are liable for the same damage, they shall be liable
jointly and severally, without prejudice to the provisions of national law concerning the
rights of contribution or recourse." As pointed out in subpart IV.B.2, infra, I do not have
much to say about these procedural choices, which represent more or less defensible polit-
ical decisions.
202. Directive, supra note 3, art. 10.
203. Drugs posing long-term risks and toxic torts are obvious cases in which plaintiff
may be unable, for a long period of time, to connect injury with responsible cause. As one
commentator has eloquently stated: "[P]rescription drugs.., contain unforeseeable risks
due to interaction with the mysterious human body." Elizabeth C. Price, Toward A Unified
Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the Causative Concept of Fault, 61 TErN. L. RLV.
1277, 1332 (1994).
204. Professor Shapo believes that the Directive's language is sufficiently clear to an-
swer this question: "In declaring that the plaintiff should reasonably be aware of the de-
fect, the Directive settles an important and controversial issue in favor of claimants."
Shapo, supra note 107, at 320. He then hedges his own bet, however, noting that in cases
where the plaintiff knows of the harm, but not the cause, "arguably the requirement of
knowledge of defect could be interpreted to include knowledge of causation." Id. (empha-
sis added).
205. See infra subpart V.A.
206. Directive, supra note 3, art. 11.
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article provides no exceptions. The unfairness of this result is clear
when the product is a drug which presents long-term hazards such as
DES2 0 7 but the inequity should not go unnoticed when the product is
made to be used safely for longer than ten years.2Cs
The parallel provision of MUPLA, which also establishes a ten-
year statute of repose, affords only a qualified presumption: '-, that
products causing injury beyond that time are safe. In subpart IV.B.2,
infra, I argue that even such a qualified presumption is mistaken. A
fortiori, then, a blanket rule against recovery is unjustified. As one
court perceptively noted, there is injustice in barring a claim "before it
ever existed. '210
IV. Product Liability Law in the United States: History
and Reform
The ebb and flow of product liability law in the United States has
been dramatic within a remarkably brief period. Courts have moved
from a position of virtually no recovery for those injured by defective
products to a position approaching strict liability and finally to a less
easily described middle position.21' My purpose here is to outline
these developments is just enough detail to allow appreciation of the
context out of which the recent reform movement has grown.
207. See eg., Hyrnowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 19S 1, cert dcnied,
493 U.S. 944 (19S9); Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 163 Cal Rptr. 132 (Cal. 199). cert. dcnted sub
nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Sindell, 449 U.S. 912 (19S0). Even a more plaintiff-
friendly approach to issues of repose will not necessarily allow these claims to go for~lard.
The New York Court of Appeals has recently held that DES manufacturers ha% t no duty
to third-generation women whose injuries (allegedly) resulted from their premature birth,
which were in turn said to have resulted from her mother's damaged reproductie sy3tcm,
all of which stemmed from the grandmother's ingestion of DES. Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co.
570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 86S (1991). Should manufacturers of
DES have foreseen that defective drugs taken by pregnant women could have ripplz ef-
fects extending for two subsequent generations? Since the answer to that question is not
self-evident, it seems the better approach would have been to allow the plaintiff to proz d
with her case.
208. See infra subpart IV.B.2 (discussing this issue in the context of MUPLAL).
209. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 110(B)(1) (general), (2) (exceptions).
210. Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 1981), quotd in
Shapo, supra note 107, at 322.
211. See generally RicHARD A. Eps"ErN, C.ASES AND MAxERAMS Oaz ToPnT 611-13 (5th
ed. 1990).
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A. The Development of Product Liability Law in the United
States
Until the early part of this century, courts lagged behind the tech-
nological and societal changes that enabled mass production of con-
sumer goods. Mesmerized by the older paradigm of direct sales of
individual goods from manufacturer to consumer-user, courts limited
recovery for injury-causing defects to those who were in privity with
their buyers.212 As is made clear from a number of cases decided dur-
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, judicial self-de-
ception in this regard was made more palatable by the fear that
tracing liability to its proper source in mass-production cases would
overburden both the court and the manufacturer.1 3
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,21 4 is deservedly a seminal case,
both because the court discarded the out-of-touch privity rule, and
because of Justice Cardozo's boldness in recognizing the rapid disap-
pearance of the world in which the rule had developed. Anyone
foreseeably injured by the negligence of the manufacturer should re-
cover, and because most products were by this time mass-produced,
the foreseeable class of plaintiffs might be quite large.2 1 S
Despite its importance, MacPherson itself did not materially as-
sist the great number of product victims. Steadfast judicial adherence
to the requirement of demonstrating negligence posed insuperable
difficulties, in part because plaintiffs needed to show some problem
with the manufacture of a defective product long after its assembly
and sale.
Unwilling directly to drop the negligence requirement, courts ex-
ercised ingenuity by permitting that result to occur de facto. First,
they increasingly relied on res ipsa loquitur, that much-reviled and ill-
understood doctrine of circumstantial evidence, to presume that an
injury-causing product was negligently manufactured.216 Second, they
212. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903). The best
known English case taking the same position is Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(Ex. 1842).
213. Huset, 120 F. at 867.
214. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
215. Id. at 1053-55.
216. The problems with using res ipsa in this context have been detailed elsewhere. See,
e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 211, at 246-47; JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI,
PRODuCrS LIABILITY-PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 18-25 (1987). The central difficulty, as I
see it, is that in many cases it may stretch credulity to argue that the defect would "more
likely than not" be traceable to negligence. There is also the issue of whether a defective
product can ever be said to satisfy the requirement that the instrumentality causing the
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increasingly allowed plaintiffs to use warranty law to achieve strict lia-
bility,217 despite the reasonable argument that warranties were in-
tended only to protect commercial and consumer purchasers from
disappointed product expectations-not to provide a remedy for per-
sonal injury.21s Eventually, courts further distorted warranty la, by
abandoning its foundation in the contract of sale: injured consumers
were allowed to reach remote sellers as well.21 '9
These developments having warped both negligence principles
and warranty law, it was probably inevitable that courts would em-
brace strict liability in tort as the preferred theory of recovery for
product defect. Appropriately, it fell to Justice Traynor, who had
championed the cause of strict liability as far back as 1944, to an-
nounce the principle's delayed vindication: "To establish the manu-
facturer's liability it was sufficient [to prove injury from] using [the
product] in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in
design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made
the [product] unsafe for its intended use."' -O
This triumph of the strict liability doctrine indicated judicial ac-
ceptance of its asserted justifications. Strict liability best protects the
helpless consumer, in part by relieving her of the difficult burden of
showing negligence; placing the cost on the party best able to bear it,
injury be in the defendant's exclusive control. This problem is particularly acute in casces
where the injury-causing product has been passed around outside the chain of distribution.
In fact, this appears to have been a problem in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling CO., 15) P.2d
436 (Cal. 1944), in which the exploding bottle that caused plaintiff's injury had been deliv-
ered to the restaurant in -which she worked some 36 hours earlier. Who kn.v %%hat might
have happened to it between that time and her injury? The court nonetheless bottomed its
affirmance of the verdict in favor of plaintiff on res ipsa, thereby triggering Justice Tray-
nor's famous concurrence. There, he argued that liability should be strict, and that courts
should simply acknowledge what they were in fact already doing by so attenuating the
requirements of negligence. Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
217. See McCabe v. L.K. Liggett Drug Co., 112 N.E.2d 254 (Mass, 1953). Sfe also
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913) (one of the first cases to suggest 11ar-
ranty as an alternative to proving negligence evidenced by the court's citing language refer-
ring to pureness, wholesomeness, and fitness).
218. Prosser referred to the warranty portion of products liability as -'a freak h brid
born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract." 1 MARSHtL S SHAV , T E L w., o
PRoDucrs LTrBiurr' Lxiii (2d ed. 1990) (quoting William L. Prosser, The Fall of the C ,tadl
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MhNN. L. Rnv. 791, S0O (1966)).
219. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A2d 69 (NJ. 1960) (the case univer-
sally credited with abandoning the privity requirement in N'arranty cases).
220. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d S97, 901 (Cal. 1962) (Plaintiff %ias
using a tool known as the Shopsmith when he was struck in the head with a piece of flying
wood inflicting serious injury. The Shopsmith w'as a combination power tool that could b2
used as a saw, drill, or lathe.).
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either by purchasing insurance or by self-insuring and then distribut-
ing the costs fairly among consumers; and providing the maximum in-
centive for the manufacturer to create safe products, thereby
minimizing the number of losses.221
It has been observed that strict liability took hold mostly in the
context of manufacturing defects-problems in production that the
product's creator did not intend and that occur only episodically. This
is not entirely true. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 22 for
example, it is unclear whether the defective set screws were a manu-
facturing defect or a design defect. The latter term is typically applied
where a manufacturer's conscious design choice results in injury to
consumers. Suits alleging defect design arise after the manufacturer
has selected a mixture of utilities and risks and one of the built-in risks
has materialized.
Justice Traynor was equivocal on the nature of the product's de-
fect in Greenman, writing of a defect in "design and manufacture.' '223
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the product defect cases that arose
before the 1970s generally involved latent defects. Thus, whether or
not the manufacturer chose the risk to which the plaintiff was ex-
posed, the plaintiff had no opportunity to screen the product for de-
fect and, therefore, no real chance for self-protection. Additionally, it
is unclear in these early cases whether the manufacturer necessarily
recognized the danger to which the consumer was exposed. Even if
the manufacturer of the defective combination power tool in Green-
man allegedly chose to make the set screws of insufficient strength,
did the manufacturer recognize that such a strength posed a risk of
injury?
Although it may therefore be an oversimplification to state that
all of the early strict liability cases involved manufacturing defects, it
is fair to note that the products might have been universally deemed
defective, and thus more dangerous than the consumer would expect.
In Greenman, would any manufacturer consciously proceed, after a
cost-benefit analysis, to produce such weak screws when stronger ones
were available for a few pennies? Even if so, should the unsuspecting
injured party be unable to recover damages?
221. Greenman was followed quickly by § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965). This highly influential text almost immediately began to exercise a strong influence
over courts and is at least partly responsible for the developments subsequent in product
liability law to be discussed herein.
222. 377 P.2d at 898-99.
223. Id at 901 (emphasis added).
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Finding an answer to the latter question is made easier once we
have tracked down the source of strict liability in these Greenman-era
cases. That source is warranty law. The jury in these early strict liabil-
ity cases was invited to consider whether the consumer's expectations
as to safety were violated. Compare Greenman with a case such as
McCabe v. Liggett Drug Co.,224 arising under the older law of sales, in
which the court tied an exploding coffee maker's breach of the war-
ranty of merchantability to the plaintiff's use of the appliance in an
ordinary manner.
Once established in the easier cases of latent defect and disap-
pointed consumer expectation, strict liability mushroomed. Most
courts expanded the cast of culpable defendants along the chain of a
product's distribution, drawing in component part manufacturers 5s
and nonmanufacturing middle sellers, such as retalers -+ wholesal-
ers, 27 and distributors.as Lessors also found themselves liable.2
These expansions have at least two sources. First, courts acknowl-
edged that the manufacturer of the completed product may not ahays
be available to the injured consumer or user, and that it might there-
fore be necessary to ensnare others in the product's chain of sale. Sec-
ond, the recognition emerged that the sale of most products takes
place through a complex web of distribution, and that sellers through-
out that chain can arrange their contractual dealings to achieve the
desired exposure to product liability.2-0
224. 112 N.E.2d 254, 256 (Mass. 1953).
225. See eg., Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1975); Suvada v.
white Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (I11. 1965), overruled in part by Dixon v. Chicago &
North W. Trans. Co., 661 N.E.2d 704 (111. 1992); Mott v. Callahan AMS MNachin2 Co., 416
A2d 57 (Nd. 19S0). See also 1 AmERPCAN Lw or PRODUCTS LAILrr 3d § S,12 (19S7)
.
"Where there is no change in the component, and where the cause of harm or injury is
found to be a defect in the component part, the maker and supplier of the defectiha com-
ponent part may be held strictly liable in tort to the ultimate user or consumer." Id.
226. See eg., Kroger Co. v. Goodhew, 206 So. 2d S 2 (Ala. 196S); Newmark v.
Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (NJ. 1969).
227. See eg., Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, Inc., 262 A2d 807 (D.C. 1970); Bow-
man Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 251 S.W.2d 153 (Tx. 1952).
228. See eg., Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Cal. CtC App, 1965);
Belcher v. Hamilton, 475 S.W.2d. 483 (Ky. 1971).
229. See eg., Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P2d 116 (Cal. 19S5), overrulrd in part by
Peterson v. Super. Ct., 10 Cal. 4th 1185 (1995); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 212 A.2d 769 (NJ. 1965).
230. These justifications have not met with universal approval. For an analylsis of the
history of the liability of nonmanufacturing sellers, see Culhane, supra note 182, at 2,S7-95.
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Simultaneously, the class of proper plaintiffs grew to embrace
users and bystanders.3 Bizarre causal chains leading to product in-
jury aside, such expansions were required by the principle of foresee-
ability. The obvious problem of applying a consumer expectation
theory to a bystander is generally thought to be overborne by the by-
stander's more complete helplessness-of all parties, the bystander is
best able to claim that she is a victim of a situation not of her own
making.
The latter expansions can be accommodated within the frame-
work of the latent defect-helpless consumer lawsuit detailed above.
More troubling, at least to the current group of reformers, was the
movement away from reliance on the consumer's expectation of prod-
uct safety. Many courts, although by no means all, began to allow
recovery even for patent defects based upon a balancing of the prod-
uct's perceived risks against its benefits.' 2
This movement was brought about, at least in part, in response to
a growing number of cases involving so-called patent defects. The
patent danger rule had uniformly denied recovery to those who knew
of a product's hazards: "[Tlhe manufacturer of [any product], danger-
ous because of the way in which it functions, and patently so, owes to
those who use it a duty merely to make it free from latent defects and
concealed dangers. [Plaintiff] must.., prove the existence of a latent
defect or [an unknown] danger .... "233
In the important case of Micallef v. Miehle Co.,2-4 the New York
Court of Appeals cheerfully abandoned the so-called patent danger
rule, reasoning that the locus of inquiry should be on whether a rea-
sonably designed product would have been safer. The court also
quoted approvingly a Washington state case: "The law, we think,
ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvi-
ous form."" 5
231. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969); Codling v.
Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).
232. See, e.g., Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 476 P.2d 713 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970); Auburn
Mach. Works Co., Inc. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979).
233. Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802,803 (N.Y. 1950), overruled in part by Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
234. 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
235. l at 577 (quoting Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 476 P.2d at 719). It should be
noted, but only in passing, that Micallef was brought under theories of negligence and
implied warranty, not strict liability (which had only been recognized as a theory in New
York since the case had been brought). Since the reasonableness of product design is im-
plicated under both negligence and "strict" product liability, the choice of theory makes
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Seen through the unerring lens of hindsight, statements such as
the above amount to an acknowledgement of the regulatory effect of
imposing liability for obvious and open design choices. Indeed, the
Micallef court noted that the earlier rule denying recovery was
"founded on the notion that it should be the task of the Legislature,
not the courts, to compel manufacturers to install possible safety
devices."' 6
During the 1970s, the abandonment of the patent danger rule,
along with a more general, expanding recognition that liability could
be properly imposed for conscious design decisions, unleashed a wel-
ter of complexities, which courts have never since managed to rein in.
Although the consumer expectation analysis was far from tidy, it at
least limited the class of claims to those involving an element of tacit
misrepresentation 3 7 Without that test, design defect cases-and sim-
ilarly, cases involving failure to warn-were dropped back into the
vast, unpredictable sea of negligence.
The best known attempt to give the expanding concept of defect
some content is the risk-utility test, first proposed by Professor Wade.
It has often been stated that the risk-utility test is one of negligence.
While it is true that the factors involved in making the determination
of defectiveness under this test have a negligence core, an attempt was
made to go beyond the central question of reasonableness on the de-
fendant's part and to look at a number of important questions con-
cerning the product, the litigants, and the market.ys
little difference here; once gone in this negligence case, the patent danger rule did not
resurface in New York.
236. Miscallef, 348 N.E.2d at 576.
237. Writers of the leading torts treatise probably overstate the point somewhat, stating
that the patent danger rule "is a vestigial carryover from pre-MacPhersan days when deceit
was needed for recovery." 5 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, THE LAW OF Tom.S § 23-5. at 360
(2d ed. 1986).
238. The factors are: (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole; (2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood
that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury; (3) The availability of a
substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe; (4) The manu-
facturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its
usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility; (5) The user's ability to avoid
danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product; (6) The user's anticipated aware-
ness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general pub-
lie knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable
warnings or instructions; and (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spread-
ing the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. John W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.. S25, 837-39 (1973).
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At first blush, it may appear odd that such a balanced approach,
relying as it does on a list of arguably reasonable factors, should have
engendered such resentment from product sellers and their insurers.
At least four reasons have nurtured this publicly expressed
dissatisfaction.
First, one should keep in mind that the imposition of any liability
for conscious design decisions represented a formidable expansion.
With the risk-utility test in place, consumers injured by products lack-
ing safety guards, by uncrashworthy cars, and by virtually any product
that could somehow have been made safer began to queue up at the
courthouse; many recovered.239
Second, given the state-by-state approach to product liability ad-
judication, the regulatory aspect of judicial results sometimes placed
manufacturers in a quandary. A decision in state X might lead a man-
ufacturer to design a machine with stabilizing extensions, for example,
while a decision in state Y might find the manufacturer liable for do-
ing just that. Thus, the manufacturer would have to choose the design
believed likeliest to impose the lowest overall costs (necessarily a
guess), or come up with some third design, or cease production alto-
gether. The spectre of inconsistency is simply not present with manu-
facturing defects since by hypothesis the product is not designed to be
defective in that way.
Third, courts sometimes went beyond the establishment of a risk-
utility test and tinkered with procedural rules so as to benefit plain-
tiffs. One important example is the seminal case of Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co.,240 in which the California Supreme Court stated that,
under the risk-utility test, "once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product's de-
sign, the burden should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove
... that the product is not defective." 241
Finally, and perhaps most troubling to manufacturers, courts have
at times toyed with the notion that a product's defectiveness should be
judged without regard as to whether a safer alternative was possible.
In O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court dismayed
manufacturers by holding that "[a]lthough state of the art evidence
may be dispositive on the facts of a particular case, it does not consti-
239. See, e.g., Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950); Pike v.
Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1970); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d
495 (8th Cir. 1968).
240. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
241. Id. at 455.
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tute an absolute defense.... [T]he burden is on the defendant to
prove that compliance with state of the art... justifies placing a prod-
uct on the market. 242
If compliance with the state of the art at the time of manufacture
will not suffice to relieve a manufacturer of liability, then even com-
pletely reasonable design decisions-indeed, even decisions made
without realistic available alternatives-could result in liability. Thus,
any consumer injured by a product that, given present knowledge or
technology, could have been safer, would be able to recover for inju-
ries caused by the product's "defect." In practice, however, the state
of the art defense has usually received judicial recognition. Further,
as New Jersey's experience demonstrates, the legislature has been
willing to step in where courts have been slow to credit the defense.2¢-
B. Domestic Reform of the Law of Defective Products
It was into this unmappable legal landscape that the reformers
arrived. It would be a mistake to assume that all who wish to limit the
class of, or the amount paid to, product-accident victims have similar
goals in mind. In the analysis that follows, I discuss what might be
termed the mainstream reform movement. It is led by those who are
concerned about the cost and availability of product liability insurance
and the effect of product liability litigation on competitiveness, but
who are also concerned that plaintiffs with legitimate claims should be
reasonably compensated for their injuries.244
242. 463 A.2d 298, 305 (NJ. 1983).
243. In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 VNJ. 1932), the court
plainly refused to recognize the defense in the asbestos case, but the damping les!atie
response was swift. See NJ. STAT. ANN § 2AL5SC-3 (West 1987):
a. In any product liability action against a manufacturer or seller for harm
allegedly caused by a product that was designed in a defective manner, the manu-
facturer or seller shall not be liable ift (1) At the time the product left the control
of the manufacturer, there was not a practical and technically feasible alternatihe
design that would have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the
reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product ....
b. The provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a .... shall not apply if the
court, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, makes all of the follow.ing
determinations: (1) The product is egregiously unsafe or ultra-hazardous; (2) The
ordinary user or consumer of the product cannot reasonably be expcted to have
knowledge of the product's risks, or the product poses a risk of serious injury to
persons other than the user or consumer, and (3) The product has little or no
usefulness.
244. The extreme pro-Defendant position expressed by the unreconstructed con-
tractarians represents a tiny fraction of the literature and is not the subject of this Article.
The most notorious among these corporate apologists is probably Peter Hubar, %%ho has
expressed his position eloquently in PErER HUBER, LIABILrr: THE LEGAL ,OLtTtO
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The Model Uniform Product Liability Act is part of the reform
movement and defines a broad legislative response to the confusion
into which product liability law had descended by the early 1980s.24 -
Many of the provisions of MUPLA have been enacted into law in
several states. For these reasons, MUPLA is used as a model for anal-
ysis here.
MUPLA begins with a section entitled "Findings" which speaks
to the commercial dislocations caused by "sharply rising product lia-
bility insurance premiums. 246 The drafters worried about higher
prices for products, disincentives for innovations and for risky prod-
ucts, the hazards of uninsured producers, and hastily enacted, il-con-
sidered legislation that might unfairly affect claimants' rights. This
section also address the problems created by the state-to-state uncer-
tainty of litigation outcomes, which adversely affect both the insur-
ance market and the judicial system.
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). He makes plain his preference for the "rugged world" in
which "contract principles... could operate very harshly." Id. at 24. He therefore ap-
proves of a no-liability result in a 1937 disaster involving Massengill, which had manufac-
tured a "miracle drug" that was never tested on animals, and then "promptly killed 100
people." Id. Huber states: "If users of the drug had wanted a guarantee of its safety and
effectiveness, they should have demanded one before buying. No such guarantee had been
provided." Id. In these good old days, "a deal was a deal." Id. Sometimes, legal refuta-
tion is no substitute for plain moral revulsion. If any reason beyond one's sense of outrage
is needed, consider that the purchasing public should be entitled to rely on a manufac-
turer's taking of reasonable precautions for its safety before rushing a drug to market.
Disallowing recovery in such a case devalues the consumers' reasonable expectations of
safety, and could reward not only corporate negligence, but intentional injury-causing acts
as well.
245. Examples are set forth supra, note 2.
246. MUPLA was published by the Department of Commerce after an extensive inter-
agency Task Force study concerning products liability. The Task Force "found that uncer-
tainties in the tort litigation system were a principal cause of the product liability
problem." MUPLA, supra note 1, Background of the Act, Appendix A, commentary at
281. The Task Force report was presented to representatives from the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget and the Domestic Policy Staff of the White House who requested that the
Department of Commerce prepare an options paper on what action the Federal Govern-
ment should take to address the product liability problem. The options paper included a
proposal for a uniform product liability law. After favorable responses to this recommen-
dation, the Department of Commerce published the "Draft Uniform Product Liability
Law" in the Federal Register for public comment. The Department of Commerce received
approximately 1500 pages of commentary regarding the draft. In addition, the Department
of Commerce brought the draft to the attention of consumer groups, and representatives of
product seller and insurer groups. The draft was also reviewed before the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Minority Enterprises of the House Committee on Small Business and
before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. MUPLA was published on January 8, 1982, and
"has benefited substantially from its review by, and input from, the various groups affected
by the product liability problem." Id. at 282.
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Given these concerns, one might have expected a comprehensive
overhaul of product liability law or at least retrenchment. MUPLA is
instead remarkably measured, offering much in the way of procedural
reform but little truly substantive change. 47 This result is neither sur-
prising nor wrong. The current section attempts a conceptual sum-
mary of MUPLA, grouping together provisions that speak to the two
overarching issues: the substantive rights of litigants and the conduct
of the litigation.2"
1. MUPLA's Effect on the Substantive Law of Product Defects
One is first struck by the small number of provisions devoted to
substantive reform. Only five of twenty-three sections deal with the
basic responsibility of product sellers, while an additional two sections
concern reducing liability based on the conduct of the plaintiff or of
third parties. In contrast, nine sections can be comfortably placed in
the "conduct of litigation" category. More significantly, the substan-
tive responsibility sections, with some exceptions, are much more
open-ended than the other provisions.
a. Defining Defect and Firing the Standard of Liability
The centerpiece of MUPLA, which is intended to preempt virtu-
ally all existing product liability law 49 is section 104 which provides
"Basic Standards of Responsibility for Manufacturers."25t However,
247. Both the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts and an ALI report (1 A'i. L
INsT., Reporters' Study on Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury 3-52 (1991), Introduc-
tory Chapters reprinted in 30 SAN Dmoo L REv. 371 (1993)), came to the same result,
except that both made the mistake of doing away with the consumer expectation test in
favor of the risk-utility calculus. See infra subpart IV.B.I(a) (on MUPLA) and ALI Re-
porters' Study, supra at 414 ("There should be no separate 'consumer expectations' test for
design defect .... )
248. Of course, the dichotomy can be criticized as forced, even false. After all, the
procedural mechanisms established by any piece of legislation do have an effect, some-
times a dispositive one, on a litigant's chances of success. Conversely, certain procedural
changes might be rendered irrelevant by a preemptive change in the substantive law. For
the reasons I develop throughout this Article, however, I am convinced that the distinction
is worth making, because it can enable comprehensive understanding of the value of partic-
ular attempts at reform.
249. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 103(A). This preemption does not apply to claims for
commercial loss, which are expressly not covered by the Act. See id. § 102(F) (defining
"harm" as excluding "direct or consequential economic loss"). Such damages can still be
recovered "under the 'Uniform Commercial Code' or similar laws." Id. § 103(A).
250. "Manufacturer" is broadly defined as "a product seller who designs, produces,
makes, fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures the relevant product or component part of
a product before its sale to a user or consumer. It includes a product seller ... not other-
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this section undoubtedly disappointed those expecting to find a
change in the law governing liability for defect.
The section begins by sorting out the various types of product
defect cases long recognized by courts. It announces that separate
subsections will deal, respectively, with products "unreasonably un-
safe in construction, in design, and in inadequacy of warning."2 1 As
to all three, liability is-at least by definition-strict under the provi-
sion: "A product manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant who
proves ... that ... the harm was proximately caused because the
product was defective." 2  Absent from that definition of "defect" is
any mention of "fault" or of "reasonableness." But, as has developed
in domestic law, the inquiry into defect itself typically comprehends a
reasonableness analysis. The qualifier "typically" in the preceding
sentence was necessary to exclude manufacturing or construction de-
fects, which the drafters believed should continue to create strict lia-
bility. As to these episodic, unintended defects, MUPLA simply
requires that the "product deviated in some material way from the
manufacturer's design specifications or performance standards, or
from otherwise identical units of the same product line."253
Manufacturing defects aside, MUPLA contemplates a full-dress
analysis of the "reasonableness" of the product in design defect cases.
A product is "unreasonably unsafe in design" if it is found that "at the
time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the
claimant's harm or similar harms and the seriousness of those harms
outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a product that
would have prevented those harms, and the adverse effect that alter-
native design would have on the usefulness of the product. 254 Article
104(B) then provides examples of evidence that is "especially proba-
tive" in evaluating a product allegedly defective in design; however,
wise a manufacturer that holds itself out as a manufacturer." Id. § 102 (B). This last sen-
tence is properly sensitive to the representational dimension of a product liability claim.
251. I set aside the separate category of express warranty, used throughout MUPLA.
MUPLA essentially grants a product liability claimant an additional path to relief if she
can demonstrate that an express warranty was breached. Since these express warranties
cannot operate through their limitations as disclaimers, they cannot grant less relief than
would otherwise be available. These warranties, while an effective means of recovery in
some cases, stand apart from the great bulk of product defect law for personal injury; they
do not raise any special difficulties that concern us here. Therefore, I do not dwell on them
further in this Article.
252. ld. § 104.
253. Id. § 104(A).
254. Id. § 104(B)(1).
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the list is neither exhaustive nor too specific. s In short, the "defect"
label goes on only after the "reasonableness" analysis goes in.
MUPLA's treatment of the warning issue parallels negligence
principles and thereby represents no substantial change from the case
law.-5 6 A product is deemed "unreasonably unsafe" by virtue of inad-
equacy of warning if "the likelihood that the product would cause the
claimant's harm or similar harms and the seriousness of those harms
rendered the ... instructions inadequate and that the manufacturer
should and could have provided... instructions or warnings."257 With
its overtly moral language, the adequacy of warning provision focuses
judicial attention squarely on the conduct of the manufacturer: Under
the circumstances, should the manufacturer have provided the con-
tested warnings? This is a far cry from strict liability.
Underscoring that point are examples of especially probative evi-
dence of a warning's adequacy which speak to the conduct of the man-
ufacturer, even more so than is the case with design defect: Was the
manufacturer able to know of the product's danger or to anticipate
that the likely user would be aware of any danger? How feasible and
practical would it have been to provide warnings? How clear and con-
spicuous were any warnings that were provided?s
MUPLA's provisions reflect the fact that a more developed body
of doctrine has sprung up around the duty to warn than in the design
defect area. Its subsections, however, adopt the typical Restatement
approach; in the closer cases the drafters chose what they considered
to be the best among the available alternatives. Thus, MUPLA fol-
lows the uncontroversial view that a "manufacturer shall not be liable
for its failure to warn... about dangers that are obvious,"25" but takes
a bolder stand on the issue of whether, and under what circumstances,
conveying a warning to an intermediary relieves the manufacturer of
liability to the ultimate user. In sum, MUPLA generally applies the
learned intermediary rule,16° relieving manufacturers of liability
255. The trier of fact is urged to give attention to: "%arnings and instructions"; the
feasibility of a product that would have prevented the harm while remaining useful; "the
effect of any proposed alternative design on the usefulness of the product"; the cost of the
chosen design, as opposed to available alternatives- and other harms "that might have re-
sulted if the product had been... alternatively designed." Id. § 104(B)(2)(a)-(e).
256. See Hager, supra note 13, at n.31 (citing cases) and accompanying text.
257. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 104(C)(1) (emphasis added).
258. Id. § 104(C)(2)(a)-(d). Subsection (e) calls the "adequacy" of the warnings impor-
tant, but this provision simply reformulates the basis of liability. Id. § 104(C)(2)(e).
259. Id. § 104(C)(4).
260. Id. § 104(C)(5). The Act provides that a manufacturer may be relieved of the duty
to warn the user if it provides warnings "to a person who may be reasonably expected to
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where the warning is more sensibly provided to the person best posi-
tioned to convey it to the class of ultimate users. MUPLA also
adopted a more specific rule for the workplace: When there is "no
practical and feasible means" of informing the employee of the dan-
ger, warnings may stop with the employer. Finally, MUPLA attempts
to impose order on the currently cluttered question of postmanufac-
ture duty to warn. Rejecting the blanket no-liability position,
MUPLA imposes a duty to warn where "a reasonably prudent manu-
facturer should have learned about the danger associated with a prod-
uct after it was manufactured."26' Subsequently, the manufacturer
must act reasonably by attempting "to inform product users" or others
in a position to prevent harm.
This analysis of the salient provisions of section 104 demonstrates
that MUPLA's drafters did not seek an overhaul of the jurisprudence
of defect-a body of law reached only after great difficulty by the
courts. Nonetheless, the law of defect was swept clean in several
respects.
First, the drafters openly cast their lot with a negligence-based
standard of liability in all but manufacturing defect cases. The reasons
for doing so were two-fold: First, as a practical matter, the availability
of closely related theories of negligence and strict liability at trial had
caused courts to "drift ... toward verbal formulas that attempt to
distinguish" between the two.262 Similarly, "[n]o court, in spite of
some loose language ...has imposed true strict ...liability. ' '263
Courts and the drafters alike recognized the frightening possibility of
limitless liability inherent in true strict liability: "[I]t is almost always
possible to design a product more safely. ' '2 61
Second, the drafters flatly abandoned the consumer expectation
test. They stated that this radical step was taken because, in most
cases, the consumer would not have any idea of what to expect. Even
where some expectation could be found, the drafters found the test
too subjective: "Each trier of fact is likely to have a different under-
standing of abstract consumer expectations. ' 265 Between the lines,
assure that action is taken to avoid the harm, or that the risk of the harm is explained to
the actual product user."
261. ML § 104(C)(6).
262. Id. § 104, app. A, commentary at 297. Extending the metaphor, the drafters noted
that the courts "have plunged into a foggy area that is neither true strict liability nor negli-
gence." Id. at 298.
263. 1d at 299.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 301.
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one can discern an additional source of disquiet concerning the older
test: it is embodied in section 402A of the Restatement, which, the
drafters sought to jettison as unresponsive to defects other than those
of manufacture. 266
MUPLA's radical departure from the well-worn consumer expec-
tation test directly conflicts with the approach taken by the product
liability directive. As previously stated, the Directive makes plain its
preference for the consumer expectation test in defining defect.-'- 7 In-
deed, the interesting question under the Directive has been whether
its definition of defect leaves room for a risk-utility analysis.-'3
It is submitted that the drafters of MUPLA went wrong in doing
away with the consumer expectation test.2 69 As shown above, their
reasons for doing so centered around the uncertainty of outcome that
the test can yield. But that uncertainty is likely to be a problem only
in those difficult cases where the consumer's expectation is hard to
gauge. In many cases, jurors can, without reservation, assess what a
reasonable consumer would have expected. Even where that is diffi-
cult, the inquiry should focus on the safety that a reasonable consumer
has the right to expect, rather than on a risk-utility analysis a manufac-
turer makes, which allows the consumer's safety to be too easily
subverted.
If there is a manufacturing defect, for example, the injured prod-
uct user recovers precisely because the product was more dangerous
than expected. As pointed out in the earlier discussion of the history
of product liability,270 the same can be said of many latent defects,
even where the problem is of design. These simple findings would
conserve scarce judicial resources. It makes little sense for attorneys
266. "Much of the controversy appears to have sprung from the fact that the authors of
Section 402A of the 'Restatement (Second) of Torts' were focusing on problems relating to
product mismanufacture... and not on problems relating to defective design or the duty to
warn." ld. at 297. This statement overlooks at least comment j and comment k to that
famous text, which expressly address the problems of warnings.
267. See discussion supra subpart Ill.B2.
268. Professor Shapo seems to believe that no room remains for risk-utility principles
under this approach: "Conspicuous by their absence are notions of cost-bencfit and risk-
utility analysis.. . ." Shapo, supra note 107, at 292.
269. At the same time, I recognize that the trend is overwhelmingly in the direction of
the risk-utility test. One fairly recent attempt to work within the strictures of that test is
found in W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through tire Muddle of Risk-Utiitiy Analysts, 39 A1. U.
L. REv. 573 (1990), in which the author seeks to make the test more useful, even more
mechanical, by reorganizing the factors and by offering some supplemental considerations
of his own.
270. See supra subpart V.A.
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to put on a complicated, and usually expensive, isk-utility play when
a much simpler standard is at hand.
Further, the consumer expectation test, faithfully applied, better
serves the requirements of justice by including the consumer-either
actually or by a "proxy of his peers"-in decisions crucially affecting
his physical and emotional health. Such an approach also values the
consumer's decision to purchase products he knows pose a danger by
disallowing recovery in those cases, assuming that the choice is not
coerced.
b. Liability of Nonmanufacturing Sellers
In something of a sidebar to the development of the central ten-
ets of product liability law, the responsibility of nonmanufacturing
sellers of defective products has its own peculiar history. While suits
against these sellers were less likely to be frustrated by the privity
rule, the continued insistence on negligence meant that, until recently,
tort claims against nonmanufacturers were unlikely to succeed. The
plaintiff had to prove some act of negligence on the part of a defend-
ant who was usually a mere conduit between manufacturer and pur-
chaser. Of course, the increased willingness of courts to allow the
skirting of the negligence requirement (and thus the limitations im-
posed by tort) by recognizing claims grounded in implied warranty
meant that immediate product sellers began to be hailed into court,
and were often found liable." Thus an anomalous result was
achieved: Absent negligence, the immediate seller-typically the re-
tailer, in consumer goods cases-was more likely to be liable than was
the party responsible for the defect. Since warranty liability was strict,
the retailer's presumed inability to inspect the product for defects did
not operate as a defense.
Inasmuch as warranty liability derives in part from the string of
contracts involving the sale of a given good, 72 the retailer could in
turn sue the next party up the chain of distribution who could then
seek indemnification against its seller, and so on, until the defect-cre-
ating manufacturer was ultimately reached. This clumsy approach has
271. Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936); McCabe v. Liggett Drug Co.,
112 N.E.2d 254 (Mass. 1953); see generally U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-316 (1995).
272. Because courts have moved fluidly between tort and contract principles in inter-
preting rights under warranties, the phrase "in part" is a necessary qualifier. See generally
V. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 95A (5th ed.
1984).
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been justly criticized,273 and not surprisingly, it became unnecessary
within a short time. Courts began to allow suits in warranty against
remote sellers274 and, by discarding the negligence requirement in
tort, came to permit liability suits even against those middle sellers
who did not have a reasonable opportunity to inspect.27
However, this move did not go uncriticized,2 76 nor was it univer-
sally accepted by the courts.277 After all, many of the principal justifi-
cations advanced in support of abrogating the negligence requirement
against manufacturers of defective goods do not apply to others in the
chain of distribution. Problems of proving negligence, for example,
are usually irrelevant to the downstream seller who did not create the
defect in the first place. Similarly, the goal of providing incentives to
the manufacturer to produce safe products is facially inapplicable to
nonproducers. Finally, and perhaps most troubling, the argument
based on notions of corrective justice seems weakened, if not de-
feated, as to nonmanufacturers. To state the issue simply: How can
justice require the middle seller to pay the injured consumer for an
injury caused by someone else?
These problems notwithstanding, most courts have allowed in-
jured product users to pursue claims against nonmanufacturing sellers.
The reasons for doing so were again best captured by Justice Traynor:
the manufacturer may not be amenable to suit, leaving the plaintiff
remediless unless others in the chain of product distribution are liable;
and the middlemen may be in a position to exert pressure on the man-
ufacturer to strive toward greater product safety.276
273. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441-42 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
274. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors. Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1%0L.
275. This approach is consistent with that taken by the REsTATEMErN (SFcoND) oF
TORTS § 402A (1966) (imposing a duty of strict liability duties on all commercial S'llers).
See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 16S (Cal. 1964); Visnoski v. J.C+ Penney Co.,
477 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
276. Culhane, supra note 182, at 293-95 see also John B. Waite, Retail Responsibily
and Judicial Lmv Making, 34 Mic. L. Rv. 494, 519 (1936) (-[ihf there b a reason, a
public gain in the transfer of the loss from the customer to the retailer, the writer is not
aware of it.").
277. See, e.g., Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 25S So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972) (refusing to
find liable either the retailer or the wholesaler of a pair of shoes which contained a latent
defect but had never been removed from their original package until they were moved to
an in-store rack).
278. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964). This last point ap-
plies only to situations involving manufacturers and middlemen %,ho deal with each other
on a regular basis. The point may not be valid where manufacturers Dho end up paying
tort judgments are not actually turning out unsafe products and wvhere nonmanufacturing
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Perhaps because courts and commentators were convinced that
compensating the injured was the true reason for extending liability to
nonmanufacturers, the Act and a number of state statutes have neatly
responded to the problem without dragging these sellers into the liti-
gation unnecessarily.
Under section 105 of the Act, the nonmanufacturing seller is usu-
ally liable only if negligent in its own right; a claimant can recover by
proving that her "harm was proximately caused by... [the] product
seller's failure to use reasonable care with respect to the product. 2 79
The statute then sets forth what amounts to a corollary rule under
which liability is improper absent "a reasonable opportunity to inspect
the product" in a way that would (or should) have revealed the defect.
Nonnegligent middle sellers are therefore typically exempt from
liability. But concern for the victim trumps the desire to completely
absolve nonmanufacturers; section 105 subjects these product sellers
to liability where, either due to lack of jurisdiction or insolvency, the
manufacturer fails to provide relief to the plaintiff.280 The drafters
also provided a catch-all protection which applies where the court
finds it "highly probable that the claimant would be unable to enforce
a judgment against the product manufacturer. '281
This compromise seems a more satisfactory resolution than that
achieved by the Directive-which allows the nonmanufacturing sup-
plier to escape liability simply by "identifying" the manufacturer. The
Directive makes no provision for those cases in which the manufac-
turer is identifiable, but for one reason or another cannot be reached.
The Act admirably cuts away much of the confusion that has sur-
rounded product liability by offering one streamlined statute to sup-
plant the warring tort theories of implied warranty, negligence, and
strict liability in tort. Dispensing with implied warranty, however,
removes the UCC's clear imposition of liability against middle sellers.
This result can be countenanced if the plaintiff is to recover in any
case, but becomes indefensible under the Directive's approach, where
a product-injured party can find himself without redress.
sellers lack sufficient knowledge or market power to affect the manufacturer's decision.
See Culhane, supra note 182, at 293-94.
279. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 105(A). Section 105 further illuminates the conduct re-
quired for liability: "[T]he trier of fact shall consider the effect of such product seller's own
conduct with respect to the design, construction, inspection, or condition of the product,
and any failure of such product seller to transmit adequate warnings or instructions about
the dangers and proper use of the product." Id.
280. Id. § 105(C)(1)-(2).
281. Id. § 105(C)(3).
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It is a close question whether corrective justice requires nonman-
ufacturing, nonnegligent sellers to compensate injured product users
(or bystanders) where the producer is absent. Some have argued that,
if the nonmanufacturer is to be released from liability on the premise
that it neither caused the defect nor was negligent in any other mate-
rial respect, then there is no reason for holding it liable just because
the manufacturer turns out to be unavailable. This policy is followed
by at least a few states which refuse to hold the nonnegligent middle
seller liable even where the manufacturer cannot be reached.2
On the other hand, the middle sellers are involved in the chain of
distribution, may be in a position to influence the manufacturer, and
usually are better able to absorb the cost than the product's injured
user. Presumably for these reasons, both the Act and a great majority
of state statutes expressly permit suit against nonmanufacturers where
necessary for recovery.2s 3 Moreover, in a sense, the intermediate dis-
tributors of the product contributed to causing the injury by allowing
the defective product to come into the injured party's possession. Ac-
cordingly, it makes sense that the middle sellers be left "standing by"
to compensate as needed, but that they be otherwise freed from liabil-
ity. The Act agrees, criticizing the approach of the minority of states:
"[T]he [pure nonliability] approach can leave a person injured by a
defective product.., without compensation. [I]n these situations, the
party who actually sold ... the defective product should bear the
loss."' 84
Finally, it is worth reiterating that the middle seller's liability has
long (and properly) been recognized as stemming from the reliance
that buyers place upon their immediate sellers. This point is in some
sense a corollary to the perception that nonmanufacturing sellers have
the ability to structure their relationships with the manufacturer-at
least by contractual indemnification provisions-so as to place them-
selves in a better position to ensure the safety of a product than at
least the consumer.
c. Special Liability Rules for "Problem" Products
This section groups for discussion sections 106 through 10S of the
Act. None of these sections is invoked in the run-of-the-mill product
liability case. For example, if the product contains a defect of manu-
282. Se4 ag., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-106.1 (Harrison 1991); NEB. RE%. STAT. § 25-21,
181 (1989); S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. § 20-9-9 (1995).
283. Many of these statutes are collected in Culhane, supra note 182, at 2W.-S3 n3.
284. MUPLA, supra note 1, app. A, § 105 cmt.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
facture, or if alternative designs were available but deliberately disre-
garded, the tests for defect found within section 104 would suffice.
Sections 106-108 only apply where the manufacturer is arguing that
the product could not or should not have been made safer, either by
design or by accompanying warning.
Section 106 echoes comment k to Restatement (Torts) section
402A and imposes negligence-based liability on sellers of "unavoid-
ably dangerous" products. Such products are those that, in light of
available knowledge at the time of manufacture, are incapable of be-
ing made safe without impairing their usefulness. 2 5  Manufacturing
defects and express warranties aside,286 a product seller will not be
liable for harm caused by these products unless the seller knew or
should have known of the unavoidably dangerous aspect of the prod-
uct-and therefore either "acted unreasonably in selling the product
at all" or "failed to meet a duty to instruct or warn under subsection
104(C), or to transmit warnings or instructions under subsection
105(A). ' ' s
These two possible grounds for liability deserve separate atten-
tion. The first liability basis, referring to those unavoidably unsafe
products that should not be marketed at all, constitutes a dramatic
departure from comment k, which limited its focus to products that
were both unambiguously useful (mostly drugs288 ) and yet hazardous
in some respect. The Act's reference to products that should not have
been sold "at all" is given context by the example provided in the
analysis accompanying section 106. Referring to the "unusual" situa-
tion calling for disposition under this rule, the drafters cited the exam-
ple of "a product seller who markets a toy that is highly dangerous to
285. Id. § 106(A).
286. These situations are dealt with by MUPLA § 106(B)(2) (manufacturing defects)
and 106(B)(4) (express warranties). As stated earlier, the former are subject to a strict
liability standard throughout MUPLA, while express warranties announce their own bases
of liability.
287. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 106(B)(1), (3).
288. There has been some debate about whether comment k should be read as applying
only to drugs. All of the examples given in the comment refer to drugs, so the tendency
has been to consider only the drugs that are covered by its terms. But that conclusion is
not dispositive. The comment refers to drugs as an "especially common" instance of un-
avoidably unsafe products. Thus, it has been argued that the class of such products should
neither be germinated nor limited by drugs. See Theresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription
Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REv. 1357, 1363 n.33 (1994)
(collecting cases that refuse "to adopt bright-line rules that would treat all prescription
drugs and devices as deserving of special ... rules").
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children." Note that the seller is held liable in this case even if the
product is accompanied by proper warnings.
The second liability basis, failure to provide adequate warnings
for products that present an unavoidable risk, is a close cousin of com-
ment k: both impose liability for selling unavoidably dangerous prod-
ucts without an accompanying warning and both focus on drugs and
similar products, such as blood. The Act and the Restatement thus
share the perception that the risk inherent in virtually all drugs, or
bodily products, is outweighed by their curative effect.
That said, one might question whether a drug seller could be lia-
ble for failing to warn users that a drug's dangers were yet unknown.
This possibility surfaces in cases where experimental drugs are rushed
to market without much testing, because even quite serious side ef-
fects are preferable to the illness that the drug was designed to com-
bat. Drugs treating the HIV virus, which causes AIDS, are the most
dramatic contemporary example.
In this circumstance, should a duty to warn attach? The Act
seems to answer no. Under section 106(B)(3), liability will be im-
posed only if the seller "knew or had reason to know of the [unavoid-
ably dangerous] aspect and failed... [to] warn." Unless the user of an
experimental drug could establish that the seller had reason to know
of a particular danger posed by the drug, liability would seem
precluded. 8 9
One additional point must be made concerning section 106. It
will be recalled that section 104, establishing the basic liability rules
for producers of defective products, treats both the seller's knowledge
of dangers associated with the product, and its ability to design a suita-
ble alternative, as factors that are "especially probative" in determin-
ing whether a product is defective. Section 106 thus creates an
important qualifier to section 104's general language: Whenever a
product is "unavoidably unsafe," liability will not attach unless the
seller had reason to know of the defect.
Section 107 of the Act picks up the thread from section 106, ad-
dressing related issues of liability for risks that are difficult, if not im-
possible, to eliminate. The section is somewhat more complicated
however, containing rules of evidence and substantive liability princi-
ples, and dealing with a wider spectrum of conduct and products than
does section 106.
289. For criticism of this position, see infra subpart V.D.
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Subsection (A) of section 107 deals with the thorny evidentiary
issue of the relevance of changes in a product, or in the surrounding
environment, after a product's manufacture.2" Unequivocally resolv-
ing a long-standing controversy, the Act simply states that
postmanufacture changes in a product's design, in a product's accom-
panying warnings, or in the custom or technology in the field are inad-
missible "for the purpose of proving that the product was defective,"
as the prejudicial effect of such remediation evidence outweighs its
probative value.29 The sound analysis accompanying the section indi-
cates the drafters' awareness of the strength of the competing posi-
tions on this issue.29
As to the "custom" in the relevant industry293 at the time of man-
ufacture, and as to compliance (or noncompliance) with "a non-gov-
ernmental safety or performance standard," the Act takes a middle-
of-the-road approach. These elements are evidence for the trier of
fact to weigh in ascertaining whether the product was defective or ac-
companied by insufficient warnings. The Act properly recognizes that
relevant customary standards of manufacture, as well as private per-
formance and safety standards, are usually present for sound reasons
and that the trier of fact should at least be permitted to consider the
manufacturer's adherence to these standards in resolving the liability
issue. At the same time, the drafters acknowledge that custom may
lag behind what a reasonable manufacturer would do, and that private
290. I disagree with the Act's decision to freeze liability at the time of manufacture. It
may be that the manufacturer retains the product for some time after it is manufactured; if
so, the manufacturer should be responsible for making necessary changes in light of new
information before selling the product. In short, control of the product, which does not
end until sale, should be the touchstone of liability.
291. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 107(A).
292. See id § 107 (accompanying analysis). The drafters recognize that some courts
have criticized the argument that allowing evidence of subsequent changes in the product
or in the surrounding technology would make manufacturers less likely to undertake prod-
uct changes. This criticism is based on the notion that, at least in some cases, the manufac-
turer will be better off making the changes so as to avoid paying an even greater number of
product-injured plaintiffs in the future. The drafters emphasize instead the highly prejudi-
cial nature of such remediate evidence. Although subsequent improvements to a product
may seem irrelevant to the issue of whether a product was defective at the time of its
manufacture, the evidence goes to whether a feasible alternative was available-imple-
mentation of prompt remediation suggests that it was. So the argument against allowing
such evidence is not strictly logical, but is based on the weight a jury might afford the
evidence.
293. The Act defines "custom" as follows: "[T]he practice followed by an ordinary
product seller in the product seller's industry or business." MUPLA, supra note 1,
§ 107(B).
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safety standards may exhibit "variance in [their] nature and
quality. '294
The treatment given to custom by section 107 unmasks another
virtue of the Act. Simply put, the Act separates different terms fre-
quently lumped together as "state of the art." According to the draft-
ers, the controversy over whether to recognize compliance with the
state of the art as a defense can be simplified, if not resolved, by doing
away with the term entirely. State of the art has been used in inconsis-
tent ways, with courts running the definitional gamut from "custom"
to the "aggregate of product-related knowledge existing at any given
point in time."295
In separating these obviously disparate notions, the Act treats
custom differently from "practical technological feasibility." While
adherence to or departure from custom is simply evidence relating to
the issue of defect, practical technological feasibility involves a shift of
the burden of proof. If the product seller can prove "that it was not
within practical technological feasibility to make the product safer...
so as to have prevented claimant's harm,""-  a presumption of no lia-
bility arises.
Consistent with the logic of the Act, manufacturing defects and
express warranties can defeat the presumption. Moreover, the pre-
sumption does not relieve a manufacturer of any postsale duty to warn
that might be incurred under section 104(C)(6). Otherwise, the pre-
sumption renders the manufacturer liable only if-with knowledge or
reason to know of the danger-it acted unreasonably in selling the
product at all.297 The analysis provides two examples of what might
be considered unreasonable conduct in this setting: one is the trusty
"child's toy," while the other is a "home heating unit with a radium
core." Although the second is a bit puzzling, gs the first is consistent
both with the recognition in section 106 that a manufacturer might be
liable for selling a product with an unavoidably unsafe feature, and
294. Id. app. A, § 107 (accompanying analysis).
295. Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State of the Art Defense, 43 ALB. L.
REx. 941, 945-46 (1979).
296. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 107(D).
297. Id. § 107(E)(1).
298. There are alternatives to home heating units with radium cores, or else we would
all be dead. Perhaps the example could be salvaged by arguing that a product using a
different element to supply the heat would be a different product altogether, but little
seems to be gained in making the point. A better example might have been asbestos,
assuming there is no alternative fire-retardant. Should liability be imposed in that case?
See Part I, supra.
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with a strain of the case law that has been willing to impose liability on
those who sell even the most technologically advanced product, if that
product (on a risk-utility analysis) should not be sold at all.2 99
Section 108 brings to rest the issue of compliance with standards
by addressing the effect of public regulatory standards and mandatory
government specifications. Taking the simpler issue first, the Act
speaks plainly on the subject of compliance with mandatory design
specifications issued by the government: If compliance nonetheless
results in an injury-causing defective product, "the government, not
the product seller, is the appropriate defendant."3 °0 On the other
hand, if the specifications are not met, and the claimant's injury is the
proximate result of that noncompliance, "the product shall be deemed
defective." Although the drafters did not so state, the apparent rea-
son for these conclusive presumptions is that product sellers, shielded
by a no-liability rule through compliance, should be subject to a strict
liability rule where they fail to exercise the straightforward means of
escaping liability with which they have been provided.
A more typical case that would arise under section 108 involves
the product subject to legislative or administrative regulation before
reaching the market. In these cases, subsections (A) and (B) of sec-
tion 108 adopt a mirrored approach: If standards are complied with,
the product is presumptively nondefective; if not, the product is pre-
sumptively defective.
299. The case that has been most often cited on this point is Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Co., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (state of the art defense not permitted in asbestos
case). Similarly, in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983), the New Jersey
Supreme Court held it a jury question whether a vinyl pool bottom was defective, even if
no other commercially reasonable substitute was available. The court held that compliance
with the state of the art was but one factor to be considered in applying the risk-utility test.
Thus, to reach the jury, "it was not necessary for plaintiff to prove the existence of alterna-
tive, safer designs." Id. at 306. Would New Jersey's subsequently enacted product liability
statute have precluded the result in O'Brien? N.J. STAT. AN ?. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1987)
creates a state of the art defense in subsection (a), but then somewhat softens the effect of
that defense in subsection (b), by allowing the court, on the basis of clear and convincing
evidence, to find that the product was extremely unsafe, a latent hazard, and virtually use-
less. If the court so finds, it shall not apply subsection (a). The New Jersey Supreme
Court's treatment of asbestos cases is followed in Louisiana. In Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113-16 (La. 1986), the court found that, because
asbestos was unreasonably dangerous per se, the defendant would not be heard to argue
that it could not know of the dangers of asbestos at the time it was manufactured and
marketed.
300. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 108 (accompanying analysis). The drafters, sensitive to
the problem of governmental immunity, also advised state legislatures to ensure appropri-
ate accountability-although not necessarily through the tort system-before enacting this
provision. d
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These burden-shifting presumptions result from the moderate
amount of deference the drafters felt such regulations deserved. On
the one hand, they placed some stock in sellers' arguments that such
standards reflect a good deal of time, thought, and effort, and are
often the subject of public scrutiny; that these standards impart wel-
come consistency and predictability to product liability law; that lay
jurors have no business restructuring carefully crafted standards; and
that properly conceived standards will supply sellers with an incentive
to comply with those standards.30 '
Yet the drafters also recognized the force of counterarguments.
First, such standards often result from compromise, and are at times
heavily influenced by industry, which has a stake in lowering compli-
ance costs. Second, regulatory bodies may have insufficient personnel
or expertise to monitor compliance sufficiently. Third, the govern-
ment has recognized that its standards are only a minimum; more may
be required in order for a product to meet the jurisprudential standard
of nondefective.
At this time, compliance (or noncompliance) with regulation
should not give rise to a burden-shifting presumption. The drafters'
approach effectively constitutes all regulatory agencies as equal, af-
fording a qualified cloaking effect to the determinations of each. Yet
the processes by which new products are approved range from strict to
lax, with agencies registering at all points on the line.!"'2 Even those
that might be deemed the most cautious and consumer-conscious,
such as the FDA, have been criticized for inadequately protecting the
citizens who depend on them. - 3 Others agencies also have spotty
301. Id. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d S9 (Utah 1991), for a judicial expoI-
tion of these points.
302. See generally SUSAN I. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, Dis'.tAmr r A'urncA
THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE (1983).
303. See Theresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations m Pr.4ouils
Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. RENv. 1121, 114S (19SS) (criticizing the FDA's and FAA'.
dependency on data provided by the industries the agency is established to rculate}. The
article discusses a number of drugs with severe adverse side effccts which the FDA ap-
proved or failed to regulate properly based on the failure of the manufacturer to inform
the agency of dangers of the drugs. In the case of Merital, the FDA itself had indications of
the severe effects of the drug prior to approving it without providing %%arnmgz of such
effects. Id. at nn.253-55. See also Keith Schneider, FDA Faulted in Thrcat Fromn Anmal
Drugs, N.Y. TiaNs, Jan. 13, 19S6, at Al (citing congressional report accusing FDA of inad.
equately monitoring the use of toxic drugs in raising livestock, posing threat to he alt h of
consumers); Robin Marantz Henig, The FDA as Powder Puf" Agency is Calied tcan n
Regulation of Cosmetics, WASH. PosT, Sept. 27, 19S., at Z12 (criticizing FDA'S relianze on
"voluntary" oversight of products by cosmetics industry); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813
P.2d at 100 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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records, such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
which has more responsibility for furthering product safety.304
Further, an overly deferential approach to regulatory approval
neglects the important difference between considering a product ex
ante, when its most significant dangers may be unknown, camou-
flaged, or downplayed, and ex post, when one or more of those dan-
gers have actually resulted in injury. The regulators, unable to
anticipate all that might go wrong with a product, may cast their ap-
proving vote without the most significant piece of information-the
fact of injury-before them.
On the consumer activist side, this issue of ignorance is inter-
twined with an incentive problem: While the seller has every incen-
tive to keep compliance costs low (and therefore to press for
approval), the consumers' representatives may be operating at an in-
formational disadvantage. Since they may not be able to predict a
product's dangers, they may allow products to pass through the regu-
latory stage without significant opposition. On the consumers' side,
the occasion of injury provides both the necessary knowledge and the
ultimate incentive to sue. Similarly, consumer advocates are not
themselves the injured parties; thus, those with the most at stake are
not in a position to protect themselves ex ante and should be given
their own voice when injury actually occurs.305
My criticisms are not meant to sour the promise of regulation.
Indeed, comprehensive regulation should be welcomed, as it can pre-
vent a great number of injuries. The EC has recognized the virtue of
this two-step approach and promulgated a host of directives aimed at
304. The CPSC has been described as "an agency racked by dissension and turmoil
[which] has virtually abandoned setting mandatory standards .... As a result... Congress
has attempted to pressure it into regulating a number of products that have become haz-
ardous to the public." Schwartz, supra note 303, at 1159. These products included "lawn
darts, cigarette lighters, all-terrain vehicles, adult sleepwear flammability, and choking
hazards in small toy parts." Id. at n.196. In 1991, the Institute for Injury Reduction stated
in a report that "the CPSC has failed to act aggressively to reduce toy injury hazards;...
less than 1 percent of all toys [are] ever sampled by the Commission." Unsafe Toys, Weak
Government Regulation cited in IIR report on Toy Injury Hazards, Daily Rep. for Exec.
(BNA) No. 228, at A-11 (Nov. 26, 1991). See also Barry R. Furrow, The Chain Saw and the
Regulator: Inching Toward Safety, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 78, 81-83 (1989) (noting
the difficulty the CPSC has in proceeding with a mandatory safety standard and suggesting
that the agency be given sufficient funds, time to learn, and Congressional support so as "to
develop and thrive").
305. To object that the consumer would be better off not suffering injury in the first
place is to miss the point. The question here is whether the plaintiff, voiceless during the
regulatory process, should have redress when injury occurs.
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consumer safety.306 Most comprehensive among these is the General
Product Safety (GPS) Directive enacted on June 29, 1992. That Di-
rective is intended as a sort of wastebasket, to catch those products
not covered by more specific directives. The preamble to the GPS
Directive acknowledges the futility of attempting to create more spe-
cific directives to regulate "every product which exists or may be de-
veloped," and governs only "in so far as there are no specific
provisions in rules of Community law governing the safety of the
products concerned. 307
An analysis of the General Product Safety Directive is beyond
the purposes of this Article. The point is that the European Union
has at least attempted a comprehensive regulatory approach by legis-
lating specifically where possible, and has thereby responded to issues
unique to particular classes of products. In the remaining cases, the
general directive applies. Applied domestically, such an approach
could greatly reduce the number of product injuries, which is, after all,
the ultimate goal.
d. Postsale Conduct of Claimants and Others
After establishing a pure comparative responsibility scheme
under section 111, the Act defines and explains the kind of conduct
that implicates comparative principles in section 112. Such conduct
includes not only the manufacturer and the user, but all parties who in
some way affect the product on its way from sale to injury.
A provision dealing with nonmanufacturer conduct is necessary
in any mature system of product liability. It will be recalled that early
product defect cases finding liability typically involved latent defects,
usually of manufacture, that passed undetected through the chain of
distribution before inflicting injury on unsuspecting product users. If
liability were still so limited, it would be sensible to place the entire
cost of injury on the manufacturer, or, if unavailable, on another
handy seller. But as doctrine developed granting rights to those in-
jured by products that reflected conscious design decisions and an-
nounced their own perils, some corresponding apportionment of
responsibility among the various sellers and the product user became
imperative.
306. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
307. Council Directive 92159 of 29 June 1992 on General Product Safety, art. 1(2), 1992
OJ. (L. 228) 24,26.
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Section 112(A), dealing with failure to discover a defective condi-
tion, sides with the modem trend in case law: A claimant need not
inspect for defects and will not be barred from recovery for failing to
do so. The same principle holds for a nonclaimant's failure to inspect.
The section's reasoning is supported by one of the fundamental under-
pinnings of product defect law: A product user is entitled to rely on
the product seller to produce a nondefective product, and the "fail-
ure," by the claimant or by another, to inspect should not relieve the
seller of responsibility for having placed a dangerous product on the
market. That same reliance should also shield downstream sellers
from negligence-based liability for noninspection since they are not
typically in a position to detect the defect.
As noted earlier, this reliance principle is most forceful in the
case of a latent defect, where the consumer is truly helpless. The
drafters have wisely equated a defect discoverable only upon inspec-
tion with a latent defect, since the seller-absent express warning to
the contrary-should not be entitled to assume that busy consumers
will stop to inspect.
Where the reliance is questionable or absent, the rationale for
recovery is weaker. The drafters' treatment of the issue of products
with defects recognizes the legal contribution to injury made by those
who use a product with a known defective condition. Therefore,
where the seller proves that the claimant knew of such a condition but
went ahead and used the product anyway, recovery may be reduced
under comparative principles: "Thus, if a claimant with good eyesight
ate a candy bar that had bright green worms crawling over it, subsec-
tion (A)(2) permits the trier of fact to find that the claimant should
bear some responsibility .... ,,s
As to a nonclaimant product user's failure to inspect, the drafters
demurred; subsection (B)(2) to section 112, which allows apportion-
ment of liability between manufacturers and such users, is optional.
To illustrate the close balance of equities that led to this hedged result,
consider a case arising in the workplace. If a piece of industrial ma-
chinery goes uninspected by the employer, and an employee is then
injured as a proximate result, should the employer bear a share of the
responsibility? On the one hand, such an approach would place the
incentive to inspect machinery on the employer. On the other hand,
the shield of worker's compensation acts to blunt that incentive. If
liability is apportioned wholly against the employer by a trier of fact,
308. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 112 (accompanying analysis).
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the product-injured user may be out of the tort system entirely. One
solution would be to allow apportionment, but not to allow the manu-
facturer's liability to be reduced to zero. In such a case, the Act's rule
of joint and several liability would ensure that the manufacturer
would always be liable, and that other culpable parties would also face
tort liability unless they were entirely exempt from the system.
Subsections (C) and (D), which deal with the related issues of
product misuse and product alteration, are found lacking in one signif-
icant respect. Misuse of a product under subsection (C) causes a re-
duction of the seller's liability to the extent that the misuse caused the
injury. If the claimant is the misusing party, recovery is simply re-
duced; a nonclaimant's misuse instead shifts the plaintiffs target, in
whole or in part, to the misuser. Of course, product misuse may be so
dramatic that liability is entirely improper because the injury would
then have been caused by the misuse, not by the product.
As to product alteration, subsection (D) differs from its sister
provision on misuse in that the reasonableness of the alteration drops
out of the equation. Thus, once the product seller shows that modifi-
cation of the product, either by plaintiff or by some third party, caused
the injury, liability is reduced to the extent that such modification
caused the harm. In opting for this blanket rule, the drafters recog-
nized that they were departing from the ascendant common law view
under which "foreseeable" modifications might not defeat liability.
Their justification for doing so was that holding sellers liable under
such circumstances amounted to imposing "absolute liability. ''Z-
This reasoning is riddled with flaws. First, the drafters do not ex-
plain why the treatment of modifications should differ from that of
misuse; such an explanation is called for if these two related, postseller
actions are to come in for different treatment. Second, it is simply
incorrect to assert that the foreseeability test leads inexorably to lia-
bility. Courts have been willing to find that product modifications
were unforeseeable,31 0 and also have declined to find liability where
the producer of the product had no realistic way of preventing the
kind of modification that caused harm-even where the modification
was foreseeable.31' Finally, the simple statement that the foreseeabil-
ity test imposes absolute liability, even if it were correct, is not a suffi-
309. MUPLA, supra note 1, app. A, § 112 (accompanying analy3is).
310. See, eg., Ford Motor Co. v. Eads, 457 S.W2d 28 (Tenn. 1970).
311. E.g., Robinson v. Reed-Prentice, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. 19S0) ('Principles of
foreseeability . . . are inapposite where a third party affirmatively abuses a prouet by
consciously bypassing built-in safety features.").
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cient reason for doing away with it. What is needed is an explanation
of why that result is undesirable, particularly since it is welcomed in
other contexts, notably with respect to manufacturing defects.
For the sake of completeness, I should point out that the drafters
do provide a few caveats to the broad rule discussed above. Where
the manufacturer instructs the user to modify the product, or where
consent is given-even impliedly-to so modify, the no-liability rule
of subsection (D)(2) will not apply. Nor will that subsection apply if
the modification was "reasonably anticipated conduct," from the per-
spective of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances,312
but only if the product seller should have warned against such modifi-
cations under subsection 104(C).
Unfortunately, this approach recapitulates the more general
weakness of any attempt to create a substantive body of product lia-
bility rules ex ante. On one level, the apparent clarity will be defeated
once the first case arises in which, for example, the court must decide
whether a manufacturer's conduct amounted to implied consent to the
modification. On a deeper level, a claimant's inability in any given
case to shoehorn the claim into one of the recognized exceptions to
the no-liability rule may result in injustice (i.e., where a reasonable
product user or a reasonable third party might have nonetheless modi-
fied the product).
2. MUPLA's Effect on the Conduct of Litigation
The rush toward codification of the substantive rules of product
liability should be viewed skeptically. Indeed, the drafters of both the
Act and the Directive have, for the most part, been suitably wary of
anticipating possible product problems. The substantive sections are
therefore largely open-textured; the bulk of my criticisms concern
provisions that may unwisely restrict judicial pliability.
However, the movement toward clarifying, streamlining, and uni-
fying the law of product liability is commendable. To begin with the
broadest issue, uniform legislation would bolster confidence in the ju-
dicial system's ability to produce consistent results. Such uniformity
can of course be achieved directly, as through an act of Congress.
Both the Directive and the Act have opted instead for a two-layered
approach, involving promulgation of rules by a central entity, followed
by implementation in member jurisdictions.
312. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 102(G).
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Regardless of the chosen method, my preference for uniformity
extends to substantive results as well as to procedure. This position is
not inconsistent with my skepticism of ex ante rule-making on the sub-
stantive issues of product liability. Whether the issue at hand is one of
procedure (lending itself to ex ante regulation) or of substance (better
treated by courts, ex post), there should be at least a tentative end to
the matter once the question has been answered in the appropriate
manner.
313
Once a decision is reached that a product is, or is not, defective-
again, something difficult to ascertain before injury-that determina-
tion should not ordinarily be disturbed by another court. Otherwise,
the de facto regulation that inevitably occurs will be patchwork or,
worse, inconsistent. Manufacturers will thereby be forced to guess as
to which of two or more inconsistent decisions should guide their fu-
ture conduct. A dramatic example of the problems created by such
inconsistency is the maze of decisions involving the drug Bendectin.
As Professor Shapo has recently pointed out,3 14 the issue of whether
the drug is capable of causing serious birth defects has received incon-
sistent answers by different courts over the past few years.31S Since
the answer to that question determines whether the drug is defective
under a consumer expectation model, a definitive answer would allow
both future plaintiffs and the manufacturer, Merrell Dow, to avoid
further litigation and to have some idea of their financial futuresIh
313. The qualification is needed because, as with any line of cases or regulation,
changed circumstances or evolving notions of justice may call for a reconsideration of any
decision. But such reconsideration can be accomplished through the standard means of
legislative amendment or overruling of precedent. Indeed, the sober reflection that at-
tends, or should attend, such steps attests to the weight that these decisions are accorded
and deserve.
314. Shapo, supra note 107, at 314-15.
315. Compare Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 649 F. Supp. 79? (D.D.C. 19 6) and
Lynch v. Merrell-National Lab. Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 156 I D.
Mass. 1986), aF.fd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding no sufficient proof of causal con-
nection as a matter of law) with Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 596 A2d 110
(D.C. Cir. 1986) and DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F2d 941 (3d Cir. 19.0)
(testimony by a single expert sufficient to establish a factual issue of eau-ation). The
United States Supreme Court has recently rewritten the test for admissibility of scientific
expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence, holding that admissibility requires a
determination by the trial judge that the expert will testify to scientific knoledze that %ill
assist in the understanding or determination of an issue of fact. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 27S6 (1993).
316. Consolidating cases can be of enormous assistance in this task. See e.g., infra note
357 (cases consolidating the Suzuki Samurai litigation).
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When the issues involved are procedural, comprehensive legisla-
tion can profitably go beyond placing cases under one judicial roof.
With the limited exception of provisions relating to statutes of repose,
most of the major issues that go into designing procedural rules can be
addressed ex ante. In this regard, the Act is superior to the Directive,
addressing and resolving a host of thorny procedural problems. In
addition, the commentary accompanying the procedural provisions in-
dicates that the drafters considered both sides of each argument.
Although emphatically not the situation with substantive questions,
which shift subtly between cases, broad decisions can be made as to
the matters of procedure. Such rule-making is in fact desirable, as it
furthers predictability and certainty without any corresponding sacri-
fice of fairness.317
The present subsection differs from my comprehensive treatment
of the Act's substantive provisions. Here, I address only selected is-
sues arising under the procedural sections of the Act. Many of these
sections are self-explanatory, borrowing from other legislation and
from current judicial practice.
For example, the Act includes provisions for sanctions against
frivolous claims and defenses;318 retains the rule of joint and several
liability;319 expressly allows the court to appoint its own experts;320
causes reduction of recovery under the collateral source rule only to
the extent that the claimant has received compensation from a public
source;321 contains an optional provision limiting nonpecuniary dam-
ages to $25,000, "or twice the amount of the pecuniary damages,
whichever is less;' '322 and retains punitive damages upon a showing of
at least reckless conduct.32 The procedural sections also contain a
317. This preference for unified rules of procedure is not meant as an endorsement of
any one rule, or of the entire package, as drafted. My agreement is rather with the process
of case disposition that the rules foster.
318. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 115.
319. Id § 111(B)(5). Liability is only several, however, "when a party is responsible for
a distinct harm, or when there is some other reasonable basis for apportioning that party's
responsibility for the harm." Id.
320. Id § 117(A).
321. Id § 119.
322. Id § 118(C). The optional recovery limitation provision will not apply when a
claimant suffers "serious and permanent or prolonged (1) disfigurement, (2) impairfment]
of bodily function, (3) pain and discomfort, or (4) mental illness," and proves these injuries
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
323. Id The court decides the amount of such damages after the jury decides whether
to impose them.
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welcome change in the typical treatment of the relation between
worker compensation law and product liability law.-' 4
None of the drafters' decisions is immune from criticism. Some
commentators have argued, for instance, that retaining joint liability is
inconsistent with the principles underlying comparative responsibil-
ity-that each party should pay only according to its share of culpabil-
ity. And the drafters themselves recognize that their position on the
collateral source rule represents a compromise that can be attacked
on both flanks. On one side are those who favor reduction of recov-
ery, from whatever source derived; arrayed in opposition are those
who fear the loss in deterrence by allowing collateral source
reduction.2-
For the most part, I leave to the reader consideration of the
forces that have led to the procedural rules adopted under the Act.
The drafters have generally understood and appreciated the argu-
ments on both sides of these issues and have tried to come up with the
best possible solutions. Returning again to the collateral source rule
by way of example-the decision to permit reduction of recovery to
the extent that the claimant has been reimbursed through public
sources reflects the perception that, as to such funds, the public would
end up paying a double cost-the product seller contributes to the
public funds from which the claimant draws, increases prices accord-
ingly, and pays the claimant's judgment, thereby increasing prices
twice. Thus, collateral source recovery under MUPLA does not di-
minish plaintiff's recovery except where the sources are public funds.
Leaving to the political process the judgment about where to
draw these lines, I discuss here only those procedural issues that bleed
into substance, and where the drafters have then imposed strict rules,
namely, the time limitations imposed on actions.
Section 110 of the Act deals with related issues concerning the
time limitations on product liability actions. To begin with the least
controversial provision, subsection (C) sets the statute of limitations
at two years but holds off the commencement of that period until "the
claimant discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence, should have
discovered, the harm and the cause thereof." This language is typical
of that found in modern tort law326 -the plaintiff is not penalized for
failing to know the unknowable.
324. See infra subpart V.C.
325. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 119 (accompanying commentary).
326. See Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.V.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974) ("[W]here medical prac-
tice is asserted... the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations b2gins to run
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Further, the requirement highlights that the plaintiff must under-
stand both injury and causation. Not all products that cause harm fol-
low the model of the exploding bottle, where causation can be directly
and immediately assigned to the offending product. Consider the
claimant who experiences a rare side effect from a pharmaceutical. If
the symptoms are nonspecific, it may take some time for the claimant
to link his harm to the drug, especially if his doctor is also without
sufficient knowledge. Assuming plaintiff's due diligence in unmasking
the connection, the statute correctly decides that recovery should not
be foreclosed.327
Somewhat more novel is subsection (A), which allows the prod-
uct seller a defense where the product caused injury after its "useful
safe life" had expired. The subsection, drawn from a state statute, 28
recognizes that a product may, because of age or overuse, cause an
injury without being defective. The drafters cite the helpful example
of a driver who continues to drive on worn tires. The product may
still be "useful," but it is no longer "safe." When that tire punctures,
injuring plaintiff, the product seller should be able to argue that the
product had exceeded its useful safe life.
Wisely, the drafters chose not to pin the determination of "useful
safe life" to any specific time period, recognizing that products exhibit
wide variation in this regard. The subsection supplies examples of
probative evidence,32 9 but avoids bright-line tests. Significantly, the
seller's representations and instructions as to the care and feeding of
the product, and the issue of useful safe life are given considerable
weight, but they are not dispositive. The drafters sided with the
courts, recognizing that to allow the seller unchecked power in deter-
mining a product's safe life would be to oversimplify the issue of
whether the product's user acted reasonably in exceeding the stated
time period. Also, such pronouncements by the seller should "not
when the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence ... should
have discovered the resulting injury.").
327. Although this result seems obvious, the language of section 110 can have the bene-
ficial effect of preventing a court from throwing the plaintiff out of court for failure to
comply with the statute of limitations, even where a reasonable person would have been
unable to connect his or her injury with the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Greco v. Uni-
versity of Delaware, 619 A.2d 900 (Del. 1993) (medical malpractice).
328. In the analysis accompanying section 110, the drafters credit MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 604.03 (West 1988) as providing the inspiration for section 110(A) of the MUPLA.
329. See MUPLA, supra note 1, § 110(A)(1)(a)-(e).
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bind the rights of a non-purchaser claimant" who would be unaware
of such statements.330
The problem with section 110 is subsection (B). Simply put, once
the product is more than ten years beyond delivery, the seller receives
the benefit of a very strong presumption that the product has ex-
ceeded its useful safe life. "The presumption may only be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence." 331 The subsection then softens the
impact of this harsh rule through a series of exceptions. The expected,
noncontroversial exceptions include: express warranties of longer safe
lives; intentional misconduct on the seller's part, which renders the
limitation void; and any remaining rights to contribution and indem-
nity, which are not affected by the presumption.
Further substantial limitations to this seller-friendly presumption
reside in subsection (B)(2)(d). The drafters follow the prevailing
trend by placing the long-term exposure cases outside the statute's
reach. Thus, where injury is the cumulative result of prolonged expo-
sure, as with workplace toxins, or if the injury takes many years to
manifest itself, as is the case with DES, -32 the presumption does not
apply. Although the drafters do not explain their reasoning for these
sensible exceptions, they are easily justified. Where the product's very
nature precludes identification of defect until more than ten years
have passed, that accident of science should not place the seller in a
better position than its counterparts who sell products with more obvi-
ous defects.
Somewhat more cryptic is subsection (B)(1)(d)'s exception for in-
juries caused by defects that were "not discoverable by an ordinarily
reasonably prudent person until more than ten... years after the time
of delivery." The drafters explain this language by citing the case of
defective plastic on a gearshift that only manifested itself after expo-
330. d § 110 (accompanying analysis).
331. Id § 110(B). This approach is actually quite unusual. In most states, % here a stat-
ute of repose applies, the claimant's case is flatly barred. See, e.g,, Or- Rv. StAT. § 30935
(1987) (exception for asbestos-related claims); TENN. CODE At. § 29-2S-103 (l9S9). TIhe
drafters of M-OPLA followed the Colorado model instead, COLO. REv, STAT. At;.v, 13-
21-403 (3) (West 1989), and afforded the seller a presumptien of no liability. This more
limited approach is more likely to survive constitutional challenge. For a collection of
cases dealing with the constitutionality of repose statutes, see DAvID A. FisCHER. & VIL,
LIAMS POWERS, JR., PRODUCTS LLABurry: CA ES AND MA,-TER.IALS 6S5-S6 n.1 (2d ed 1934)
(cases going both ways on the issue).
332. DES is short for diethylstilbesterol. Once marketed as a means of combatting mis-
carriage, DES has been accused of causing a host of illnesses and other problems in the
daughters of the mothers who ingested it. Sce eg., Sindell v. Abbott Lab,. 607 P.2d 924
(Cal. 1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 19S9).
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sure to sunlight occurring more than ten years after delivery. Presum-
ably, this exception is intended to apply only in those cases where the
product is a "time bomb" of sorts that only "goes off" after more than
ten years, and after the dangerous condition has finally been acti-
vated. Further, this exception only applies when the user had no
knowledge of the inherent dangers in the product.
What effect would this subsection have on a more typical case,
where the product causes injury in such a way that it is unclear
whether the injury was caused by a defect, or by use of the product
beyond its useful safe life? The Act's strict statute of repose was
probably created with exactly that sort of case in mind. So, for exam-
ple, if a passenger is injured on an airplane that had been in service for
more than ten years, any claim against the product seller would have
to contend with the presumption that the product had exceeded its
useful safe life.
This result is unacceptable. Products such as airplanes, industrial
equipment, and many durable household appliances have useful safe
lives that plainly exceed ten years. The consumer injured beyond that
point should not be forced to present clear and convincing evidence to
rebut the presumption of no liability. The Act is, however, preferable
to state statutes which impose an absolute statute of repose, and the
drafters did make note of the consumers' "justifiabl[e] concern...
about overly broad absolute cut-offs of their right to sue. '333
Nonetheless, for products with long useful lives that cause injury
through long-term exposure, the Act ends up doing what it tries to
avoid with toxic exposures-it gives sellers of more durable products
an undeserved advantage over those who sell products with shorter
useful lives.334 The section should have been omitted entirely335 in
333. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 110 (accompanying analysis).
334. Thus, the arguments for permitting such a presumption must come from the more
general reasons offered to justify such statutes. These are succinctly set forth in VINCENT
R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 789 (1994).
335. For a recent article advocating a more flexible approach to the issue of repose in
product liability cases, see Mark W. Peacock, An Equitable Approach to Products Liability
Statutes of Repose, 14 N. ILL. U. L. Rnv. 223 (1993). However, because Professor Peacock
makes his assumptions in a world where statutes of repose are acceptable in principle, his
proposal would not assist the plaintiff in many cases. His concern is to create an exception
for the cases where the manufacturer "misrepresent[s] its product or fraudulently con-
ceal[s] ... its knowledge of the unreasonably dangerous and defective condition of its
product to the detriment of the consumer .... ." Id. at 224. One might think that such a
reasonable position would already have enjoyed wide judicial favor; in fact, as he points
out, the majority of courts have not recognized an exception to statutes of repose even
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favor of the provisions governing exposure to slow-acting environ-
mental toxins.
V. Application of Rules and Principles of the Directive and
the Model Uniform Product Liability Act
The promulgation of the Directive holds promise for a consistent
body of product liability law on both sides of the Atlantic. Movement
in the direction of consistency depends, in part, on the extent to which
the nations of the European Union select the same options in cases
where the Directive provides a choice. Beyond that, the judiciary's
role should not be underestimated. One of the goals of this Article
has been to demonstrate that the rules, particularly of substance, can-
not truly begin to be assessed until the courts have interpreted them.
Inasmuch as constructions of rules relating to the conduct of liti-
gation are generally simpler to predict than are constructions of the
substantive rules of liability, one regrets that the Directive has unfor-
tunately not developed its procedural rules as fully as has the
MUPLA. It is too much to expect that such rules, even when devel-
oped, will be fully consistent with those in force in the United States.
After all, even those states that have based their legislation on
MUPLA exhibit important divergences in enactment. Yet, one need
think only of jurisdictional problems to recognize that attempts at
achieving consistency are worthwhile. To give just one example: Bob,
a resident of Philadelphia, purchases an automobile assembled in Illi-
nois. A defective belt tears loose, and his car veers out of control,
thereby injuring Bob. The belt is manufactured in Germany and the
automotive company is a joint venture between a German and an
American manufacturer.
Much of the wrangling over jurisdiction in such a case might be
less portentous if the basic procedural rules approached uniformity.2" '
In both the United States and Europe, these matters are properly left
to the political process, with the legal academia and citizens' groups
where the equities are clear. Id. at 237 (citing cases at n.67). MUPLA, hoxav.zr, would
recognize this equitable exception. See supra note 329.
336. As mentioned earlier, there will remain a host of problems that mieht ovanrhelm
any advantage gained by streamlining the procedural course of such a case. The unas:aila-
ble facts that the suitor before a domestic court enjoys structural advantages not enjoyed
by her European cousin, and can usually count on a more substantial recovery sug"est that
the divergences can only be overcome by looking beyond a particular field of law.
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standing by to ensure that the fights of injured citizens are not unfairly
compromised. 37
The balance of this final section is devoted to a consideration of
the ways in which courts-here and abroad-might approach the is-
sue of defect, which is at the heart of the greatest number of product
liability cases. Unfortunately, no elegant theory is at hand for resolv-
ing this question in every case. About the best that can be done here
is to canvas a representative sample of different types of defective
products.
In each case, I discuss the approach and, to the extent predict-
able, the likely result under both the Directive and MUPLA. I then
provide commentary as to which, if either, of the approaches provides
a better chance for a just result, and offer observations that might be
useful in resolving the case. My assumption throughout is that the
guiding principle should be the consumer's expectation, either actual
or by inference where not directly ascertainable.
A. Simple Defects of Manufacture
A chair is fashioned with a bolt of defective metal. The chair,
newly purchased by Alice, collapses and causes her serious injury.
The metal defect is proven by uncontradicted testimony of metallurgic
experts who testify that other chairs by this manufacturer were con-
structed of stronger metal, and that this chair's bolt contained impuri-
ties at the microscopic level.
Why bother discussing this case at all? Under both the Directive
and under all competing legislation, actual and contemplated, in the
United States, this defect of manufacture calls for strict liability. The
Directive's imposition of liability for products more dangerous than
the "consumer has a right to expect" applies. Further, even under
domestic proposals and enactments that apply the risk-utility test to
defects of design, manufacturing defects are left in the realm of true
strict liability.
Yet the concession by the drafters of MUPLA and similar legisla-
tion-notably including the proposed revision of section 402A-that
liability for manufacturing defect should be strict suggests that the un-
derlying justification for liability is inconsistent. Liability in the manu-
337. As pointed out in subpart II.A, supra, civil-law countries have a long heritage of
deferring to the professoriate. Although this tradition is not established with respect to
Directives, perhaps such an approach could assist in just resolutions of disputes over the
interpretations of specific provisions.
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facturing defect context is necessarily based on consumer expectation;
the consumer is powerless and caught unaware. It is also true that the
manufacturer could in general prevent the injury more easily than the
consumer. Thus, the risk-utility calculus would generally favor the
plaintiff as well. But this is not always the case, especially when one
considers the costs in making absolutely certain that no defective
products slip through the manufacturing process. In fact, since abso-
lute certainty borders on the theoretically impossible, risk-utility is not
the theory being applied.
One explanation for the inconsistency between the theory under-
lying recovery for manufacturing defect and the approach taken in the
rest of the cases invloves the practical problems in the risk-utility ap-
proach when applied to manufacturing problems: Defects are isolated
and hard to prove. But that explanation is belied by the legislative
history of the various enactments, which reflects the perception that
the true strict liability approach in the manufacturing defect cases is
simply fairer to the consumer who is assumed to be helpless to pre-
vent or predict injury333
Since it is clear that liability in the manufacturing defect cases
stems from a consumer expectation model,3 39 it is lamentable that the
"reformers" did not carry this insight into at least those cases of de-
sign defect where the consumer is equally helpless. Returning to
Greenman,31 why should the theory of liability, and potential recov-
ery, turn on whether the defect was of manufacture or of design? The
proper focus should be on Greenman's reasonable expectation that
the set screws were sufficiently strong to do the jobs for which he
purchased the tool. The considerations of justice that seem to have
impelled recovery for those injured by defects in manufacture apply
just as strongly where the unsuspecting plaintiff is injured because the
defendant decided, applying a risk-utility weighing, to forego the use
of a stronger screw, (Le., the tests to uncover defects in screws). Yet
because this case falls within the literal definition of design defect, the
manufacturer might be able to escape liability where the incidence of
338. Henderson and ITwerski admit as much, in remarking that -[c]onsumers injured by
flawed products argue that their fundamental expectations as to product performance have
been disappointed." Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 1516. Why haven't these same
expectations been disappointed when the product turns out to have a latent defect in de-
sign, for example?
339. Indeed, the drafters of the proposed revision of Restatement (Third) of Torts see-
tion 402A have noted that the original section 402A was mostly concerned %ith defects of
manufacture, where the consumer expectation model governed.
340. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
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injury would be lower than the anticipated cost of compensating the
few who might be injured. But surely this hidden defect should call
for liability, notwithstanding cost-benefit considerations.-"
A more recent example of defects of an uncertain type might be
the pedicle screw inserted into the backs of people with chronic pain.
It now appears that the screws may actually be increasing pain, per-
haps because some of them seem to have broken in the users'
backs.342 Under MUPLA and the Restatement (Third) approach, re-
covery might be granted or denied based on caprice: Whether the
defect is called one of manufacture or of design. Under the consumer
expectation model, the nature of the defect would be relevant only to
the extent that it illuminated the central issue of the communications
between seller and user. For instance, if the problem of breaking
screws was consistent and known but inevitable, and that possibility
and its consequences were clearly communicated to a potential user,
recovery might reasonably be denied. If, on the other hand, breaking
screws were unexpected at the time of insertion, the consumer's de-
feated expectation of reasonable safety might properly permit
recovery.343
In attempting to track down representations made to users, the
pedicle screw liability issue is further complicated by the intervention
of surgeons. As one article states, these devices were "touted as state
of the art by many surgeons." 344 Further, doctors appear to have been
using the screws in a manner not approved or contemplated by the
FDA, or perhaps even by the manufacturers.3 4 5 To the extent that
341. Professor Phillips has noticed the same inconsistency in the Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Product Liability: "[The Reporters] ... recognize that the representa-
tional aspect of products liability is an essential part of the consumer expectations test...
which the Reporters are particularly anxious to reject." Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61
TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (1994). But, this rejection does not extend to manufacturing
defects, which the Reporters admit "disappoint reasonable expectations as to product per-
formance." li. at 1269 (quoting REsTATENMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILTY
(Council Draft No. 2, 1994)). As he notes,"[s]urely these rationales apply equally to design
and warning defects." Id. at 1270.
342. FDA Hears Complaints on Spinal Screws, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 1994, at 16.
343. Even these two brief examples suggest the error in segregating the so-called manu-
facturing defect cases since they imply that the line between manufacturing and design
defect may at times be difficult to draw. What if the screw breaks only when it is subject to
unusually heavy exertion? What if it does not always break under that circumstance?
344. Susan Fitzgerald, Spine-Fusion Surgery Backfiring for Many, PHILADELPHIA IN.
QUIRER, July 18, 1994, at Al.
345. The FDA had approved them only for "repairing bones in the arms and legs ....
This same article mentions two manufacturers of the screws, AcroMed Corp. and Sofamor
Danek Group Inc., both of which, it notes, have been sued in a class action. Id. at A6.
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consumer expectations arise from a course of communication with
their physicians, and not from any representations by the manufac-
turer, liability might properly lie only with the doctors. In an impor-
tant sense, these surgeons could be viewed as "creating" a product of
their own-peticle screws used for a new purpose.-"-
Operating in a risk-utility universe, the drafters could only sepa-
rate the manufacturing defect cases for special, "true" strict liability,
treatment, thereby missing nuances that create the need for judicial
intercession in the first place. The consumer expectation approach fa-
vored by the Directive avoids this forced dichotomy, instead empha-
sizing the need to pick through the complexities of the bargain struck.,
often through implicit communication between buyer and seller.
The problem with the risk-utility test is most forcefully demon-
strated in the manufacturing defect cases where the theory is aban-
doned because of its inability to achieve justice. But across the much
broader spectrum of design defect and failure to warn cases, focus on
the consumer's expectation, rather than application of an unrecon-
structed risk-utility test, repeatedly results in outcomes more consis-
tent with the requirements of justice. The remainder of this section
considers a few representative categories of products with problems-
automobiles, industrial equipment, and pharmaceuticals-which call
into question such diverse issues as the state of the art defense, the
connection between defect and warning, the special problem of un-
avoidably unsafe products, and the difficult issues of causation that
the enactments address but do not advance.
In each class, a discussion of cases will be accompanied by an
analysis of the relevant provisions of the Directive and of the
MUPLA. I will then offer further observations. The aim is not simply
to convince the reader of the superiority of the consumer expectation
approach,3 7 but to highlight various problems with other rules set
down by either of these liability schemes.
346. Fitzgerald notes that "[d]octors often adapt drugs and techniques to situations for
which they are not specifically marketed-an 'off-label' use." Id. Of coure, a factual
investigation would be needed to determine the extent to %%hich the manufacturcrs, indi-
vidually or collectively, might have encouraged these "off-label" uses. Dpending on the
results of such an investigation, they too might be liable.
347. Indeed, the risk-utility test can be of some value in determining liability, but only
insofar as it feeds into the consumer's reasonable expectation of the product's safety.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
B. When is an Automobile Defective?
The threshold difficulty in most automobile cases is that the of-
fending vehicle is alleged to be defective not because it spontaneously
explodes, but because it affords less protection in an accident-is less
"crashworthy"-than the injured occupant expected. The exploding
car presents an easy case, mainly because of the helplessness of the
properly relying consumer. Of course, under the system instantiated
by MUPLA, inquiry into risk-utility would be needed before liability
could attach.
The crashworthiness cases illustrate the troubled relation be-
tween regulation, legal doctrine, and plain fact that plagues product
liability. As illustrated by these cases, prediction and easy rules are
beguiling but misguided.
The simplest crashworthiness cases involve design problems that
are hidden, unknown to the class of consumers, and not directly regu-
lated. In Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union,34 an Audi was struck
from behind by a speeding Ford. The fuel tank, which was located
under the floor of the Audi's trunk burst into flames, severely burning
the occupants. The matter was tried by jury under the Tenth Circuit's
approach, in which the consumer's reasonable expectation was dispos-
itive in deciding the liability issue. Although the plaintiffs might have
been expected to succeed on that basis, their attorneys may have (par-
adoxically) lost the case by introducing evidence of other available
design alternatives at the time of manufacture. This maneuver, the
court stated, opened the door for the defendant's argument that Audi
had followed general industry practice. Such practice was "relevant
... to the determination of the expectations of the consumer...."349
Without a special verdict, it is impossible to divine the basis of the
jury's decision that the car was not defectively designed. Perhaps the
jury thought that since the gas tank had to be somewhere, the indus-
try's custom made sense absent a showing that the custom represented
a decision to sacrifice safety for reasons of cost. Alternatively, per-
haps the suggested design alternatives would be more dangerous in
most cases and courts have properly required that a product's entire
design be considered in making decisions regarding defect.35 0
In short, the jury's decision may well have been faithful to the
consumer expectation test. The consumer does, or should, expect a
348. 739 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1984).
349. d at 1485.
350. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1327-28 (Or. 1978).
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product that is, all things considered, as safe as can feasibly be made.
This expectation certainly holds true where the consumer's knowledge
is weak or absent compared to the seller's. Risk-utility considerations
may illuminate this issue, but should be in service of it; not the other
way around, as MUPLA would have it.-'- Of course, if a manufac-
turer had actual knowledge of a high degree of risk of an explosion
and deliberately chose to withhold that information, liability would be
proper under a theory of criminal fraud3-2
The decision where to place the fuel tank, when any choice brings
some degree of risk, stands on different footing from the defect al-
leged in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.35 3 There, a head-on collision
resulted in the steering column of the plaintiffs Corvair striking the
plaintiffs head. The plaintiff introduced testimony to show that the
Corvair's steering mechanism, unlike that of other cars, was posi-
tioned so that "it receive[d] the initial impact of forces generated by a
left-of-center head-on collision. The unabsorbed forces of the colli-
sion in this area [were] transmitted directly toward the driver's
head .... 3-4
Absent some good reason for placing the steering column in an
apparently dangerous position-a place other car manufacturers
avoided-liability for such an injury should be simple: the plaintiff
reasonably expects that the car will not be fatally unsafe in a way that
could have been, and was, avoided by other manufacturers. s5 By fo-
cusing on the right to safety the consumer "is entitled to expect," the
351. See MUPLA, supra note 1, § 104 (accompanying analysis).
352. Cf. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 34S, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)
(finding that Ford knew of the dangers that a rear-ended Pinto would explode, but chose
not to redesign the car anyway, punitive damages were therefore appropriate).
353. 391 F.2d 495 (Sth Cir. 1968).
354. Id at 497 n.2.
355. Of course, it is assumed that the defectively placed steering column %%as the legal
cause of plaintiff's injuries. In Berrera v. Hyundai Motor America Corp., 620 So, 2d 890
(La. CL App. 1993), plaintiffs alleged that a defective seat track latching mechanism in-
creased their injuries. The jury credited the defense expert's testimony that "the principles
of biokinematics demonstrated that plaintiff's theory was a physical impossibility." Id. at
895.
All product liability law, judicial and legislative, requires a showing of causation.
Again, the Directive imposes liability for a damage -caused by a defect." Council Direc-
tive 851374 art. 1, 1985 OJ. (L 210) 29. 30. MUPLA is equally explicit, requiring that
liability for a defect of any kind be imposed only where "the harm was proximately caused
because the product was defective." MUPLA, supra note 1, § 104. Courts have occasion-
ally been sensitive to the problems of proof in manufacturing defect cases, allowing the
plaintiff a presumption that the product was defective (and so that the defect %%as the cause
of injury), where tracing the creation of the defect to the manufacturer presents too high a
hurdle. See, e-g., Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 211 N.W2d 810 (Wis. 1973).
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consumer expectation test and the Directive achieve the right result
here. Under the risk-utility test the defendant might still prevail by
showing that costs were kept down by placing the mechanism in this
dangerous place.
Particularly where the defect is latent and no regulation specifi-
cally applies, the consumer's safety should not be bargained away so
cheaply. Indeed, it is fundamentally wrong to say that the consumer
has bargained at all as to the safety issue in this case. Unaware of the
problem with the steering column, how can it be said that the con-
sumer willingly sacrificed safety for lower cost?
These two cases are relatively simple because the defects are in-
controvertibly latent. No bargain as to that particular safety feature
took place, therefore the question is whether the manufacturer prop-
erly attended to the consumer's safety in designing the vehicle. But
most cases are more complex, making the question of consumer ex-
pectation more troubling.
The issue of vehicle rollover supplies a lively example of the in-
tersection of politics, regulation, marketing, consumer behavior, and
jurisdiction that often complicates the resolution of design defect
cases. Design defect claims relating to rollovers involve vehicles al-
leged to roll over too easily, because of their center of gravity, or roofs
that are not strong enough to withstand the impact when the car does
roll over. This second set of cases is simpler to resolve, because it
generally involves latent defects, where the consumer could not know
what the roof would do in case of impact." 6
The first set of claims, currently in litigation throughout the coun-
try,35 7 has most notoriously involved the Samurai, a small, inexpen-
356. See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985) (roof over
driver's seat collapsed). A somewhat more difficult case was presented in Reed v. Chrysler
Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992), where the court overturned a directed verdict for
defendant. The plaintiff's theory of design defect was that the roof should have been made
of metal, not of fiberglass. Although the fiberglass construction of the roof was obvious to
the plaintiff, the increased risk posed by fiberglass may not have been so apparent. And
what should be done about the fact that the vehicle in which plaintiff was travelling had, at
the time, "the only plastic top sold in North America?" Id. at 228. Without an express
showing that the vehicle was sold cheaply because of its unique top, the prevailing industry
custom should suggest culpably poor design.
357. See, e.g., Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding
trial court's imposition of liability as sanction for repeated discovery abuses); Marlow v.
American Suzuki Motor Corp., 584 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (providing a flavor for
the procedural complexities that attend multidistrict litigation); In re Suzuki Samurai Prod,
Liab. Litig. No. 784, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17014 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 29, 1988) (transferring
eleven pending actions to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
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sive, four-wheel-drive vehicle manufactured by the American Suzuki
Motor Corporation (Suzuki). 3 5 s The vehicle gained unwanted press as
far back as July 1988, when Consumer Report rated it "Not Accepta-
ble" for public purchase, "the first such rating that the group had
given to an automobile in ten years.- 35 - In the wake of such bald
condemnation by a respected consumer watchdog, one might have ex-
pected the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), a federal agency, to have recalled the cars. It did not. Nor
did the NHTSA subsequently regulate the vehicles into a safer config-
uration. Its response was instead to attack the Center for Auto Safety
for undermining "public confidence in [NHTSA's] ability to pursue
safety defects .... 3 60 The Center, a nonprofit organization, had been
alerting the public to auto defects, including that presented by the
Samurai.36
Further smudging the picture, documents unearthed during litiga-
tion disclosed that General Motors, having learned by its own testing
of Samurai's unacceptable propensity to roll, had declined Suzuki's
invitation to market the vehicles, as early as April 1984.7-'2 Suzuki ap-
parently recognized that the vehicle's structure, originally designed for
off-road driving, posed risks under routine driving conditions. As a
Suzuki official put it, the company "decided to let consumers deter-
mine for themselves what this new vehicle was, and how it would be
used." 63
The question naturally arises whether consumers were provided
with enough information with which to make a decision. If they were
not, the case resembles the infamous Ford Pinto litigation, where Ford
higher-ups knew, but deliberately declined to make public, that the
358. Other cars have also been "accused" of a similar propensity to roll over. Sce Volk-
swagen v. Marinelli, 628 So. 2d 378 (Ala. 1993). in which the court upheld the jurys finding
that the Volkswagen "Thing" was defectively designed because of its propensity to roll
over.
359. Kenneally v. Suzuki Motor Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1355 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10,
1994).
360. Warren Brown, NHTSA Employes Criticize Center for Auto Safty's Tactics,
WAsI. PosT, Sept. 21, 19S9.
361. Bill Rankin, Suzuki Lawyers Join Samarai in Hot Seat, ALrt,,A rA Co0a... Apr. 16,
1993, at D1.
362. One crucial document was described and quoted in Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co.,
987 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1993). The court in Malautea upheld the trial judge's s2vere
sanctions by entering a default judgment against Suzuki on the issue of liability betaus- of
abuses during the discovery process. Because of one such abuse, the document discu-sed
above had to be obtained from General Motors, not from Suzuki.
363. Warren Brown, The Samurai is Superior but Still in Court, VASH. Po. Apr. 1,
1988, at N54.
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Pinto had a propensity to explode in a rear-end collision. In such
cases, punitive as well as compensatory damages are appropriate, and
were properly imposed.3" In the Samurai case, enough "information"
might come from the appearance of the vehicle itself. However, there
is a large difference between a latent defect, like a misplaced steering
column or an exploding gas tank, and a small utility vehicle that might
be said to disclose its own problems.
This last possibility is the most troubling, as it forces a choice be-
tween the somewhat-informed consumer and the manufacturer that,
at least to an extent, is fulfilling a consumer-fueled desire. Reduced to
essentials, the question is: To what extent, if any, should the consumer
be able to bargain away personal safety? The presence on the market
of motorcycles, for example, suggests that consumer preference and
the attendant manufacturing response are given some weight. But
how much?
Before answering this question, let us consider one more alleged
automobile defect-airbags. Although the technology for these has
been available for more than twenty years,365 they have been widely
available in vehicles only since model year 1992.366 Since the late
1980s, cases have been brought in which injured plaintiffs involved in
front-end collisions have argued that air bags would have prevented
or reduced their injuries.367
364. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
365. For a useful treatment of this issue, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Nader's Failures?,
80 CAL. L. REv. 289 (1992) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFrS, THE
STRUGGLE FOR Auro SAFETY (1990)). The technology has been available at least since
the early 1970s. Id. at 295.
366. Id. at 291. Current federal regulations require air bags (or "inflatable restraint
systems") for both front seat passengers in 95% of the autos produced by each manufac-
turer between September 1, 1996 and September 1, 1997, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 4.1.5.2.1 (as
amended Sept. 2, 1993); after that, they are to be required in all passenger cars. 49 C.F.R.
§ 571.208 4.1.5.3 (1993).
367. See, eg., Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990); Wood v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G.,
567 A.2d 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). An interesting twist on the air bag defect issue is
presented by Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., No. B072243, 1995 Cal. Ct. App. LEXIS 208,
in which the court directed the trial court to allow plaintiff to proceed on a consumer
expectation theory where the allegedly defective design was an improperly placed airbag.
When the bag inflated upon impact, plaintiff's left arm and hand were forced upward into
the windshield, and her elbow was driven into the windshield's side pillar, fracturing it. Her
argument was that the air bag was defectively placed "in conjunction ... with the wind-
shield." Ild. at *2.
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The decisions thus far have addressed whether the claims are pre-
empted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.21 ', Pur-
suant to that Act, the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration has issued an ever-changing battery of regula-
tions, beginning in 1967, to deal with crash protection. What has en-
sued is a postmodern update of Dickens.26 9 In short, passive restraint,
of which air bags are generally considered the most effective means,
was originally contemplated as a requirement for the 1976 model year,
but is not to be fully implemented until 1998.3T1
The tortured history of the passive restraint requirement, along
with the system's now universally recognized desirability, bleeds the
force from MUPLA's presumption of nondefectiveness where govern-
mental standards are followed.371 But the central question still needs
an answer: Should autos without airbags be considered defective?
The beginning of an answer can be found by taking the Samurai,
the motorcycle, and the cars without airbags together. Taking the sim-
plest case first: Motorcycles should not be considered defective sim-
ply because they are less safe than cars. Consumers know of the
relative risk of injury and have an alternative. Moreover, it would
probably be impossible to design them to be as safe as cars, at least at
reasonable cost or without removing what attracts riders to them in
the first place.
As to the other two cases, only the full development of a record
during litigation can establish the crucial facts. In cases involving
368. See, eg., Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1116; Wood, 865 F.2d at 395; Gingold, 567 A2d at
312; Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 143S, 1446 (10th Cir, 19-3) tcollecting
cases on both sides of the question).
369. I refer here to Jarndyce v. Jaradyce, a contested will case that ultimately ended
when, after many years of procedural confusion and delay, the estate in question had bo2n
entirely consumed by lawyers' fees. CHALns DicaN~s, BL., XK HOUSE (Norman Page cd.,
Penguin Books 1971) (1853).
370. For a synopsis of this saga, see Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1103,
1111-12 (D. Mass. 1987). The Administration's repeated rescission of the implementation
date, at one point rejected by the Supreme Court as arbitrary and capricious, Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), speaks more elo-
quently about the limitations of the regulatory process than any law review article. See
also James S. Kunen, Comment Rats, NEw YOPKER, Mar. 6,1995. at 8 (-[Th2 regulatory
process is not known for breakneck speed .... The National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration ... issued a standard in 1971 requiring passive restraints in paxssnger cars as
of January, 1972. After petitions for review, court challenges, and political interventions of
every sort, the standard is now set to kick in with the 1998 model year.").
371. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 108. See supra subpart IV.B.I(c). One might ask
whether this is even such a case, since there were no mandatory regulations concerning
airbags.
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early purchasers and users of the Samurai, for example, the consumer
expectation test might well dictate a finding of defectiveness, as the
uninformed consumer would "reasonably expect" the vehicles not to
roll over as easily as they do." For vehicles purchased later, or for
those used after the problem became widely known,373 it might seem
that reliance on consumer expectation analysis would doom the
plaintiff.
Yet here, as with airbags, we find cases where the risk-utility anal-
ysis might be used profitably in service of the consumer expectation
test. If it turned out that the Samurai could have been made more
stable at a low cost, the consumer might expect (or be deemed to ex-
pect) such expenditure to be made.374 But the plaintiff might trip over
the fact that safer substitutes, especially for everyday driving, are
readily available-at least some at the same cost.
As Professor Shapo pointed out generally twenty years ago,375
attention should be given to the complex cluster of messages that au-
tomobile manufacturers generate in order to induce confidence in,
and thereby sales to, the consuming public. Thus, a manufacturer that
emphasized the safety of a particular model should be called to ac-
count when that model proves less safe than others.
The stronger case, then, is with the airbag, since no safer substi-
tute was available at the time the injuries occurred. Absent a market
choice, 376 the consumer expectation test-or, the safety "the con-
sumer is entitled to expect"-should be stated roughly as follows:
372. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6. The conclusion here is necessarily qualified because
the language of the Directive, the "presentation of the product," is an important circum-
stance to consider in determining defectiveness. A jury's finding that such small vehicles
are prone to rolling over might pose problems for a purchaser under this test.
373. The Directive speaks to the issue, listing "the time when the product was put into
circulation" as one determinant of defectiveness vel non. Id. art. 6, § 1(c).
374. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 104(B)(2)(a)-(e) lists some of the factors to be consid-
ered in making this risk-utility decision.
375. See generally Shapo, supra note 11.
376. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 37
(1983), the Supreme Court noted that the Secretary of 'ftansportation had rescinded the
pending passive restraint requirement because of perceived public hostility to the require-
ment. Even if that observation were correct, at least some consumers would have valued
safety over cost. Indeed, some air bags were available early on. Between 1972 and 1976,
General Motors, Ford, and Volvo produced 12,000 cars that offered optional air bags.
Frank Waters, Air Bag Litigation: Plaintiffs, Start Your Engines, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 1063,
1068-69 & n.40 (1986). Was this limited experiment a financial failure? General Motors
claimed poor success in selling the bags, yet all of its cars produced with the systems were
sold. Id. at 1066. In any case, the industry's perception of consumer reluctance meant air
bags were not again available until the mid-1980s, and then only on some Mercedes-Benz
models. Id. at 1068. The device did not become standard equipment until 1992.
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Given the readily available technology for airbags during the past two
decades, has the consumer's reasonable expectation of safety been ful-
filled? This question is painfully poignant here, as it is sadly evident
that the NHTSA failed to fulfill its duty to protect auto occupants.
Deprived of that protection, should the injured consumer be
compelled to absorb the cost? On the contrary, a powerful argument
is at hand for judicial regulation in such a case. Given the obvious and
relatively cheap safety advantage afforded by airbags-or, at least,
passive shoulder restraints-administrative inaction invites the court
to perform its role of spurring the legislative branch to act. To put the
question rhetorically: Should the courts stand to one side when, by
the NHTSA's own 1977 estimate, passive restraint systems could have
prevented some 12,000 deaths and 100,000 injuries annually? s"
C. Defective Products in the Workplace
Consider the following examples of injuries incurred in the
workplace:
(1) A woman's hand is mutilated when entangled in a grain ele-
vator, from which the gear guard had been removed.37"'
(2) Despite a flurry of warnings from a company succeeding the
manufacturer of a press brake, the hand of an untrained young worker
was severed when he reached into the machine to pull a metal sheet
towards himself. Ownership of the machine had changed several
times between initial purchase and injury.371
(3) The superstructure of a crane strikes a man and seriously in-
jures him; the danger is "open and obvious.""
(4) Pinned at the neck by an overturned forklift, plaintiff suffers
serious brain damage. The forklift had ridden on a mechanical
dockboard which employed a unique design, materially dangerous in
one important respect, but available with an optional safeguard to
compensate for that danger.'s
377. Waters, supra note 376, at 1064-65.
378. Fell v. Kewanee Farm Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Io,'.a 1990).
379. Seeley v. Cincinnati Shaper Co., 606 A.2d 378, 30-,. (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992).
380. Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 178-SI (Colo. 1992).
381. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.V.2d 616 (Minn. 1984). The optional safety da'.ce
was not selected by the purchaser, whose identity was not clear in the decision.
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(5) Finally, a huge class of workers claims injury resulting from
prolonged exposure to asbestos in the workplace. 3 2
As the above examples suggest, product-related workplace inju-
ries exhibit many of the same variations as harms caused by general
consumer products, but are complicated by the setting in which they
arise. In addition to the chain of product distribution typically associ-
ated with consumer goods, these cases must often take into account
the conduct of another responsible intermediary, the employer. The
cases cited above reveal that the employer's engagement with the in-
juring product may be substantial and may be relevant to deciding
whether the employee's injury was due to a defect or to employer
conduct. Further, although the life expectancy of a product is not
strictly related to the setting in which it is used, the generally long life
and frequent resale of industrial machinery threatens to render
opaque the already turbid issue of whether the injuring product had
passed its useful safe life. The present subsection sketches out some
thoughts on approaching workplace defect issues. My bases are, as
always, the Directive and MUPLA.
While making no specific reference to cases arising in the work-
place setting, the Directive seems to foreclose the possibility that a
worker's compensation scheme in a member state could reduce the
injured consumer's recovery against the producer.8 3 In a case involv-
ing both product defect and employer misconduct, as by modifying a
product in a dangerous way,384 or by failing to pass on a manufac-
382. See, eg., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986)
(affirming directed verdict in favor of asbestos manufacturers, finding that plaintiff had not
established causation); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 665 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Haw.
1986) (granting plaintiff's motion to exclude state of the art defense as it applied to strict
liability claim); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992) (interpreting Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. j (1964) as creating a state of the art defense);
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982) (not permitting
defendant to argue that asbestos installation was considered safe at the time plaintiffs were
exposed, rejecting state of the art defense). For a more complete listing, see Charles C.
Marrel, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liability for Failure to Warn as Dependent
on Defendant's Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.L.R. 4th 368 (1984).
383. Directive, supra note 3, art. 13. By the terms of Article 13, liability might be sup-
plemented by an existing worker's compensation scheme; for example, a member state's
other protections for injured consumers are not affected by the Directive. However, re-
ducing the producer's liability would defy the Directive's universal goal of increasing con-
sumer protection, render superfluous the specifically permissible derogations from strict
liability set forth in Article 15, and contravene Article 8, paragraph 1.
384. See, e.g., Fell v. Kewane Farm Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 916 (Iowa 1990);
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice, 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980).
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turer's warning,3" Article 8 announces that "[t]he liability of the pro-
ducer shall not be reduced when the damage is caused both by a
defect in product and by the act or omission of a third party." The
producer might, depending on the law of employer liability within the
jurisdiction, have "contribution or recourse"2'3 against an employer,
but the victim's recovery against the producer would be unimpeded?
MUPLA, by contrast, expressly reduces the claimant's award in
the product liability suit by "the amount paid as Worker Compensa-
tion benefits for the... injury plus the present value of all future
Worker Compensation benefits payable for the same injury under the
... statute.' 388 The statute goes on to deny the employer any right to
subrogation against a product manufacturer where workers' compen-
sation benefits are paid out to an injured employee, unless the em-
ployer has been able to wrest an express agreement of indemnity from
the seller.3 9 Thus, the first subsection addresses the suit brought
outside of the workers' compensation statute,-"" while the second con-
siders the procedure to be followed where no suit is brought.
The analysis accompanying section 114 makes an elaborate argu-
ment favoring its approach, zeroing in on a tension inherent in prod-
uct injury in the workplace cases. On the one hand, philosophical
385. The point is somewhat tricky because the product can be considered defective by
reason of inadequate warning if, and only if, the court finds that the manufacturer has a
duty to take reasonable steps to warn the ultimate user (here, the employee). In a jurisdic-
tion adopting that approach, both the producer and the employer could be liable, although
a member state's own worker compensation scheme might supersede the employer's re-
sponsibility. An example of a case adopting this approach is Oman v. Johns.Manille
Corp., 764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 970 (1985). The other appro,2ch i3
to regard communication of an adequate warning to the employer as legally suffiiecnt. SE.,
eg., Rusin v. Glendale Optical Co., 805 F2d 650 (6th Cir. 1936). A thorough discu-sion of
the cases appears in Kenneth M. Willner, Note, Failures to Warn and the Soplsticatcil User
Defense 74 VA. L. RE-v. 579 (19S).
386. Directive, supra note 3, art. 8, para. 1.
387. Compare id. art. 8, para. 1 (prohibiting a reduction of liability where injury is due.
in part, to the action of a third party) with id. para. 2, (%here the plaintiff's negligence
contributes to the injury the producer's liability "may be reduced or dis3llow ed"). How-
ever, one cannot completely ignore the final clause of Article S, paragraph 2 % hich reduces
recovery traceable to the fault of "any person for whom the injured person is responibleg"
If a national court concluded that employers were, for purposes of this section, respo lible
for their employees, recovery might be reduced. I suspect the ansiver would mostly de-
pend on the worker's compensation law in effect in the jurisdiction.
388. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 114(A).
3S9. Id. § 114(B).
390. Section § 114(C) follows up on § 114(A), allowing the seller to bring an action for
reduction of the judgment when the suit is concluded before the inevitable workers' com-
pensation proceeding has ended. If an award has already been made, the seller is entitled
to "recoupment from the employer." Id. § 114(C).
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commitment to workers' compensation as the exclusive remedy for
workplace injuries argues against a complete contribution claim by
seller against employer. If that course were permitted, the employer
might pay greater damages than would be statutorily permissible
under workers' compensation. 9' On the other hand, disallowing con-
tribution against the employer might leave the seller to make full rep-
aration, "despite the possibly greater responsibility of the
employer. ''39 2
The Directive's approach, although leaving workers' compensa-
tion law out of the statutory scheme, is preferable. MUPLA, con-
cerned with the transaction costs attendant to dissecting and assigning
liability in the setting of defective workplace products, effectively al-
lows employer contribution to reduce the liability of product manufac-
turers even if they may be fully responsible for causing injury. Such
would be the case with asbestos, for example, assuming that the manu-
facturer would be liable in the first place. Allowing full recovery
against the seller could permit the injured worker to obtain more than
full recovery by way of full tort damages in the suit against the manu-
facturer, plus workers' compensation damages.
But this problem may be more seeming than real. First, it may be
a mistake to assume that such outsized recovery must be avoided.
Plaintiffs routinely receive a "windfall" of sorts when punitive dam-
ages are permitted; allowing such damages to go directly to plaintiff is
thought, in part, to provide incentive for the plaintiff to bring suit in
cases where such a course might not otherwise promise substantial
recovery.393 If it is nonetheless deemed wise to prevent the "windfall"
recovery that could ensue under my suggested approach, it would be
better to cede the spillover recovery to some third party, such as an
eleemosynary institution of the manufacturer's choice.3 94
391. Id. § 114 (accompanying analysis).
392. Id. The analysis accompanying § 114 discusses the approaches considered but dis-
carded, and notes that its approach is "based, in substantial part, on a proposal developed
by the American Insurance Association [that] has also been incorporated in the 'National
Workers Compensation Standards Act of 1979'... and 'Standards for State Product Liabil-
ity Tort Litigation Act'." I.
393. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872) (plaintiff spat upon in the courtroom;
court upheld award of $1000 in punitive damages, noting that the "law ... should afford
substantial protection against such outrages, in the way of liberal damages," so as to allow
the plaintiff to participate in the preservation of public order).
394. I have long thought that such a creative approach would have prevented some of
the outrage that followed the result in Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). It
was not seriously questioned that plaintiff, who was seriously injured by a rigged gun while
breaking into defendant's storehouse, should receive compensatory damages, but the dis-
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As the drafters of MUPLA point out, the real problem domesti-
cally is that there has been no integration of workers' compensation
and product liability law.395 Until this is achieved, proper allocation
of responsibility between the parties may in fact result in excessive
recovery for the plaintiff, because the worker compensation law will
require payment by the employer in every case. The preferred ap-
proach would be to assess the responsibility of all parties in the chain
of a product's manufacture, distribution, sale, resale, and use. By
leaving the employer out of the mix, the Directive allows allocation to
take place as it would in a typical case. MUPLA, hemmed in by the
reality of the worker compensation law, gropes unsuccessfully for an
equitable compromise.
Several factors may combine to render the achievement of a just
result especially difficult in workplace cases, even apart from the stat-
utory worker's compensation problem. The case of Seeley v. Cincin-
nati Shaper Co.396 provides a convenient stalking horse for assessing
how courts weave through complex legal and factual issues on their
way to a decision, as well as a means for grading the performance of
both the Directive and MUPLA in challenging workplace litigation.
The offending machine in Seeley was a press brake, which severed
the plaintiff's hand when he reached into it to recover an ill-positioned
metal sheet. The machine had been manufactured in 1966 with a
point-of-operation guard.3 97 As manufactured, "the machine not only
accepted such a guard, but was inoperable without it."", But by the
time of plaintiff's injury in 1987, the press brake had been sufficiently
modified in other ways that the guard could be, and had been, re-
moved.3 99 That removal, however, was not the "fault" of plaintiff's
employer because it had purchased the machine after the guard's
removal.400
sent expressed outrage over forcing the defendants to pay punitive damages to thQ plaintiff
under these circumstances. lI& at 663 (Larson, J., dissenting).
395. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 114 (accompanying analysis) (preferring that th2 workler
compensation law be the sole source of recovery in product-injury cases, but only if r
compensation were achieved: "A model product liability law, however, is an inappropriate
vehicle for making alterations of that dimension in Worker Comp2en-ation law."J.
396. 606 A.2d 378 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
397. Since the complaint acknowledged that such a device, even if prcera-nt, might not
have prevented plaintiff's injury, it is somewhat puzzling why the court dizcuzred this point
at length. As it turns out, the more serious problem cited by plaintiff vas th2 lack of a
"universal" guard.
398. Seeley, 604 A.2d at 379.
399. 1l at 380.
400. Il.
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The case is rich in further complications, only some of which were
material to the result. First, ownership of the machine had changed
hands several times between initial purchase and injury;40 1 second, the
plaintiff had been given only fifteen minutes of training by the em-
ployer before being sent to use the press brake;41° third, although the
machine had been modified in many ways during the twenty-plus
years between manufacture and injury, the modifications were not rel-
evant to the putative defect in design, which was a failure to include a
universal guard.40 3
The final set of important facts relates to the postsale conduct of
defendant, a successor to the manufacturer. At first, Cincinnati did an
exemplary job of keeping up with its machine,4 n but lost track of it
after a few years, having received no further requests for mainte-
nance. Shortly after plaintiff's employer purchased the press brake, it
contacted Cincinnati and requested operations manuals, thereby rees-
tablishing communication.405 The defendant sent a letter urging the
employer to consider changes in the safety climate that might require
"updating, ' '40 6 and enclosed several other materials. The court set
forth the substance of these materials in detail. In sum, they informed
the employer of the necessity of meeting relevant safety standards, 07
of the dangers of placing one's hands into the point-of-operation, and
of other suggested safeguards, including maintenance and the proper
use of safety signs, which were also included with the materials.
Finally, defendant sent an agent to make a service call on plain-
tiff's employer. Once there, he concluded that the large-scale modifi-
cations to the press brake made it an unsuitable candidate for service.
He neither saw the machine in operation nor believed he was making
a "safety visit. '4 8
One of the most trying tasks for a court in such complex cases is
to decide which issues are relevant to its decision. Here, for example,
the court correctly concluded that the modification of the machine,
although extensive, was ultimately not relevant to plaintiff's design de-
fect allegation. Although several (extraneous) pages were spent on
401. l
402. Id. at 379.
403. I&
404. Id. at 380.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. These standards were set forth for the industry by the American National Stan-
dards Institute (ANSI). Id. at 381.
408. Id. at 382-83.
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the issue of the point-of-operation guard, the decision recognized that
plaintiff claimed a failure to include a universal guard that would have
presumably prevented his injury.409 Thus, the allegation that the
safety devices had been removed was dropped from consideration.
This approach is consonant with both the Directive and MUPLA, and
fits well with both existing case law and basic tenets of causation. As
long as the modification does not affect what actually happened to the
plaintiff, it should be irrelevant.
With the troubling issue of safety devices thus put aside, the court
was left to wrangle with a welter of other issues. Indeed, perhaps the
purest lesson to be learned is that no statute, directive, or regulation
can sufficiently anticipate the endless range of product problems to
provide courts with answers. The central question, around which all
others orbited, was whether the press brake was "defective." Yet, the
court in Seeley would have found little assistance from general statu-
tory invocations to consider the "presentation of the product"-or
"the use to which it could reasonably be expected [it] would be
put"410 -or whether "the likelihood that the product would cause the
claimant's harm or similar harms and the seriousness of those harms
outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a product that
would have prevented those harms."4"' All that could be said is that
the case might assume a different aspect to the court, depending on
whether the defect is to be assessed from the perspective of the in-
jured user (a better word than "consumer" in the workplace setting)
based on product presentation, or from the point of view of the manu-
facturer, weighing risks against benefits.
Nevertheless, the more specific provisions in both the Directive
and MUPLA might have furnished assistance to the Seeley court in
slogging through some of the case's complexities. Had modification of
the point-of-operation guard been causally relevant, for example, the
Directive would have allowed liability to persist if such could have
been "anticipated" by the producer;,41 in this case, since the machine,
as manufactured, was "inoperable" without the point guard, liability
would not seem proper. Yet, since the presentation includes warn-
ings-and noting the economics of the workplace-we might want to
require an admonition to forego modification that might allow re-
moval of the guard, which in turn might lead to injury. Liability under
409. I& at 379.
410. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6, § 1.
411. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 104(B)(1).
412. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 1(b).
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MUPLA could follow a similar pattern; although modifications gener-
ally exculpate producers,413 it might be possible to bring the modifica-
tion within the exception for reasonably expected conduct, if the
manufacturer should have warned against doing so.414
The case might also test judicial commitment to the restrictions
on recovery imposed by statutes of limitation and repose. The
machine was manufactured and sold in 1966, but did not injure the
plaintiff until 1987, thus invoking absolute manufacturer immunity
under the Directive's Article 11,4 15 while triggering the less absolutely
protective cloak of a presumption rebuttable only by "clear and con-
vincing evidence" under MUPLA.416 In this case, such "clear and
convincing evidence" might be adduced through a showing that many
of these machines were still in use, or, as in this case, that the succes-
sor to the manufacturer sent a representative to instruct the employer
on the proper use of the machine, thereby creating an implied repre-
sentation that it could still be used safely.
D. Liability for the Sale of Injury-Causing Pharmaceuticals
This final topic has been introduced earlier in this Article.417 My
goal here is to emphasize the gains in justice that follow from adopting
the Directive's emphasis on the consumer's expectation in these cases,
and in any cases that might be said to involve "unavoidably unsafe"
products. Indeed, insofar as the Act inadvertently allows the con-
sumer's expectation to creep into the analysis at all, it inches, albeit
inconsistently, toward a more just result. For the most part, though,
the Act abandons focus on the consumer in favor of the manufac-
turer's balancing of risks and utilities, and thereby falls short of sup-
plying suitable protection to the product-injured consumer.
One might begin this analysis by asking why drugs are singled out
for special treatment. This unusual status, which can be traced back at
least as far as comment k to Restatement (Second) of Torts, section
402A, stems from a recognition that drugs are likelier than other
products to be "unavoidably unsafe." Of course, the category of un-
avoidably unsafe products is hardly restricted to drugs; rather, because
413. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 102(D).
414. See id. § 102(D)(2)(d).
415. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 316-33, discussing the limitations provisions of MUPLA. As men-
tioned there, MUPLA at least avoids the flat bar of statutes of repose in effect in many
states.
417. See supra subparts ILI.B.4 & IV.B.1(c).
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they are often necessary for health and well-being, it is perhaps per-
missible to allow them to bear a higher level of inherent risk than we
would tolerate for other products. Thus arises the conclusion that
such products are culpably defective only when unavoidably unsafe.
Domestic courts have struggled both to determine whether a
product is unavoidably unsafe,415 and, if so, whether that information
was sufficiently communicated to its user. 19 Although most drug
cases are analyzed as involving an "unavoidably unsafe" product,
some courts have recognized that such treatment is not always war-
ranted.42 Once the determination of unavoidable "unsafety" has
been made, though, the inquiry shifts to the adequacy of warning.
418. A threshold question that has pestered courts is whether all prescription drugs
should be subject to the "unavoidably unsafe" defense, or %%hether the doctrine should
only apply "when it is shown that [the] product is incapable of being made safe given the
present state of human knowledge but possesses such a high degree of sozial need so that
its use is warranted, provided warnings are adequate." Hill v. Searle Lab., F 2d 10Y4,
1068 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing cases on both sides of the question), The Hill court took the
latter view, and then proceeded to find that the intrauterine device under attack did not
qualify for comment k treatment, since "alternative means of birth control are a~ailable
and [the manufacturer had] made no showing that... IUDs in general ... are exception-
ally beneficial to society." Id. at 1069-70. The court also noted that the drafters of com-
ment k considered granting "a blanket exception" to strict liability for prescription drugs,
but that the "proposal was defeated." Id. at 1069, citing 38 ALI Poioc. 19, 9-93 (1961 ).
The court also noted that the example given in the text of comment k-the Pasteur rabies
vaccine-"suggests that only special products, those %kith exceptional social need, fall
within" the exception's reach. Id. at 1069. In accord with this reasoning is Patten v. Led-
erle Lab., 676 F. Supp. 233 (D. Utah 1987) (involving defendant's motion for instruction on
the DPT vaccine). Even under a case-by-case approach, though, courts have assumed that
some products plainly qualify for "unavoidably unsafe" status. See, e.g., Re% as v, W th
Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir. 1974) (oral polio vaccine was justifiably marketed de-
spite the "minuscule" danger of contracting polio); Harwell v. American Medical Sys .,
Inc., 803 F. Supp. 1287 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (court concludes. without analysis, that a pFnile
prosthesis is unavoidably unsafe).
419. Thus, given the usual determination of unavoidable danger, the wxarning issue
pushes to the fore in the vaccine cases. Sce eg., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab,, 498 F2'd at 1275-73
(despite vaccine's prescription drug status, manufacturer should have known that proiuct
"would not be administered as a prescription drug, and therefore was required to warn
foreseeable users"); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 14'.3, 1498-99 (D. Kan. 19S7)
(manufacturer's motion for summary judgment on the warning issue denied since the izsue
was factual, and reasonable people could disagree as to whether manufacturer's %arning
was adequate); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324-20 (Kan. 1935)
(warning adequate as a matter of law).
420. The clearest set of cases in which the product should not be treated as "unavoid-
ably unsafe" is where a particular batch of an otherwise safe drug is defective. Gottsdanker
v. Cutter Lab., 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (Salk polio vaccine; virus not
killed as others were). Or, a product may be unsafe by comparison to available, safer
alternatives. This was particularly the case in Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 642
F2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981), in which the court found that strict liability was the proper theory
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Read properly, the Directive's approach to the difficult issue of
injury-causing pharmaceuticals encourages courts to continue to ask
these two questions: Was the drug designed with reasonable safety,
from the consumer's perspective; and, if some level of unsafety is una-
voidable, were adequate warnings given? Recall that the main ques-
tion asked under the Directive is whether the product is
"defective,"42 and that answering this question requires examination
of the product's presentation, including, presumably, both design and
warnings.' Thus, a valuable drug such as insulin would not ordina-
rily be deemed defective so long as the consumer's decision to use the
drug is properly informed by disclosure of material423 side effects. Yet
it would also be possible for an injured user of the drug to argue that
insulin could have been made safer. A particular dosage of the drug
might be tainted, thereby betraying the consumer's expectation in the
clearest way. Or, less likely, the drug might not have been adequately
tested for possible adverse side effects. As a related matter, safer al-
ternatives might exist or be technologically feasible. Thus, the Direc-
tive's approach vindicates the consumer's expectations that the
manufacturer has taken reasonable steps for her safety throughout the
course of pharmaceutical research, development, and marketing.424
MUPLA, by contrast, inconsistently values the consumer's expec-
tation and leans more heavily on a risk-utility calculus that seems par-
ticularly inapposite where warnings are involved. Section 104(C)
contains the most direct focus on consumer expectation, but is of
small comfort, as it concerns the denial of recovery; liability is pre-
cluded for failure to "warn about dangers that are obvious."42 Other-
where a contraceptive pill contained 100 milligrams of estrogen, even though a fully effec-
tive dosage was only 50 milligrams, presenting a lower risk.
421. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6.
422. See supra subpart III.B.2.
423. The adjective is used to restrict recovery to those cases in which a reasonable user
of the drug, presumably a diabetic, would attach importance to the side effect in question.
Given the great value, perhaps necessity, of insulin, only quite serious side effects might
call forth a duty of disclosure. Cf Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (consent is only "informed" when the "[p]atient possesses enough information to
enable an intelligent choice . . . [aIll risks potentially affecting the decision must be
unmasked.").
424. Recall, too, that under the Directive's definition of state of the art defense, or what
has been called "development risks," knowledge of a problem is sufficient to impose liabil-
ity-presumably for failure to warn-even if the current state of science and technology do
not permit the problem's cure. Article 7 asks whether "the state of... knowledge.., was
... such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered." Directive, supra note 3,
art. 7.
425. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 104(C)(4).
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wise, the overarching philosophy is to impose liability where the
"manufacturer should and could have provided... warnings ... 14,,
Standing alone, this language admits an interpretation that values
reasonable consumer expectation in deciding whether warnings
"should and could" have been supplied. And, MUPLA at least makes
noises in that direction by asking whether the manufacturer was able
to "anticipate that the likely user would be aware of any danger" 427
and "how clear and conspicuous were [the] warnings?' 4 :S
These understandable concerns uncover the powerful pull of a
liability regime that honors the consumer's informed choice, and that
mulcts sellers who, having the opportunity, fail to engage the con-
sumer in the making of decisions crucial to his physical and emotional
well-being. Perhaps this acknowledgment shows that issues of warn-
ing quite patently involve a dialogue between seller and buyer. "This
is as safe as I can, or am financially willing, to make this product. It
contains hazards, which I'm enumerating. Do you still want it?" The
buyer can answer yes or no only if the information is presented in this
sort of straightforward way.
426. Iet § 104(C)(1).
427. Id. § 104(2). This limitation on liability has been consistently recognized by the
courts. See, e.g., Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457,465 (5th Cir. 1976) (worker
died from exposure to toxic fumes from petrochemical product; district court's finding of
liability reversed because of limited market into which defendant had sold product, a mar-
ket in which it "could reasonably anticipate that only a professional familiar with the pre-
cautions necessary for safe handling of benzene and similar petrochemical substances
would come in contact with or otherwise handle the [product] .... "); Jamieson v. Wood-
ward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (no duty to warn purchaser of elastic
exerciser who was injured when the device "snapped back" and struck her in the eye since
"small boys know ... that a rubber band is elastic and when stretched will, when released,
return to its original length with some degree of force"); Poland v. Beaird.Poulan, 433 F.
Supp. 1256, 1264-65 (W.D. La. 1980) (plaintiff, an experienced user of chain saws, did not
need to be warned that chain saw, if not properly maintained, could "kick back" and cause
injury).
428. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 104(4). For cases finding no duty to warn of dangers that
are clearly and conspicuously identified, see Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prod. Co, 840 F2d
935, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (clear and conspicuous label warned that propane c)lind.r's
contents were "'flammable' and should not be used or stored in 'living areas"'); Higgins v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 671 F. Supp. 1063, 1065-66 (D. Md. 19S7) (where paint
designated for "industrial use" was accompanied by "clear and conspicuous [label] warn-
ings against the use of the product by amateur painters," firefighters who claimed injury
from fumes lost on summary judgment). But cf. Toy Mfrs. Am., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 9S6
F.2d 615,619 (2d Cir. 1992) (denying manufacturer's motion for declaratory judgment that
federal law preempted a state statute prohibiting the sale of "any toy or other article mar-
keted or determined to be for the use of children ... which does not bear 'a conspicuous
warning label that clearly and conspicuously communicates that the contents contain small
parts"' (quoting CoN,. GEN. STAT. § 21a-337, as amended by 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 92-
127, § 1, and 1992 Conn. Pub. Act [May Session] No. 92-11, § 57)).
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Yet this "lapse" into consumer expectation language is somewhat
overborne by the MUPLA's insistence, again in section 104, that lia-
bility be assessed from the manufacturer's point of view: "Was [the
manufacturer] able to know of the product's danger?" and "How fea-
sible and practical would it have been to provide warnings? 4 2 9 This
reading is bolstered by reference to section 106, which restricts liabil-
ity for unavoidably dangerous products to cases where the "seller
knew or had reason to know of the [unavoidably dangerous] aspect"
of the product, and was therefore unreasonable in failing to warn,
or-in rare cases-in selling the product at all.430
Again, the very word "warning" suggests consumer involvement,
but the skewed focus of MUPLA seems to drive courts back toward
the risk-utility calculus. A few examples will show that the focus
makes a difference in a subset of drug cases, and that in those in-
stances, the consumer expectation test is more likely to achieve a fair
outcome.
It is perhaps useful to begin with those cases in which there is no
difference in result under either a consumer expectation or a risk-util-
ity test. In most cases, when a product is sold over-the-counter, suffi-
cient experience with the properties of its ingredients enables a clear,
full warning of material hazards. Thus, where a cold remedy expressly
warns of drowsiness, a user who is injured when he falls asleep while
driving to work should have no claim. Proper warning in these cases
means clear and conspicuous language in the product's packaging,
since such drugs are consumed "typically without any intended or ac-
tual intervention by a physician."'431
The chief difference between over-the-counter and prescription
drugs-physician involvement in the decision whether and how to
take the drugn3 -- also suggests a complication in the chain of warn-
429. MUPLA, supra note 1, § 104(C). In the workplace setting, the Act, in adopting a
more humane version of the "no duty to warn" rule, nonetheless focuses only on the con-
duct of the manufacturer, leaving out the expectations of the injured worker. Id.
430. See supra subpart IV.B.1(c).
431. Torsiello v. Whitehall Lab., 398 A.2d 132, 137 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
432. See JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, § 13.10, at 13-60
(1993). In determining a drug's legal status, among the important questions to ask is
whether the drug is dangerous if used "without practitioner supervision .... If so, pre-
scription status rather than OTC [over the counter] status is likely ...." Id. Of course, this
determination does not take place in a political vacuum. For a particularly scathing criti-
cism of the process by which drugs move from prescription to over-the-counter status, see
Jerry Avorn, Drug Regulation and Drug Information-Who Should Do What to Whom? 85
Ahi. J. PUB. HEALTH 18, 18-19 (1995) (the "eats-through anything medical cost contain-
ment movement .... consumer activism, the waning clout of physicians, and the zeal of
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ings; one that has been the subject of analysis in several decisions.
Because of the anticipated conversation between patient and physi-
cian, the general rule has been that an adequate warning to the physi-
cian discharges the duty to warn as a matter of law4 33 This general
rule makes good sense in the majority of prescription drug cases, just
as it does in the employment setting.4  After all, the justification for
such indirect warnings is that a physician who is familiar with the med-
ical history of the patient, the suitability of the drug for the health goal
to be achieved, and the adverse side effects that may ensue, ,.ill en-
gage the patient in a discussion. This exchange would necessarily in-
clude warnings more specifically targeted than those generically
available in an over-the-counter setting. 35 Under most circum-
stances, then, directing a warning to the physician would be in har-
mony with the consumer expectation model of liability.
Yet cases such as MacDonald v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.425,
highlight the limitations of steadfast reliance on the physician. In a
case involving a stroke caused by ingestion of oral contraceptives, the
court took note of the actual circumstances that often surround such
prescriptions, and imposed a duty to warn the patient directly. 37 In-
terestingly, it put forth justifications for this result that are in tension.
On the one hand, the court noted that "whereas a patient's involve-
manufacturers and pharmacists who have found that products %%ith unrestricted availabil-
ity, even at lower costs, can generate more profits than products with prescription-only
status" are factors pushing towards over-the-counter status despite contrary clinical
indications).
433. -[T]he prescribing physician acts as a 'learned intermediary' between the manufac-
turer and the patient, and 'the duty of the ethical drug manufacturer is to %arn the doztor,
rather than the patient, [although] the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient for a
breach of such duty."' MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 NE2d 65, 69
(Mass. 1984) (quoting McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P2-d 52-, 529 (Or.
1974), cert. denied, 794 U.S. 920 (1985)).
434. The argument is that the employer, knowing the workforce, will typically be better
equipped to convey warnings with the proper import.
435. See Avorn, supra note 432, at 19 (decrying the inadequacy of warning from the
consumer's perspective when a drug moves to over-the-counter status, -Instructions for
use and listings of warnings, adverse effects, and even ingredients, %%hich are scantily
presented in microtype on most over-the-counter medications, cannot be expected to help
most consumers.").
436. 475 N.E.2d 65, cert denied, 474 U.S. 920 (195).
437. Although MacDonald is probably the best-kno-n example of a court requiring
warnings to the consumer in the prescription drug context, it certainly %%as not the first.
See eg., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1269, 1277 (5th Cir. 1974) (duty to %arn foresee-
able users of the Sabin oral polio vaccine); Lukaszevicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (where federal and state law mandated %arning- and
found negligence per se in failing to supply such warnings, failure to directly %iarn the user
of oral contraceptives was actionable).
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ment in decision-making concerning use of a prescription drug neces-
sary to treat a malady is typically minimal or nonexistent, the healthy,
young consumer of oral contraceptives is usually actively involved in
the decision.., and the... physician is relegated to a relatively pas-
sive role. '4 38 On the other hand, it remarked that, because the pre-
scription is renewed automatically, the patient "may only seldom have
the opportunity to explore her questions and concerns about the
medication .. .
The first of these observations, to the extent valid, may argue in
the other direction: If the woman taking the drug is "actively in-
volved" in her decision, the drug company probably should not be
liable when it supplies a proper warning to the physician. If the physi-
cian chooses to be "passive," liability is properly assessed against him
or her. If rote renewal without further conversation is common, as
seems more likely, then the very dialogue that the prescription re-
quirement is supposed to foster is not taking place. Accordingly, man-
ufacturers should be compelled to warn the consumer directly.440 The
FDA's regulations regarding the pill also supported the court's deci-
sion, as they were based on findings that users "should, without excep-
tion, be furnished with written information telling them of the drug's
benefits and risks."'441
The risk-utility and consumer expectation tests might well come
to the same result in this case, but the latter test respects the reality of
the exchange between patient and physician. The risk-utility test
might exculpate a seller based on some objective determination that
direct communication to consumers of the dangers of prescription
drugs was "not reasonable." Again, such emphasis does violence to
the legitimate expectations of the drug user.
The other case in which the choice of liability theory could be of
importance involves experimental drugs, in which the users are, to
some extent, human guinea pigs.44 2 Vaccines for polio, for example,
have not unexpectedly caused some small percentage of the popula-
438. MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 69.
439. Id.
440. In MacDonald, the defendant had, in fact, transmitted a warning directly to the
patient. Since the jury found that warning inadequate, however, the question whether a
warning to the physician sufficed assumed central importance. Id. at 70-71.
441. Ic at 70.
442. The comparison may be inapt when the user's status is one of choice, presuming
full disclosure is made.
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tion to contract polio.443 This risk, however, which is greatest when an
effective vaccine is first used-before final safety screening proce-
dures have been established44-should be effectively communicated
to potential users. Yet MUPLA presumably would not require such a
warning, assuming that the risks of infection without the vaccine out-
weigh the risks of infection by the vaccine." 5 This risk-utility calculus
undermines the result in cases such as Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc.," 6 in which the plaintiff was not informed that the Sabin polio
vaccine, even when properly administered, carried a one-in-one-mil-
lion chance of infection. The court's focus on the plaintiffs actual cir-
cumstances is instructive. While agreeing that the chances of
contracting polio from the vaccine were generally much lower than
from not taking it, the court validated the jury's conclusion that the
plaintiff's situation might be different because of his age and because
"the immediate past history of incidence was extremely low"" 7 where
he lived. Thus, he might well have decided to forego the vaccination.
Translated into consumer expectation language, a reasonable poten-
tial user of the vaccine might expect disclosure of the possibility of
infection through vaccination, because everyone is not similarly
situated.
Of course, the understood requirement for recovery in cases such
as Davis is that the undisclosed risks are known, though small. Both
the Directive and MUPLA assume no liability where the risks are un-
known.448 Under either a risk-utility test or a consumer expectation
443. This risk is a constant one with vaccines, as vaccinations involve inno:ulating the
subject with the very virus the vaccination seeks to prevent. See Jonas Salk et al,
Noninfectious Poliovirus Vaccine, in VACCrNES (Stanley A. Plotkin & Ediard A, Mortimer
eds., 1994): "The aim of vaccination against polio is to induce immunity to the dizaca
without causing the disease that the vaccine is intended to prevent." Id. at 219. Dr. Salk
maintains to this day that infection with polio from the killed-cell vaccine that he pio-
neered was a result of one laboratory's failure to follow approved safety prczedurcs, Id. at
209.
444. Dr. Salk himself concedes that the experience of infection by failure to follow. ap-
proved procedures had the "effect of... introduc[ing] a precautionary 'acond ... tep
during the inactivation process, although the absence of such a step had not bean the cau
of the problem." Id.
445. Recall that, by the terms of section 104(C)(1), adequacy of varning i3 a':e- a.d by
reference to "the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's harm or similar
harms and the seriousness of those harms . MUPLA, supra note 1. § It4Ielt 1),.
446. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 196S).
447. 1& at 130.
448. Directive, supra note 3, art. 7(e), (no liability unless "the state of :ientific and
technical knowledge was ... such as to enable the existence of the defect to b2 di:'zCa-
ered"); MUPLA, supra note 1, § 106(B)(1) (no liability "unless the seller knew or had
reason to know of the [unavoidably dangerous] aspect [of the product] ... ")
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test, why should a drug manufacturer not be liable for failing to in-
form the user that the drug is experimental and that it may harbor
effects as yet undisclosed? It appears that cases of this sort will largely
arise inadvertently, as providers of drugs at the clinical trial stage are
usually careful to spell out their ignorance.# 9 Where such disclosure
is provided, liability should not attach.4
While less than clear on this point, the Restatement's language in
comment k can be read to afford the decision-maker some leeway in
such cases. With experimental drugs, although "there can be no assur-
ance of safety," comment k still imposes the "qualification that [such
drugs] are properly prepared and marketed .... 4 51 Proper market-
ing might include a warning to the effect that the product's dangers
are still a mystery.
VI. Conclusion
Product liability issues mirror questions found throughout tort
law, issues that require continual judicial effort in the "upkeep of the
common law. '452 For that reason, legislative enactments choking off
liability in whole classes of cases are misguided. As we have seen,
both the Directive and MUPLA have generally managed to avoid
such a blunderbuss approach, lacing their substantive liability rules
449. The current, and understandable, rush to bring drugs for combatting the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) to market furnishes dramatic examples of this sober disclo-
sure. See, e.g., Informed Consent Form to A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Dose Rang-
ing Study of Salk HIV Immunogen in Incomplete Freund's Adjunfant in Patients with Early
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, at 3 (Mar. 14, 1990) (on file with the author)
("Theoretically, a vaccination of any kind might cause a worsening of my infection with
HIV .... With any investigational treatment there may be risks involved that are not yet
known and are currently unforeseen.").
450. My colleague Barry Furrow has recently argued that drug manufacturers and,
where applicable, managed care organizations, should be subject to "absolute strict liability
with limited affirmative defenses," such as the fault of the patient or the prescribing physi-
cian. Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability for Bad Outcomes From Drug Therapy: The
Doctor, The Hospital, the Pharmacy and the Drug Firm, 44 DRAKE L. REV. (forthcoming
Spring 1996). This position probably approximates my own. By valuing the consumer to
the extent of dispensing with defenses based on the "reasonableness" of the drug manufac-
turer's conduct, while allowing defeasement of liability where an affirmative showing of
misconduct at some other point in the product's chain can be identified. My only criticism
of this position is that its imposition of liability for "bad" patient outcomes begs the ques-
tion of what, in these cases, is to count as a "bad" outcome. Are even serious side effects
from a drug to treat HIV infection necessarily "bad," for example? I believe we can ascer-
tain the meaning of "bad" in specific situations by looking to the consumer's reasonable
expectation (under the circumstances) of product performance.
451. RESTATE~MENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1977).
452. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 594 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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with hedges and balances that encourage jural participation and
creativity.
Nonetheless, the underlying philosophy of a particular statutory
regime sends courts off in a particular direction, and is therefore of
signal importance. Because the Directive's consumer expectation and
protection model better serves justice in focusing on the communica-
tions between the product seller and the (reasonable) plaintiff, it is to
that extent preferable to MUPLA's risk-utility calculus, which deval-
ues such expectations.
That said, some refinement of the law is welcome, and MUPLA,
at least in its intended effect on the conduct of litigation and in mak-
ing hard choices on such recurrent problems as the liability of non-
manufacturing sellers and on regulatory compliance, has cemented
some solutions to issues that had been needlessly fluid. One need not
agree with every proposed solution to laud MUPLA's efforts at
streamlining product litigation. Indeed, the Directive's principal fault
is in failing to deal squarely with such issues. Although such paralysis
may be explainable by the importance and difficulty of achieving the
central goal of strict product liability, the Directive should be seen as
but a modest first step in the greater task that looms. That task is no
less than the creation of a consistent body of product law on both
sides of the Atlantic, within the limits imposed by the nature of prod-
uct defect cases. I

